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PREFACE
This study grows out of work that each of the authors have previously done on the dynamics, in various social contexts, of family recovery
from disasters. In those earlier studies, the importance of ethnicity
and race was left largely unexplored. Our previous research did note the
importance of culture, age, and social class as determinants of patterns
of aid utilization. To that mix of social variables we now add race and
ethnicity (and/or religious affiliation) as additional pieces in the
puzzle of family recovery.
Four sites are discussed, each with its own mix of disaster agents,
ethnic groups, patterns of destruction, aid utilization, and victim
recovery. We examined a tornado in Texas, a flood in Utah, an earthquake
in California, and a hurricane in Hawaii. Groups affected by the disasters were, among others, bl acks, Hi spani cs, Japanese-Ameri cans, Fi 1ipinos, and Mormons. This study looks at various factors--particularly
aid from official and "unofficial" sources--that affected the recovery of
those disaster victims.
The United States has an institutionalized structure of public and
private organizations that aid the victims of natural disasters. Our
study examines some of the patterns of aid utilization across the various
groups of victims and the effects of such programs on victim recovery.
Understanding the complexities of a dynamic social process like family
recovery requires consideration of a large number of influences. While
we have attempted to focus on those judged to be most relevant, there
always remains the possibility that others not examined here may prove to
have greater explanatory power. This work should be read as part of the
continuing effort of several researchers to understand and conceptualize
the process of long-term family recovery from disasters.
We would like to thank the National Science Foundation and William
Anderson, the NSF project manager, for their support. We would also like
to acknowl edge the generous ass i stance of Sha ron Maste rs, New Mexi co
State University, and Jan McStay, Battelle Human Affairs Research Center,
who each organized and conducted the field work for this project and who
contributed to this final report in many other ways as well.
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CHAPTER I
I NTRODUCTI ON
Study: Areas
When this research began in early 1982, our primary goal was to
examine the differential effects of various types of aid and aid programs
on the postdisaster recovery of black and Mexican-American victims in
comparison to "non-minority" victims. We have remained faithful to that
goal although we have expanded the number of ethnic and cultural groups
exami ned beyond those ori gi na 11 y proposed for study. Thi s increase was
accomplished in part by adding research sites to the original two sites
designated for study and, in part, by including one multi-ethnic site
(Hawaii) in our research.
The research grows out of previous research that both authors have
worked on, independently and jointly, including comparisons of disaster
recovery between two cultures (Bolin and Trainer, 1978; Bolin and Bolton,
1983), between rural and urban areas (Bolin, 1981), and between elderly
and non-elderly disaster victims (Bolin and Klenow, 1983). Our focus in
this research is on aid from federal, state, and local agencies and its
effects on the recovery of victim families from disasters. In addition
to these formal aid programs, we also consider aid and social support
received from family, friends, and neighbors. We identify variations in
patterns of aid utilization across several racial and ethnic groups at
four disaster sites, and demonstrate how these patterns are associated
with differential rates of family recovery.
The four sites studied include (in order of consideration):
1)
2)
3)
4)

Paris, Texas (tornado)
Salt Lake City, Utah (flooding)
Kauai, Hawaii (hurricane)
Coalinga, California (earthquake)

Patterns of aid utilization and family recovery are examined and compared
among mi nority groups as we 11 as between mi nor it i es and whites. From
these compari sons, po 1icy recommend at ions are deve loped and presented
regarding the nature of rehabilitation and recovery programs offered to
disaster victims.
Three of the four sites were studied using general sociological
1

survey techniques. The exception, Salt Lake City, was analyzed using indepth interviewing techniques on a small sample of victims and disaster
agency personnel. The different methods used in Salt Lake City reflect a
conscious choice on our part: the technique was considered most appropriate to that disaster site given the scope of impact and the actual numbers of vi ct ims i nvo 1ved. However, as di scussed in the methods sect i on,
the i ntervi ew protoco 1 was deri ved from the schedu 1e used at the other
sites and thus is comparable, although not statistically.
While our intent in this research--to examine the nature of aid
utilization by victims and their recovery patterns--is not new (e.g.,
Bo 1in, 1982; Drabek and Key, 1984), the study does break new ground in
that the victims represent a range of ethnic (as well as religious)
groups. The groups stud i ed, of course, are cross-cut by age and soci a1
class dimensions that have been found in other research to affect disaster response and recovery outcomes. Th iss tudy also departs from previous research in that we examine victims of a number of different disaster agents (earthquakes, floods, hurricanes, and tornadoes).
The number of influences on how families respond to and recover from
disaster are potentially limitless. Our goal here is to focus on a
limited number of variables--such as ethnicity and its accompanying
cultural features, aid utilization (or the lack thereof), social support,
demographic and social class, as well as the physical impacts of the
disaster agent itself--and to give a broad overview of the family recovery process across the several ethnic groups and disaster sites examined.
Because of the range of disaster impacts, ethnic groups, and social
responses that we encountered, each chapter focuses on somewhat different
features of disaster recovery, depending on what, in each case, we considered most pertinent for understanding recovery at that particular
site. For example for the Paris, Texas disaster, race, social class, and
age are singled out, while culture (religion) is concentrated on in the
the Salt Lake City case. Thus, the varying sites provided us with a
unique opportunity to study the recovery process for different social
groups in different social contexts with varying degrees of local, state,
federal, and private disaster aid available to the victims.

2

Organizatio~l1.e

Book

This report is divided into six major chapters. General theoretical
and conceptual issues are discussed in Chapter II, and a brief review of
previous research is given. Chapter III is about the Paris, Texas tornado. Chapter IV describes the effects of the Salt Lake City flood.
Chapter V analyzes the impacts of Hurricane Iwa on Kauai. Chapter VI
deals with the Coalinga, California earthquake. The final chapter presents our findings and suggests explanations for differences in recovery
and outcome.
We outline the

particular

instruments,

research

sites,

sampling

techn i ques, and fi e 1d procedures for each study site in each chapter.
Following a discussion of disaster agent and site characteristics, the
general features of the population sample--including ethnic, demographic,
and disaster loss characteristics--are examined. The analysis for each
site continues with consideration of material losses, injuries, temporary
housing and related residential dislocations, disaster impacts on family
interaction and social support networks, psychosocial impacts, aid programs and their utilization, insurance use, and related social dynamics.
One intent of the analysis is to refine a multivariate model of family
recovery conceptual i zed

and deve loped

in an ear 1 i er research proj ect

(Bolin, 1982). Multiple regression and related multivariate statistical
techniques are used in reviewing the data from most of the sites in order
to select sets of important determinants of family recovery.
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CHAPTER II
THEORETICAL AND RESEARCH ISSUES
This research focuses on variations, due to differences in ethnicity
and class, in disaster victims'

ability to cope with and recover from

losses and disruptions incurred during natural disasters. The study of
the complex interplay of class and culture comprises a major portion of
all

sociological

research.

Therefore,

in order to avoid a voluminous

literature review, we only cite pertinent work concerning disasters and
analogous

social

situations.

However,

the

identification of disasters

and "analogous situations" itself implies a theoretical perspective, and
before reviewing the literature, we first detail that perspective which
has guided this research.
Families and Stress
~ocial

Syste~~,

Subsystems, and Stress

System and system stress are general sociological concepts that have
been

readily

accepted

by

a

number

of

disaster

researchers

who

have

focused on the family as a unit of analysis (e.g., Drabek et al., 1975.
Drabek and Key, 1984; Bolin, 1982).

It should be noted that the con-

ceptual use of "systems" in the research reviewed here, and in our research as well, should not be confused with formal general systems theory
(e.g.,

Buckley,

1967)

theori sts. General

which

WdS

pupuldr

in

Lhe

1960s

among

some

systems theory is now mori bund--a perspect i ve whose

promise outweighed its utility (e.g., Ritzer, 1983). Nor is the use of
general notions of social systems here to be confused with the static and
politically

loaded

structural-functionalism

popularized

by

Parsons

(1951). System is used in this research as a sensitizing concept, a word
that alerts the researcher and reader to possible interactions between
various actions of society in specific circumstances. Unlike Parsonian
funct i ona 1 i sm,

the

idea does

not

rely

on

theoret i ca 1 tauto 1ogi es

of

functional requisites or system homeostasis.
We have followed what is referred to as an "open systems perspective" (e.g., Drabek and Key, 1984) in which the family system--an interdependent

set

of coresidential

both--is

viewed

as

having

persons

varying

linked by blood, marriage, or

degrees

4

of

interaction

with

other

social entities (systems) in its environment (Kantor and Lehr, 1975).
The family is an "open system" because it interacts with the environing
social order, either with kin, neighborhood, community, or the economic
structures of society.
Haas and Drabek (1970) as well as others (e.g., Mileti et al., 1975)
utilize the notion of system stress as a part of the open systems perspective. Stress, according to these authors, is said to exist when the
demands on a social system exceed the system's ability to respond to all
demands. In this context, disasters are viewed as creating a set of
demands on a stricken family (e.g., search, rescue, evacuation, clean-up,
reconstruction). Many families cannot respond to all such demands unless
they acquire additional resources, and the stress they experience therefore initiates a set of coping responses--responses that are in fact the
subject of this report. These coping strategies usually involve obtaining additional material, social, and/or psychological resources.
Families may acquire necessary resources through a variety of social
support systems including kin, neighborhoods, formal disaster agencies
(FEMA, Red Cross, etc.), and informal and/or local organizations
(churches, civic organizations, etc.). Thus, the linkages families
establish with various entities in the community constitute systems of
interaction (Wellman, 1974) that can facilitate a family's response and
recovery from disaster. In our analysis we focus on a number of these
systems: the victim family/kin group system, the victim family/neighborhood system, and the victim family/disaster organization system. The
latter includes all organizations, formal and informal, that a family
utilizes in their recovery.
Families and Social Support
The relationships a family has with its kin group are the subject of
much sociological research (see Lee, 1980, for a relatively recent review
of these studies). Most of this work points out the importance of kin
relations for American families, whether in or out of crisis. The extensiveness of kin relations and the strength and energy of the ties
typically vary by class and ethnicity, with blacks, Hispanics, and certain religious groups maintaining more active relationships than others
(Lee, 1980; Staples and Mirande, 1980).
Recently, research has focused on social support networks--sets of
5

persons that families and individuals rely on in times of crisis. The
concept of social support has been important for some time in sociological research on the family (e.g., McCubbin et al., 1980; Stack, 1974;
Lopata,

1978;

Cantor,

1979).

In

the

studies

done

so

far

involving

chronic and acute stress (Kahn and Antonucci, 1980), social support has
been found to moderate or buffer the effects of both. Social support, of
course, is unlikely to occur in the absence of available resources for
those

giving

support

to

material or psychological

the

stricken,

whether

those

resources

(Bolin, 1983). Kahn and Antonucci

are

(1980) have

a 1 so suggested that the qua 1 i ty of the support gi ven is perhaps more
important as a stress mitigator than the sheer number of persons in the
support network.
Kahn and Antonucci (1980) identify three elements in social support
--affect,

affirmation,

and

aid.

The

authors

define

affect

as

the

emotional component of social support, affi rmation as agreement by those
in support with the statements and behaviors of those in crisis,. and aid
as transactions in which direct aid (money, labor, etc.) is given by the
support

networks.

The

first

and

third

have

particular

currency

for

disaster research and will be discussed later.
Disasters and the Disruption of Social

S~q[_~

The specific role of social support in family response to disasters
has been considered by several researchers who have di scussed the issue
both in terms of kinship relations and in the more recently developed
jargon of social support networks. Drabek and his colleagues have shown
the

kin

support

network

to

constitute

a key decision-making context

regarding potential evacuation (Drabek, 1969; Drabek and Boggs, 1968; see
also Clifford, 1956). Further, Drabek et ale

(1975) have examined the

effects of disasters on the number and quality of ties or linkages that
disaster victims maintain or create with their friends and relatives. In
general, the data show (e.g., Drabek and Key, 1984; Bolin, 1976) that
disasters often strengthen the relationships that victims have with their
primary support groups, if such ties were relatively sound to begin with.
More recently Bolin (1983) found social support to have a role in mitigating psychosocial disruption due to disaster. In his study Bolin (1983,
p. 11) writes

6

Social support should be seen as part of the coping mechanisms
that can be used by disaster victims to reduce the • • • stresses placed on them.
Not all disaster victims have such
networks available nor do all disaster victims utilize them
even if they are. Support of the primary group can provide
victims with types of aid that formal organizations cannot.
Also • • • the so-called therapeutic community seems to increase
the willingness of support networks to help victims in whatever
ways necessary.
The role of support networks as "stress buffers" has recently been
suygested in other disaster literature
1979)

as well

as in the more general

(Golec, 1982;

Bahr and Harvey,

stress research (e.g., Kahn and

Antonucci, 1980).
In cultures with strong kinship systems, extended kin function as a
primary giver of both emotional

and material aid promoting family re-

covery (Bolton, 1979; Bolin and Bolton, 1983). In societies that emphasize kinship less, support networks have been shown to provide important
affective support mitigating the effects of disaster trauma (Bolin, 1976;
Drabek and Key, 1984).
The death of family members and other close persons is the most
direct way disasters disrupt

social

support networks.

In the Buffalo

Creek disaster, for example, one half of the survivors had lost close
friends

or

relatives

(Gleser et

al.,

1981),

significantly disrupting

traditional support networks and greatly adding to the survivors' yrief
and bereavement. Children are particularly vulnerable to psychological
impairment as a result of death in the family (Perry and Perry 1959;
Blaufarb and Levine, 1972).
Societal

responses

to

disasters--such

as

evacuation,

housing, and relocation--can also disrupt social
place

additional

relatives as

stress

on

victims.

Several

studies

providers of emergency shelter for

temporary

support networks and
have

discussed

disaster victims and

evacuees (Instituut voor Soci aal Onderzoek, 1955; Moore, 1964; Bates et
al., 1963; Davis, 1977; Trainer and Bolin, 1976; Loizos, 1977; Bolin,
1982)--an important social support function. Evacuation is a relatively
common response to both human-caused (Houts et al., 1980; Levine, 1981)
and natural di sasters (Drabek, 1969; Drabek and Boggs, 1968). Evacuation
is often to the homes of relatives, thus placing victims in a socially
supportive context

(e.g., Loizos,

1977); this is particularly true of

7

societies in which the responsibility to kin overrides such problems as
overcrowding and increased monetary demands (Loizos, 1977; Bolton, 1979).
However,
(e.g.,

in situations where families

Young,

1954;

Boyd,

are separated during evacuation

1981) or evacuate to the

homes

of non-kin

(e.g., Instituut voor Sociaal Onderzoek, 1955), the likelihood of negative psychological

impacts

is

increased

significantly.

Other

research

has indicated (Bolin, 1982; Bolin, 1984) that beyond a period of approximately one month, the relationship between a host family and evacuee
family,

even if they are kin,

begins

to deteriorate,

resulting

in

a

possible breakdown in the social support offered by the host family. The
deterioration

is

crowding

money

and

usually manifested
problems

in

(Bolin,

interpersonal

1984)

and

is

conflict
another

due

to

potential

stress on the evacuated family (ct., Loizos, 1977). Thus, while evacuation can

result

group support,

in victim families

being physically close to primary

under some ci rcumstances

such

support may

break down.

This is particularly likely in cultures in which there are not strong
kinship ties.
Temporary

housing

is

another societal

response that

can

disrupt

support networks. Temporary housi ng as well as longer-term or permanent
relocation

results

in

"relocation

stressors"

(Parker,

1977,

p.

548).

Because temporary housing is frequently located away from the impact zone
of a disaster (e.g., Bolton, 1979; Davis, 1977) and frequently also away
from established transportation systems (Davis, 1977; Ciborowski, 1967) ,
the emotional benefits of social support in a familiar surrounding may be
denied relocated victims. The inability to move back to former neighborhoods increases psychological stress on victims (Miller et al., 1981), in
part by denying them the therapeutic effect of social
post-disaster community

(Milne,

1977;

Wettenhall,

support in the

1979).

For example,

following the large scale evacuation of Darwin, Australia after a devastating cyclone, those evacuees who could not return to their homes and
neighborhoods suffered the most stress and exhibited the greatest number
of psychosocial problems (Western and Milne, 1979).
In addition, the temporary housing itself often causes additional
stress. Trailers, in particular, seem to cause difficulties, especially
if the trailers are placed in camps or courts specifically constructed
for disaster victims (Bolin, 1982; Quarantelli, 1982). Not only do such

8

courts remove victims from the supportive environment of their old neighborhoods (Bolin, 1982), they can also add to victims' fear of disaster
recurrence if the camps are located in

perceived

high

risk

areas

as

happened at Buffalo Creek (Erikson, 1976). Because trailers are issued
on a first come, first served basis, the temporary housing camps seldom
refl ect the soci al

patterns of the preimpact nei ghborhoods

(Gl eser et

al., 1981) and as a consequence can create "further disruption to social
networks.

• • retardi ng the rei ntegrat i on of fami 1 i es into establ i shed

neighborhoods"

(Trainer and Bolin, 1976, p. 55).

Several researchers have al so pOinted out that temporary housi ng is
often found by victims to be crowded and of substandard quality (Birnbaum
et

al.,

1973;

Bolin,

1982),

Mitchell, 1976; Mitchell

culturally

inappropriate

(Hogg,

1980;

and Miner, 1978), or accompanied by excessive

bureaucratic intrusion (sometimes perceived as harassment from officials)
into the lives of the occupants (Bolin, 1982). As one respondent reported (Bolin, 1982, p. 171), "We lived in a FEMA trailer for five months;
for the last two months the lady from FEMA hounded us about when we would
be movi ng out.

I had been i nj ured and.

• in the hospita 1 so thi s

treatment particularly bothered me."
Relocation and its attendant disruption of neighborhood patterns.
social

support networks,

and familiar surroundings also compounds the

stress that vi ct ims experi ence (Ahearn and Castellon, 1979; Ti erney and
Baisden 1979; Dudasik, 1980). Because the stressful effects of evacuation, temporary housing,
Bolin,

1982;

Hogg,

and

relocation are long-term (Erikson,

1976;

1980), they may produce chronic or delayed stress

disorders among victims; and because such social responses to disasters
tend to isolate victims from the needed comfort of their support networks, those effects may be compounded.
In the case of human-caused di sasters such as Love Canal
1981),

there

is

no acute

impact

phase at

a 11.

Instead,

(Levi ne,

a peri od of

chronic threat and uncertainty is followed by the dispersal and relocation of the victims. At Love Canal the chronic stress of being exposed
to toxic chemicals of uncertain danger was followed by the loss of homes
(see Fried, 1966) and the disruption of neighborhood support networks as
victims were

relocated across a wide area

(Holdren, 1982).
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away

from the danger zone

~~~~~_~~~~s~~ __~_~~~~~_~odel

Families as social systems undergoing stress due to either internal
or external factors have long been the subject of sociological research,
and much of the current work is influenced by the half century of family
stress research that began with Burgess (1926) and a number of studies
examlnlng how families responded to the capitalist economic crisis of the
1930s in the U.S.

(e.g., Angell,

1936;

Cavan and

Ranck,

1938;

Koos,

1946). Perhaps the most influential development has been Hill's classic
family stress model--the so-called A,B,C,-X formulation (Hill, 1949; also
Hill,

1958;

Hill

and Hansen,

1962). This

model

suggests

that A (the

stress event--in Hill's work, war-induced spousal separation) interacts
with B (a family's stress-meeting resources) and with C (family perception or definition of the situation) to produce -X (the crisis situation). According to Hill (1949) the family is initially disorganized by
the stressor, but then goes through a recovery phase in which it reestablishes some level of organization and equilibrium.
Burr (1973), as part of his effort to develop a comprehensive deductive theory of family behavior, has expanded Hill's model. Burr introduces concepts of vul ne rabi 1 ity and regene rat i ve power, and his mode 1
suggests that the stressor event coupl ed with the 1 evel

of a family's

vulnerability (amount of resources) influences the severity of the crisis
experienced by the family.

In addition,

a family's definition of the

stress event influences their vulnerability, and their regenerative power
affects their ability to recover from the disruption.
Much

of the

clinical

and

sociological

research on family stress

depends on and shares particular terms and definitions. Stressors are
often defined as any life events of such magnitude that they cause change
in

families

(McCubbin,

1980).

Similarly,

stress

consists

of

family

responses to stressors and generally refers to tensions and disruptions
not

adequately dealt with

by the family

(Burr,

1973). Crisis is the

extent of disorganization due to a lack of family coping resources (Burr,
1973;

Lipman-Blumen,

categorization tool

1975).

Lipman-Blumen

has

offered a comprehensive

for assessing family crises (such as those produced

by disaster), as well as for classifying stressors. The system classifies

crises and stressors

1975, p. 890):

by the following dimensions

internality vs.

(Lipman-Blumen,

externality; pervasiveness vs. bounded10

ness; precipitate onset vs. gradual onset; intensity vs. mildness; transitoriness

vs.

chronicity;

randomness

vs.

expectability;

natural

vs.

artificial origin; perceived unsolvability vs. solvability. This system
is similar to a number of classification models for disasters

(e.g.,

Barton, 1970).
While, in our research, disasters are viewed as major disruptive and
stress-producing events, it must be remembered that families experience
continual stresses as a result of routine as well as unexpected events,
e.g., bi rth of a child, divorce, widowhood,
changes,

illness

unemployment,

residential

(McCubbin et al., 1980). Thus, disasters were rarely

the first or only stress-producing event in the families studied.
In the literature there seems to be a tendency to view the family as
a closed system, reacting to stressors based on internal resources (e.g.,
Hill,

1958;

Hansen and Hill,

1979). McCubbin and his colleagues have

suggested that more attent i on be pa i d to the 1 inks that fami 1 i es under
stress establish with various support networks (McCubbin, 1979; McCubbin
et al., 1980). As noted previously, such support networks will be considered as an important coping resource for families impacted by disasters
(Bolin, 1982). In the this research such extra-familial support systems
include kin, neighborhood, formal disaster agencies, and informal/local
organizations.
Disaster Research and Long-Term Impacts
This study is but one part of a large body of research conducted by
social scientists on the many aspects of human response to disaster. A
great deal

of resea rch has been conducted on the wa rni ng, impact, and

evacuation phases of disaster (e.g., Mileti et al., 1975; Perry et al.,
1980). However, because the research discussed here focuses on long-term
recovery, the 1 i terature revi ewed wi 11 be restri cted to those studi es
which relate to the long-term effects of disasters on families and individuals.
Disasters and Mental Health
One growi ng area of

research

concerns

the

short-

and

long-term

impacts of di sasters on mental health. Although thi s has been a concern
of disaster researchers for decades, there is a surprising lack of consensus concerning whether such impacts exist to any significant extent
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and,

if so,

how to detect and measure them (Perry and Lindell,

Quarantell i, 1979).

In general, sociological

1978;

research has seldom found

severe psychopathologies among disaster victims, but rather has focused
on transitory mental health problems and problems in coping.
Available literature may be divided into two general

groups: so-

called clinical studies and more broadly focused disaster case studies
using general

sociological

survey techniques.

In the clinical studies,

much of the evidence for mental health problems as a result of environmental stresses derives from studies of human-caused "disasters" such as
war and the war-related experiences of survivors (e.g., Chodoff, 1970,
Hocking,

1970;

explosions,

Segal,

and

1974),

accidents

nuclear war (e.g., Lifton, 1967), fires,

(e.g.,

Lindy

et

al.,

1981;

Carlton,

1980;

Raphael, 1977). Many of the recent clinical studies focus on one event
in particular, the Buffalo Creek disaster

(e.g.,

Titchener and

Kapp,

1976; Gieser et al., 1981), a catastrophe so devastating that the enduring psychosocial
Creek Syndrome"

reactions of survivors have been labeled the "Buffalo
(Titchener and Kapp, 1976, p.

295). Although the evi-

dence from Buffalo Creek is important, some reviews have demonstrated
that

only

Buffalo Creek

shows

a

link

between

disasters

and

"severe

psychopathologies" (Baisden, 1979, p. 328).
Human-caused di sasters appear to be associ ated with mental
problems

more

often than

natural

disasters

for

a

number

of

health

reasons.

Specifically, in human-caused disasters blame can be assigned; in natural
disasters, culpability is much more difficult to establish. Thus, anger
at the "callousness and irresponsibility of other humans"

(Lifton and

Olson, 1976, p. 10), blame assignation, and feelings of being victimized
by others are associated with mental

health problems among victims and

survivors of human-caused events (e.g., Bucher, 1957; Janis, 1951).
A wide

range

of

emotional

responses

to

disasters

have

been

described in the literature dealing with both human-caused and natural
events. General fears, anxieties, and tensions are frequently mentioned
as common emotional responses (e.g., Taylor et al., 1970; Bates et al.,
1963;

Blaufarb

1977). Such
types

and

Levine,

responses

including

have

tornadoes

1972;
been

Bolin,

1982;

reported across

(Taylor,

1977),

Richard,
a

1974;

range

earthquakes

Milne,

of di saster

(Greenson

and

Mintz, 1972), nuclear plant accidents (Houts et al., 1980), hailstorms
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(Leives1ey, 1977), cyclones and hurricanes (Bates et al., 1963; Parker,

1975), train accidents (Raphael, 1977) and floods (Ollendick and Hoffman,
1982).
One of the classic formulations of psychosocial response to disas-

(1956)

ters is Wallace's
characteri zed

by

shocked

"disaster syndrome"--a cognitive dysfunction
and

dazed

behavi or.

Di saster syndrome as a

response to unexpected and severe events is repeatedly mentioned in the
sociological literature (e.g., Barton, 1970; Perry and Lindell, 1978),
although

Kinston

and Rosser

(1974)

10% of

suggest that perhaps only

disaster victims develop acute problems requiring intervention. Generally, sociological researchers are more likely than clinical researchers to
treat such cognitive disturbances as normal and shortlived (cf., Barton,

1970; Zusman, 1976).
Situational as well as deeper depression is also mentioned in the
literature as a relatively common emotional response to impact and loss
(e.g., Taylor, 1976). Severe or prolonged disasters appear to be linked
to more severe depression (e.g., Hocking, 1970; Knaus, 1975; Leivesley,

1977) •
Psychosomatic and physical

health problems are typically reported

after many disasters (e.g., Logue et al., 1981), and sleep disturbances
are a common

reaction

reported by a number of researchers

(Flynn and

Chalmers, 1980; Bolin, 1982; Hocking, 1965; Church, 1974; Price, 1978).
General physical illness does not appear to be a long-term consequence of
disasters (e.g., Parker, 1977; Melick, 1976).
Disasters also seem to be able to cause a variety of interactive or
interpersonal disturbances, and the effects of disasters on family relationships

have

received much

recent

attention

(Drabek and Key,

1984;

Bolin, 1982; Erikson, 1976; Taylor, 1976). Irritability and the inability to get along well with other fami ly members duri ng recovery has been
one Significant finding (Bolin, 1982; Henderson and Bostock, 1977).
Qua rante 11 i (1979) has also cons i dered "response generated demandS II
--a concept important to studies of long-term response. He demonstrates
that it is important to cons i der if and how soci a 1 responses to di sasters, almost independent of impact related disruptions, can prolong or
even create problems among victims. While the initial
of

disasters

can

potentially

create mental

13

health

physical
problems,

impacts
how the

larger society responds to disasters can create or maintain heightened
stress levels that cause psychological and social problems that might not
otherwise have occurred. Thus, in the case of major disasters--in particular those requiring large-scale federal intervention, long-term stays
in emergency shelters, or re10cation--menta1

health problems are some-

times generated by the demands of recovery (as distinct from the initial
traumatic event).
Besides considering various stressors, the vulnerability of different demographi c groups to di saster-i nduced psycho1 ogi cal
also

be

considered.

Early

disaster

research

(Friedsam,

prob1 ems must

1961;

Moore,

1958) specifically suggested that the elderly were "at risk." However,
recent research has indicated that, in fact, the elderly are less likely
to require mental health support services than other victims (Bell, 1978;
Huerta and Horton, 1978; Bolin and K1enow, 1983; Kilijanek and Drabek,

1979). In a number of studies children have been found to be particularly vulnerable to disaster stress (e.g., B1aufarb and Levine, 197-2; Lacey,

1972,

Newman,

1976;

K1iman,

1976); flynn

and Chalmers

(1980) suggest

that children are vulnerable because of their lower coping capacities.
Similarly, Bolin (1982) found that large families were more subject to
emot i ona 1 problems

fo 11 owi ng di saster,

number of dependent children.

pe rhaps

refl ect i ng the greater

In addition, following severe disasters,

researchers have observed separation anxieties (Bolin, 1982; Boyd, 1981;
Singer, 1982), phobias, and sleep disturbances among children (Frederic,

1977; Newman, 1976; Perry and Perry, 1959).
---

While children and large families appear particularly vulnerable to
the stresses of disaster,
vulnerable.

Those

groups

several
include

with higher education levels

other demographic
blacks

groups

(G1eser et a1.,

seem less

1981), those

(Bolin, 1982), those with higher incomes

(Bolin, 1982), and those with extensive social support networks (Bolin,

1983; Huerta and Horton, 1978; Lucas, 1969).
Generally speaking, the literature on stress and psychosocial .disorder views demographic characteristics as mediators between the stressor
and coping responses; such characteristics affect how persons understand
and interpret the stressor (Lumsden, 1975) and are also associated with
the available coping resources of victims (G1eser et a1., 1981). G1eser
et a1.,

(1981) in their study of Buffalo Creek found that blacks ex-
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perienced

lower

incidences of psychic trauma than whites.

Similarly,

they found that children scored high on disruption scales while victims
of high socioeconomic status scored low.
with Bolin's recent research
show that the

Such findings are consistent

(Bolin, 1984).

In addition, some studies

relationship between age and stress-caused psychosocial

disruption tends to be curvilinear for udults, with younger and older
adults scoring lower on psychopathology scales than those of middle age
(Kessler, 1979).
Because the demography as

well

as

ethnicity

of

victims

figures

prominently in our research, some pertinent studies on class, ethnicity,
and

mental

health

should

example, found that blacks,

be

mentioned.

femal~,

Warheit

et

al.

(1976),

for

the poor, and those with low educa-

tion had the highest rates of depression. However, they also found that
race effects disappear when socioeconomic status is controlled, indicating that

clas~_was

a more significant variable than. race. Similarly,

Mirowsky and Ross (1980) found Mexican-Americans to suffer less distress
than whites. While Mexican-Americans may be distressed by low incomes,
some Hispanic cultural

factors

(family-centeredness, extended kin net-

works) buffer the stress of poverty (Madsen, 1964; Lomnitz, 197U; Farris
and Gl enn, 1976). The same however was not found by Mi rowsky and Ross
(1980) for blacks. With blacks, class status was the predominant factor
and not black ethnicity (Gaity and Scott, 1972; see also Antunes et al.,
1974; and Dohrenwend, 1966). The importance of race and class as determinants of individual and family disaster response will be examined
more thoroughly later.
Long-Term Family Recovery
Several studies of natural disasters have recently focused on the
long-term recovery of victim families. Drabek and his colleagues (e.g.,
Drabek et al., 1975; Erikson, 1976; Drabek and Key, 1984) have produced
some of the most

sophisticated

research on the long-term impacts

of

natural disasters. One important contribution of their research has been
analyses of the types of relationships or linkages that victim families
establish

in order to obtain

(Drabek and Key,
recovery,

recovery aid

and

resources.

1984) that besides relying on internal

victims received aid

from extra-familial

extended family, friends, and organizations.
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They found
resources in

sources,

including

Currently, disaster researchers commonly discuss the "therapeutic
community" (Barton, 1970) as a contextual factor in recovery. Therapeutic community refers to the emergence of support and altruistic norms in
communities after disasters--a process that facilitates a collective
response to disaster. However, just as a community can create a supportive context for family recovery, it can also constrain that recovery.
For example, in a study of a community stricken by a massive tornado,
Bolin (1982, p. 61) notes that
although elements of the therapeutic community were ••• present,
these 'utopian elements' are balanced or ••• negated by the
inequities that rapidly manifested themselves in the form of price
gouging, unscrupulous contractors, and rapidly rising rents.
In a more theoretical vein, Trainer and Bolin, (1976, p. 288) identify
three community-level constraints on family recovery: physical constraints, temporal constraints, and subjective constraints. Physical
constraints usually consist of destroyed community facilities and
neighborhoods that delay a return to normal daily activities. Temporal
constraints involve the time required to carry out routine and recoveryrelated tasks in the postdisaster environment. Delays in clearing roads
and reestablishing transportation, failure to provide public transportation, the necessity to spend significant amounts of time attempting to
acquire aid--all reduce the time available for more direct recoveryrelated activities as well as for nondisaster-related family activities.
Subjective constraints include the disruption of a family's sense of the
familiar and normal caused by reconstruction activities.
Because the community constitutes an important frame of reference
for disaster victims, disrupted services and altered community patterns
occurring simultaneously with the other serious demands of a disaster can
contribute to overall victim stress and inhibit recovery. Furthermore,
communities may be transformed in the reconstruction process through
ch anges in thei r geography and phys i ca 1 1ayout, re 1ocat i on of nei ghborhoods, relocation of business districts, and so on. As noted, these
recovery-generated disruptions can generate long-term sociocultural
transformations which undermine the sense of well-being. (e.g., Dudasik,
1980; Trainer and Bolin, 1976).
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Communities as a complex social whole constitute symbolic objects
providing orientation for residents (Hunter, 1974, 1975; Fried, 1966) and
are the basis of residents' cognitive maps (Suttles, 1972; Trainer and
Bolin, 1976). These mental maps render the local community familiar,
safe, and readily accessible to those who reside there. Beyond this,
residents identify with their communities and, in so doing, form part of
their concept of themselves (Hunter, 1974). Cognitive identity with the
community is likely to increase with length of residence and with participation in local activities and organizations (Bell and Newby, 1971).
Because disasters disrupt residents' sense of spatial organization and
identity with the community, social and behavioral problems may follow
(e.g., Barkun, 1974; Hogg, 1980). Thus, disasters not only result in a
disruption of expected services but also tend to sever the social ties
many victims have to the locale--ties which may provide important psychological support in times of stress. Trainer and Bolin (1976, p. 280)
state that after disasters, ties with "voluntary associations, churches
and recreational groups may. •• have to be reestablished after the
period of concentration on immediate emergency and recovery activities."
Further, they note that (p. 280)
social activities will be disrupted due to the relocation of
families and to the destruction of the physical facilities for the
various activities. Other activities may be disrupted not a direct
consequence of the disaster, but rather due to changes in the
physical setting during and after reconstruction. Reconstructed
communities seldom are identical to their pre-disaster form.
Spatial relocation of activities not only affects those directly
impacted by the disaster, but others in the community as well ••
The complexities of social life may be disturbed for periods extending beyond to actual physical reconstruction of the community.
Although the focus of this research is on the long-term recovery of
minorities, little previous disaster research has focused on these groups
at any stage of disaster impact or recovery. Of the research available,
a good deal examines the effect of race and ethnicity on warning response
and evacuation behaviors (e.g., Lindell et a1., 1980; Perry et al.,
1980). The effect of the mass medi a on di saster response ina bl ack
community has also recently been analyzed by Beady and Bolin (1983).
It is more difficult to find research on ethnic minorities in the
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recovery stages of a di saster. Moore (1958), ina study of the effects
of tornadoes on several Texas towns, di d have some black and Hi spani c
victims as part of his sample.

In general,

he found blacks to have

suffered greater losses proportionally than others and, consequently,
suggested that they had greater need for external resources to facilitate
recovery.
In another study of a tornado in Texas, Minnis and McWilliams (1971)
examined changing patterns of residential segregation. The Lubbock
tornado that they examined disrupted existing housing patterns, and in
the aftermath, some neighborhoods became somewhat more racially integrated. The researchers examined victim tolerance of this changing
neighborhood composition, finding that blacks were more tolerant of
integration than were whites (pp. 169-170).
Much of the 1iterature useful for understandi ng bl ack recovery from
disaster comes not from the disaster literature, but from research on the
black family. Research on minority families has examined the role of
social support among blacks (e.y., Martin and Martin, 1978; Lin et al.,
1979;

Lopata, 1978) and reliance on kinship networks during times of

stress such as unemployment. Staples (1976) reports that American blacks
are more likely to have extensive and cohesive kinship networks and are
1i kely to rely on those networks under stressful

ci rcumstances

(e.g.,

Babchuck and Ballweg, 1971; Cantor, 1979; Jackson, 1971; McAdoo, 1978).
Stress due to events such as unemployment or desertion is analogous to
stress caused by disaster. Hence reliance on social support by minorities may be expected following disasters and may be an important part of
the long-term recovery process of minority families.
Bolin (1984) found that for black disaster victims, primary group
aid appeared as a neg~~~ factor in economic recovery; the primary group
was not a useful source of economic aid. He also notes that blacks were
frequently unable to qualify for certain governmental recovery programs-an issue that will be examined in more detail later. Nonetheless, it was
found that social support of black victims did contribute to their emotional recovery.
Bolin's research has also examined long-term recovery of tornado
victims and included a comparative analysis of rural and urban victims,
as well as a similar comparison of the elderly and non-elderly (Bolin and
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Klenow, 1983). Other research by Bolin (1982) on the long-term recovery
of families is directly relevant to the current research. Indeed, instrumentation as well as the general theoretical orientation of the
present study follows closely that of the earlier work. For this reason,
some key findings regarding differential impacts of the disaster as well
as Bolin's multivariate model of family recovery will be reviewed. It
was found that elderly victims were more likely to experience a long-term
decline in their standard of living than others, but that older victims
experienced fewer disaster-related strains in family relationships and
were less likely to express anxiety over future disasters. The elderly
tended to "un derutilize" federal aid programs (particularly SBA), as did
lower socioeconomic status victims. Social class was also found to be a
determinant in the use of FEMA trailers--victims of lower socioeconomic
class being more likely than others to live in them as temporary shelter.
Lower socioeconomic status victims, younger victims, and those with large
numbers of dependents were each more likely to receive money from Individual Family Grant programs. Bolin also reported that rural disaster
victims tended to receive less aid from fewer sources than did urban
victims, a factor that slowed rural victims' recovery.
In summarizing recovery outcomes of the disaster victims, Bolin
(1982, p. 240) reports:
\

1)

Elderly and rural victims were relatively slower in their
economic recovery.

2)

Elderly victims scored higher on the emotional recovery index
than others.

3)

Large families (containing more than 3 dependents) were slower
in both their emotional and economic recovery.

4.

Most victims, irrespective of age, disaster losses, income, or
family size were likely to evaluate the recovery aid they
received as inadequate.

\

I n model i ng the recovery process, Bo 1i n defi ned a combi nat i on of
socioeconomic and impact variables. Interacting with aid, social disruption and social support were shown to be factors determining emotional
and economic recovery outcomes (Bolin, 1982; see also Bolton, 1979;
Bolin, 1976; Drabek and Key, 1984).
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\

Bolin and Bolton (1983) tested a model of the recovery process in a
compari son of family recovery in Lat in Ame ri ca and the United States.
Their model was similar to that just described with the important addition that this one was cross-cultural; their analysis highlighted differences

in

response

and

recovery

strategi es

that were attri butabl e to

culture. Features of Latin American culture that affected recovery were
the

strong familial

obl igations

ties

rather than

and the
universal

patronage

system in which

personal

rules determined access to recovery

resou rces. Thus in Lat in Ameri ca cont i nuity of employment (as a result
of patronage) was an important determinant of recovery, while in the
U.S., aid from

~overnmental

sources was a key factor in recovery.

In general, the purpose of models of the recovery process is to
deve lop an unders tandi ng of the i nte rp 1ay of factors affect i ng recove ry
outcomes. In the present research the concern is with the effect of the
race/ethnicity
(Bolin,

of

the

victims.

1982; Drabek and Key,

Previous

research

has

already

shown

1984; Bolin and Bolton, 1983) that the

availability and utilization of extra-familial aid and disaster insurance
are important determinants of recovery outcomes. As Bolin (1982, p. 241242) has written,

"[nhe determi nants of family recovery are many and

varied: recovery is the outcome of family [demographic] characteristics,
social support networks, aid programs and insurances • • • " Recovery has
also been shown to be influenced by disaster impacts and losses--both of
a material and personal (injuries/deaths) sort (Bolin, 1982).
In thi s study, a general model of the recovery process is used as a
guide to analysis of the data. In the model, recovery is viewed as the
outcome of predi saster condit ions and characteri st i cs interacting with
disaster

impacts

and

losses.

These

di saster

effects

create

specific

factors and processes during recovery (e.g., obtaining recovery aid), and
all factors interplay to determine recovery outcomes. In this analysis,
_ predisaster conditions and characteristics include socioeconomic status,
age of family members, family size,

race/ethnicity, and

related back-

ground characteristics. Impacts!losses include material losses to home,
home contents, and vehicles; personai losses including injuries to family
members,

deaths

of

family

members

or

friends;

psychological

impacts

(bereavement, anxiety, etc.); disruption of family lifestyle and living
patterns.

Recovery

involves

such

factors
20

and

processes

as

utilizing

support

networks,

obtaining

organizational

aid,

settling

insurance

claims, living in temporary housing, relocating residences, and resolving
psychological

impacts.

Recovery has

been measured

along

a number of

dimensions (cf., Bolin, 1982; Bolin and Bolton, 1983; Drabek and Key,

1984),

but the essential

emotional

recovery.

For

dimensions
our

considered here are economic and

purposes

economic

recovery

is

measured

subjectively by asking respondents to evaluate whether they feel they
have recovered economically from the effects of the disaster. Similarly,
emotional recovery is a sUbjective evaluation by victims that feel they
are "over" the emotional impacts of their disaster experiences. In the
chapters that follow, differences in recovery will be considered, focusing on patterns of aid utilization and ethnicity/race as key elements
determi ni ng recovery outcomes.

In the fi na 1 chapter, di fferences among

sites will be evaluated comparatively.
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CHAPTER III
THE PARIS, TEXAS TORNADO
Introduction
On April 2,

1~82,

a tornado touched down outside of Paris, Texas and

proceeded eastward through the city, tearing apart neighborhoods, killing
and injuring many people, and leaving hundreds of others homeless. With
that event, the 1i ves of many persons were i nel uctably changed, and a
complex array of social responses was begun. In this chapter, the nature
of the response and recovery of victim families in Paris will

be an-

alyzed. The tornado devastated both black and white neighborhoods and
thus afforded a uni que opportunity for compari ng the recovery processes
of two racial groups.
Research Design and Implementation
Three factors made Paris a good site for the purposes of this research. Fi rst, there were almost equal numbers of black and white victims. Secondly, the tornado was so severe that there was a large pool of
victims who suffered moderate to serious losses from which to draw a
sample.

Finally,

the site was declared a disaster by the President,

thereby insuring the presence of federal disaster organizations in addition to the many local, state, and independent organizations.
Family surveys began in mid-December--eight months after the tornadO's

impact. To ensure an adequate sample from among those residents

with destroyed homes and those with major damage, a goal was established
to interview approximately 400 families, or about 25% of the 1530 families reported by the Red Cross to be affected. Approximately equal numbers of black and white respondents were interviewed across a range of
disaster loss levels, and in the end, a total of 431 victims (28.2%) were
interviewed.
Surveys were administered to one adult family member in each household

selected

for interview.

Interview schedules contained 178 ques-

tions, measuring 340 variables.

The

instrument utilized

in the Paris

survey is virtually identical in form and content to the surveys used at
the other research sites--the only differences being those required by
site-specific concerns (disaster agent, local socio-cultural forms, etc.)
Interview schedules sought information on a wide variety of family
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demographic characteristics

including:

age

and

sex

composition,

size,

type, residential history, and income, education, occupation, and marital
status of heads of household and respondents. The schedu 1es a 1so contained a number of Lickert scale attitude items, scaled from strongly
agree to strongly di sagree, that presented respondents with statements
describing typical

disaster-related

impacts.

Responses

to these

items

could indicate a range of psychological, emotional, economic, social, and
family-related disruptions. Another series of questions elicited information on physical impacts, such as injuries, deaths, property and financial losses, as well as on emergency period activities, and aid determination, utilization, and adequacy. The importance of aid in emotional and
economic

recovery was

also

recorded.

Additional

questions

were

asked

regarding various aspects of insurance coverage and regarding victim experiences while living in FEMA mobile homes. Finally,

respondents were

asked a series of questions designed to assess the level of their emotional and economic recovery, and to determine additional opinions on aid
programs,

reconstruction

activities

within

their

neighborhoods,

and

officials' handling of the disaster and its aftermath.
In addition to the family
nongovernmental

interviews,

city,

state,

federal,

and

disaster relief organization officials were interviewed

to obtain general

backyround information on the tornado and its after-

math. Newspaper accounts and other published sources of information were
a 1 so

used

to develop the ch rono logy presented below.

I ntervi ews with

officials were conducted two months prior to the family interviews, and
follow-up interviews were conducted at the time of those interviews.
After receiving training,
organizations

and a local

eighteen

persons,

recruited

from

junior college, conducted the actual

local
inter-

views under the supervision of a field director. The survey was publicized in the community

in several

ways. The two local

newspapers ran

press releases on the survey two months prior to and again at the actual
time of the interviews, and one radio station ran periodic press releases
during

the field

work.

The city manager,

the

police department,

the

mayor, disaster relief agencies and organizations, and local community
leaders were informed of the survey when interviewing began.
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Paris:

A Chronology of the Disaster

At 9:15 a.m. on Friday, April 2, 1982, the National Weather Service
issued a tornado warning for portions of north central and northeast
Texas. Thi s warni ng was to expi re at 3 :00 p.m., but severe weather continued and the warning was extended to 9:00 p.m. Therefore, at 3:00 p.m.
a watch was in effect for Lamar County, of which Paris is the county
seat. It was not until approximately 4:10 p.m. that a tornado (or perhaps a pair of tornadoes) was sighted moving toward Paris. The tornado
traveled eastward through the northern part of the city, bypassing the
central business district but hitting two residential neighborhoods--an
older neighborhood in the northwest and a newer neighborhood in the
northeast.

The

southern

sect i on

of the city was

1eft

vi rtua lly un-

touched.
The tornado cut a swath of destruction approximately five miles long
through the city. Although the funnel cloud was estimated to be about
200 yards wide at the ground, its accompanying heavy winds damaged property across a half-mile wide strip. The tornado traveled at approximately 50 miles an hour and stayed on the ground for 20 to 30 minutes.
According to the Red Cross, 11 people were killed. Of these, four
were in mobile homes, and five were persons 65 years old or older. A
total of 322 people were injured, 59 of whom were admitted to area hospitals.
Immediately following the storm, the Red Cross conducted a "windshield survey"--a house-to-house, street-by-street survey delineating the
total area affected and the amount of damage sustained. They found that
426 houses, two mobile homes, and 130 apartments sustained major damage;
and 519 houses, and 122 apartments sustained minor damage. In addition,
a number of small businesses and six churches sustained various levels of
damage. Two larger businesses, the American Box Company and the Paris
Lumber Company, were totally destroyed. Total damages were estimated to
be in excess of $50 million.
A total of 1530 fami 1i es were affected by the tornado through i njury, death, or property loss or damage. Of the city's 26,000 residents,
nearly 10% were left homeless. Approximately 3,000 residences were without electrical power for at least 24 hours, and thereafter electrical
service was only restored piece-by-piece in the disaster area. Gas ser-
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vi ce for 400 to 500 houses was damaged or interrupted by the storm but
was generally brought under control within 24 hours. Phone service was
interrupted for some 3,000 to 4,000 residents, although most phone service

was

also

restored

within

24

hours.

In

addition,

water

service

ceased briefly due to loss of power at a pumping station.
The city's emergency warning system was put into operation despite
recent disagreement on its design. A year prior to the disaster, the
city council turned down a proposal to install fixed warning sirens, and
a new system was scheduled to be voted upon again by the council. The
system that was in effect utilized police, fire, sheriff, and ambulance
vehicles stationed around the city. At about 3:30 p.m. on the day of the
disaster, after the National Weather Service had confirmed the existence
of a tornado, those vehicles traveled up and down the streets of the town
sounding

their

sirens.

Although

city

officials maintained that their

emergency plan worked well, at budget hearings in June of 1982, a fixed
warning system was approved.
The city of Paris had an emergency management plan, and its coordinator set up an emergency operations center in the police department
building the evening of the disaster. At the same time, the Texas Department of Public Safety requested assistance from the National Guard,
and these two groups,

along wi th the city's po 1 i ce depa rtment, estab-

lished security procedures for the disaster zone. The city council met
in an emergency meeting and instituted a 10:00 p.m. curfew for one week
for the area affected by the disaster. A pass system to the disaster
area was also put into effect.
Additional emergency vehicles and aid came from Oklahoma and parts
of northeast Texas. Dallas and surrounding areas sent 60 paramedic teams
which participated in search and rescue operations. On April 2, the Red
Cross set up two emergency shelters
schools.
family

However, most victims

and

friends

in the cafeteri as

of two

publ ic

probably sought emergency shelter with

not affected

by the disaster.

Only a few victims

utilized the Red Cross shelters, and one shelter was subsequently closed.
The Salvation Army did take in about 40 victims the night of the disaster.
On April 8th, Paris and Lamar County were declared disaster areas
by the federal government, making disaster relief programs available to
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residents. These programs included temporary housing, low-interest SBA
loans to repair or replace uninsured homes and businesses, and other
forms of individual and community assistance. On April lOth, two disaster assistance centers (DACs) were set up to provide one-stop assistance
to victims seeking federal, state, and nongovernmental aid and services.
The DACs were closed by April 15th, although applications continued to be
taken at the local FEMA headquarters. By April 27th, 84 mobile homes and
four travel trailers were in place, providing temporary housing. Since
local

restrictions prohibited the placing of mobile homes on private

lots, mobile homes were placed in temporary FEMA courts. However, travel
trailers were allowed on private lots where home rebuilding was taking
place. In addition to mobile homes, other temporary housing assistance
was provided by FEMA which placed 299 families

in

apartments

victims

and

provided

monetary

assistance to

family and friends. By May 27th, 90% of all

rental

houses and
staying with

eligible applicants were

housed in temporary or permanent residences.
After the initial

emergency period,

new assistance organizations

came forward, and those already engaged in emergency assistance redirected their efforts to longer-range assistance and community restoration
programs. FEMA began searching for permanent housing for those families
in

temporary

shelter.

Eligible families were guaranteed three months

temporary housing assistance, after which they had to be recertified for
housing every 30 days. By September 22,123 families out of the 387
placed by FEMA in temporary housing were still
housing.

Low-income families

proved

in need of permanent

particularly difficult

to

place,

because low-income rental units were scarce. Many families had to wait
until rebuilt units became available in a tornado-damaged housing complex. By the time of the survey interviews, most families had found
permanent housing, with only the most difficult to place remaining in
FEMA mobile homes and rental

housing.

By December 31,1982 all

FEMA

mobile homes and travel trailers had been removed from Paris, and FEMA's
local operations were closed.
Approximately a week after the disaster, the curfew for the stricken
area was lifted. Debris removal and cleanup, conducted by the city with
partial

funding from FEMA and the assistance of a local army reserve

construction unit, began soon after search and rescue operations were
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completed.

Utility and street

Development

Block

Grant

repair--partially funded by a Community

project--was

conducted

by

the

Department

of

Public Works. The block grant also aided in the repair and rebuilding of
low-income and substandard housing and rental

units. The city council

used the building permit process to prevent price gouging by unscrupulous
contractors attempting to take advantaye of home owners anxious to rebuild their homes.

In addition to these activities,

the city approved

the fixed disaster warning system as well as a warning system utilizing
local

cable television.

Moreover, other facets of the city's emergency

response program were reviewed, modified, and expanded.
Initially, Red Cross aid was limited to the provision of food and
shelter. While the organization continued to provide meals to victims,
staff, and volunteers working in the cleanup,
its efforts,

and,

on April

5th,

it subsequently expanded

opened two centers to provide direct

assistance to victim families. This aid was accomplished by setting up a
line

of

credit

with

local

merchants

for

necessities,

such

as

beds,

clothing, shoes, cooking and eating utensils, and first month's rent. In
addition, workers at the centers compiled case records containing information such as family data, sustained damage, injuries, property ownership, insurance, assets, and employment.
On April 16th, the Red Cross was notified that the FEMA mobile homes
would not be available for purchase by victims. From case records, the
organization had

identified 305 low-income and elderly families whose

homes had sustai ned major or total damage.

It was therefore decided to

enter an Additional Assistance Phase in which aid is provided for such
things

as

rebuilding,

prescriptions,

and

Cross assisted in
other homes,

repair,

occupational

medical

bills,

supplies.

rebuilding 30 houses,

bought two houses

furnishings,

During

this

appliances,

phase,

the

Red

funded major repairs of three

and two trailers,

and funded

numerous

other lesser home repairs. Their repair and rebuilding efforts were made
available primarily to low-income and elderly home owners. They were not
able to aid renters to any great extent, but they did expand their assistance to include victims outside of the declared area. The Red Cross was
assisted by work crews from other disaster relief organizations, including

the

Mennonite

Disaster

Service

and

Christian

Public

Service.

By

September, the Red Cross had served over 68,000 meals and assisted 1103
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families with medical care. The Red Cross Disaster Headquarters was
closed in Paris on September 24th, and personnel made only intermittent
site visits thereafter. It is estimated that the Red Cross spent over
one million dollars in assisting families in Lamar County.
An additional substantial amount of private assistance was provided
through the Interfaith Disaster Services (IDS) of Paris and Lamar County.
IDS, a nonprofit organization, incorporated during the second week of May
as a result of the efforts of Church World Service and IDS officials from
Wichita Falls, Texas (which had undergone a major tornado disaster several years earlier). Board members were mostly local ministers, and funding initially came from local churches in Paris and from Church World
Services. While the Red Cross did not provide a great deal of aid to
renters, IDS did. In comparison to FEMA and the Red Cross, IDS was more
flexible in the types of aid it could provide and the people to whom it
could be provided. Aid included such things as insulation, apparel,
furniture, appliances, and payment of utility bills and/or rent. Although they did not involve themselves in actual house repair and rebuilding, IDS worked closely with the Red Cross in this area, providing
goods and services that the Red Cross could not provide. At the time of
the survey, IDS anticipated being in operation in Paris until April or
May of 1983 and expected to expend about $500,000 in aid to victims.
By November 1, 1982, approximately 85% of the housing units that
were goi ng to be rebu i 1t or repa i red had been. Thus, recovery was well
underway in Paris when data collection began.
~~~~~~~~

Effects of the Disaster
sons ~~1:..~~_VJ...ct i ms
The study sample was divided about equally between white and nonwhite racial groups, with 49.2% (212) white victims and 50.8% (219) black
victims. To assess differences between the two groups, seven characteristics were compared: household income, occupation and education of the
head of household, household size, household type, marital status of the
respondent, and age of the respondent (see Appendix A, Tables 1-7 for a
summary of this data).
There were statistically significant differences between racial
groups on all of the cha racteri st i cs exami ned except for age of the
Del1!.~9..r:.aP'!:i..£~mpari
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respondent. The soc i oeconomi c vari ab 1 es--i ncome, occupat ion, and educa. tion--all

showed black

victims doing significantly poorer

than

white

victims. The family variables--size, type, and marital status--produced
more complex results. The major differences in household size appeared
to be in the categories of two-person households and households with five
or more members; 37.7% of white households and 20.5% of black households
contained two persons. Conversely, 10.4% of white households and 25.1%
of black households had five or more members. In light of this finding,
it was not surprising to find that the majority of white households did
not have young chi 1 dren present
households

were

"childrearing"

(61. 3%), wh il e the maj ority of black
(37.9%)

or

"extended"

(14.6%).

At the

time of the tornado, more white victims were married than black victims,
while more black victims were single, separated, or widowed. There were
no significant differences between racial groups in terms of respondent
age, and in general, respondents were concentrated in the 30 to 59 age
bracket.
These data indicate that while socioeconomic resources were fewer
for black households than for white
greater social

and economic

households,

responsibilities;

black

heads

households

had

of households

re-

ceived less social or economic support from spouses but supported more
dependents.
Disaster Impacts and Losses
Damages to homes of respondents (renters and owners) were estimated
by the respondents themselves

(Appendix A,

Tables 8-9). Typically the

estimates were originally given to them by insurance adjustors, disaster
personnel, or contractors. About one-half of each group reported structural damages of 50% or less. Slightly more white victims (37.7%) than
black (33.3%) had their homes completely destroyed.
However, in terms of dollar losses due to house damage, there were
significant differences between racial groups, reflecting their different
economic conditions; 36.5% of black respondents and 25.3% of white respondents appeared in the lowest category «$5,000 damage). Seven percent of black and 15.7% of white respondents reported losses in excess of
$36,000. The average amount lost by black and white victims due to resi-

dential

damage was $12,600 and $17,500 respectively. (These statistics

are for owners only.)
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One

hundred

thirty-two

respondents

rented

apartments

or

houses.

Almost half of the black victims were renters, the majority of whom lived
in federally subsidized apartment units, whereas only 12.3% of the white
victims lived in rental housing.
Percentage

of

damage

to

home

contents

(furnishings,

appliances,

etc.) also showed some relation to racial group (Appendix A, Table 10).
About 28% of the white victims, as opposed to 20% of the black victims,
reported total loss of the contents of their homes.
In terms of dollar losses to contents, again there were significant
differences between racial groups, with white victims reporting greater
losses than black victims (Appendix A, Table 11). Low to middle income
families in both racial groups, but especially blacks, were more likely
than

persons

in

higher

income

groups

to

report

high

damage

levels

(Appendix A, Table 12).
Vehicle losses were comparable to losses to house and contents. Of
all victims interviewed, 29.2% had cars and other vehicles destroyed or
damaged to the pOint that they could not be used. Comparatively, 37.3%
of white victims and 22.2% of black victims lost at least one vehicle,
and white victims lost a greater number of vehicles, with 12.2% of white
victims and only 2.3% of black victims losing two or more vehicles. In
terms of monetary loss, white victims had an average loss of $4,400 and
black victims an average loss of $2,600.
Respondents were also asked if they lost mementos or personal possessions that had high personal value. Of the entire sample, 42.7% reported such 10sses--45.8% of white victims and 39.7% of black victims.
Victims were also asked to subjectively compare their losses to those of
victims around them. Among white respondents, 72% considered themselves
better off, 17.1% about the same, and 10.9% worse off than other victims.
Among bl ack respondents, 54.8% considered themsel ves better off, 27.9%
about the same, and 17.4% worse off. Even though white victims experienced greater losses in absolute amounts, it appears that black victims
experienced a greater sense of deprivation.
and

Severa 1 categori es were exami ned regardi ng personal

i nj ury: deaths

injuries

to

to

co-resident

family

members;

lnJuries

relatives,

friends, and neighbors; deaths among primary group members; and the impact

of deaths

on

the

emotional

well-being
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of

victim

families.

The

literature suggests that both injuries and deaths within the co-residential

family and among relatives,

negative psychosocial

friends,

and neighbors tend to have

impacts on families (e.b., Bolin, 1984; Gleser et

a1., 1981).
Approximately 21% of the population in the impact zone were injured,
and of those injured, 18% required hospitalization. Eleven people were
killed. A little over 12% of white households and 8% of black households
had at least one family member injured, while only 1.9% of white households

and

1.4% of

black

households had two or more members

injured.

There were two family members killed in the study sample, and both were
from black households.
Since Paris is a small and rather isolated community with a stable
population, a large proportion of those sampled--about half--had close
relatives,

friends,

and neighbors

injured or killed

in the storm.

In

comparing the number of injuries within primary group categories (Appendix A, Table 13), it appears that differences between racial groups were
only significant for the number of friends injured, with twice as many
black victims as whites reporting injuries to friends.
Although only 11 deaths

resulted from the Pari s tornado, a 1 arge

proportion of those sampled knew and felt close to those killed (Appendix
A, Table 14), perhaps indicating the closeness of the community. As with
the injury data, the only significant difference between racial
was for reported loss of friends,

significantly more blacks

groups

reporting

such loss.
In comparing the emotional effects of deaths across racial groups,
there were no significant differences except for those who had relatives
ki 11 ed (Appendi x A, Tabl e

1~).

Among white vi ctims, those who had rela-

tives killed were less likely than those with no kin deaths to be completely recovered eight months after the disaster. Contrary to expectations,

black

victims showed no similar effect.

black community,

kin deaths foster communal

It may be that in the

support which in turn may

facilitate higher recovery rates. On the other hand, white victims may
be expected to deal

with the loss of kin on a more individual

basis,

retarding the recovery process.
Residential Dislocations
In Paris, the tornado entered the city from the west, touching down
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in older nei ghborhoods.

I n genera 1, these nei ghborhoods were composed

primarily of one-family, wood-frame houses. A large percentage of the
residents were poor, working class families. Since the houses in the
older

neighborhoods

were

of a more

fragile

construction,

many were

leveled by the storm. A federally subsidized housing project, also located on the west side of town, was hit

by the tornado and heavily

damaged.
Moving eastward through the northern part of the city, the tornado
next struck a mobile home park and a middle-class, suburban-type neighborhood. The mobile home park was totally destroyed. Even though the
houses in the middle class neighborhood were new and typically of brick
const ruct ion, those in the storm s direct path were dest royed. Many
others had their roofs blown away, leaving them uninhabitable. The
central business district and the south side of the city were not
touched. The families with destroyed or uninhabitable homes had to find
immediate emergency shelter and then longer-term temporary housing until
their homes could be repaired of replaced, or new permanent housing could
I

be found.
Of those sampled, 65.7% had to make a least one residential change
as a result of the tornado, and white families moved somewhat more often
than black families. Of white families, 36.3% moved at least twice and
30.2% moved three or more times prior to establishing a permanent residence. For black fami 1 i es, 37.9% moved at 1east twi ce and 20.1% moved
three or more times. When interviewing took place approximately eight
months after the storm, 13.5% of the total sample--20% of the black respondents and 7% of white--were still living in temporary housing. The
relationships by race of several independent variables to the number of
residential changes were also examined (Appendix A, Table 16). As expected, those victims experiencing high loss levels moved more often than
those with moderate damage; at both hi gh and moderate damage 1eve 1 s,
white families moved more often than black families. Higher income seems
to permit families to make more frequent moves to find satisfactory permanent housing; for both racial groups, victims with high income moved
more frequently than those with lower incomes, although in lower income
levels white families moved slightly more often than blacks. Age was
also related to the number of residential changes, with young families of
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both racial groups moving more frequently than older families; younger
'white families moved more frequently than blacks in the same age category.
An emergency shelter was set up by the Red Cross in an elementary
schoo 1 on the northeast side of the city, a lthough no one in the sample
stayed overnight there. This failure to use the shelter may have been
due to its 1ocat i on and to the general reluctance of many vi ct i ms to use
pub 1 i c shelters • Although the shelter was located in the mi dst of the
middle-class neighborhood affected by the tornado, it was some distance
from the older northwest neighborhood also damaged.

In addition, since

only part of the city was stricken, emergency shelter could be had at the
homes of friend and relatives not involved in the disaster. Of the 284
families who had to leave their homes, 69.7% went to the homes of relatives

for

emergency shelter

(with

no

significant differences

between

racial groups). In addition, 9.6% of white families and 13.0% of black
families went to the homes of friends. Others, in both racial groups,
went to motels, camped, stayed in recreational vehicles, or remained in
their damaged homes until longer-term housing became available.
For victims staying with relatives or friends,
was

often

an

longer-term housing

extension of their temporary shelter arrangements.

FEMA

provided compensation for those who housed victims; each victim family
(regardless of size) staying with relatives or friends was given $250 per
month with which they could reimburse their hosts for expenses incurred
during their stay. At the time of interviews, the exact number of victim
families

receiving

this

assistance

was

not

available,

but

of

those

sampled, 242 families said that they stayed with relatives or friends at
some time since the tornado.

Among white

victims,

57.5% stayed with

relatives or friends, and 31.1% of those received compensation from FEMA
for

their

friends,

stay.
and

For

50.8% of

black
those

victims,
received

54.8%

stayed

with

FEMA compensation.

relatives
For

or

victims

staying with relatives and friends, 97.2% of whites and 85.1% of blacks
were satisfied with the amount of aid they received.
Other families utilized a variety of longer-term housing, such as
mobile homes, apartments, rental houses, and purchased homes. In comparing longer-term housing arrangements across racial groups, white victims
purchased homes more frequently than blacks, while black victims tended
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to rent more than whi tes. Accordi ng to FEMA reports, 391 famil i es were
eligible for temporary housing assistance and 387 were actually assisted.
Of these, 299 were placed in houses or apartments, 84 in mobile homes,
and four in small travel trailers. Since city regulations did not allow
mobile homes on private lots, two FEMA mobile home parks were established
(see Bolin, 1982, for a discussion of a similar situation). One park was
located on the east side of the city in a privately-owned mobile home
park and the other in destroyed neighborhoods on the northwest side of
the city. Of the 35 families in the sample that lived in FEMA mobile
homes, 22.9% were white and 77.1% were black.
The frequency of res i dent i a 1 changes may be expected to have emotional/psychological effects on families, and several of these effects
were examined (Appendix A, Table 17). Among white victims, the number of
postdisaster moves was related to reduced leisure time, continued stormrelated upsets (distress and anxiety), and strained family relationships.
Among black victims, the frequency of postdisaster moves did not effect
leisure time, but did have a negative impact on family relationships and
a particularly strong effect on persistent, continued storm-related upsets. In comparing the perceived disruptive effects of residential
changes between racial groups (Appendix A, Table 18), it is clear that
black victims felt that their residential changes were significantly more
disruptive than did white victims.
While much family disruption was due to housing changes in the pursuit of a permanent residence, another source of disruption was the construction work involved in repairing damaged residences. Of those
sampled, 239 families, or 55.5% said that they had to live in their homes
while construction work was in progress. While a plurality of families
found the repair work moderately disruptive, a large number found it extremely disruptive (Appendix A, Table 19) (differences due to racial
groups were not significant). However, in comparing the disruption from
repair work to that due to residential changes, it is clear that residential change had a much greater impact on families, particularly for
blacks.
Reported vi sitation patterns before the tornado and those eight
months after the tornado were also studied (Appendix A, Table 20). They
were approximately the same for both racial groups before the tornado,
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and the tornado and the degree of damage it caused appears to have had no
on visitation with kin, close friends, or neighbors. It should be
noted that in general white respondents appeared to have larger available
social support networks. For example, whites reported an average of 15
close friends while blacks averaged nine. While both groups averaged the
same number of close nei ghbors (four), whi tes had an average of ei ght
close kin in town, while blacks had six.
Economic Impacts
Vi ctims were asked if thei r standard of 1 i vi ng had changed as a
result of the tornado. In comparing racial groups (Appendix A, Table
21), 20% more black families than white reported a drop in their standard
of living. Understandably, when amount of damage was controlled, those
in both racial groups with high damage levels were more likely than those
with moderate damage to report a decl i ne, and a hi gher percentage of
black victims than white victims at both damage levels reported a drop.
The greatest difference between the racial groups was at the moderate
damage levels, with almost four times as many blacks as whites reporting

~ffect

a decrease.
Controlling for age of the respondent did not alter the fact that
the tornado had greater economic impact on black families. A higher
percentage of black victims than white in both aye categories indicated
that their standard of living had gone down since the tornado. Although
a greater percentage of older white victims than younger white victims
reported such a drop, the difference was not large. A significantly
greater percentage of young blacks than older blacks reported a drop in
their standard of living. Thus, among all racial/age groups, it appears
that the standard of living of young black families was most affected by
the tornado.
Respondents were also asked if their economic condition had changed
since the tornado. Responses show a similar pattern of differences between racial groups as those regarding the standard of living. Of white
families, 65.6% felt that their economic situation had returned to its
pre-storm condition, and 34.4% either weren't sure or said it had
worsened. By contrast, 49.3% of black families felt that their economic
condition was the same as before the storm and 50.7% said they were worse
off.
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An economic condition that may affect families after a disaster is
inflation in prices, caused in part by the strong demand put on goods and
services and in part by exploitation by some businesses. To examine this
effect,

respondents were asked if increased pri ces had affected thei r

financial

recovery from the storm (Appendix A,

Table 22).

Here again

black families felt a greater economic impact than white families; almost
23% more

black

families

felt

that

impaired due to rising prices.

their

financial

recovery

had

been

In addition, using an indicator of in-

creased costs of living, 26.6% more black families than white reported
that since the tornado, their living expenses had risen. Significantly
more black families than white also reported an increase in the cost of
thei r hous i ng, although changes in 1 i vi ng expenses appear to have had
greater impact on black families than the housing costs.
Since most industries in Paris are located on its perimeters and the
central business district was not in the tornado's path, business activities were not severely disrupted for any length of time. Correspondingly
most respondents in Paris did not report unemployment due to the storm's
impact on

business.

While

some

victims

found

themselves

forced

into

unemployment after the disaster, others obtained new or additional jobs
to help cover losses that were not covered by aid and insurance.
Paris, the percentage of families

getting new or additional

In

jobs was

small, perhaps due to the recession during the aftermath of the tornado
and lack of extra job opportunities.
Impa~~~l..amily~~c_tJ..~~9.

Disasters may have positive as well as negative effects on family
relationships and functioning. Families may gain strength from confronting the external challenge; however, they may .also be weakened by the
constant stress and tension created by a disaster, particularly if the
family was only weakly bonded prior to the event (Drabek and Key, 1984).
In addition, the task of restoring losses and damaged property is time
consuming and can result in less time available for family recreational
and emotional needs. Several indicators were used to assess family disruption.

These

included

self-reports

of

"upsets"

with

storm

related

events, feelings of pressure due to time constraints, lack of patience
with others, and strains in family relationships (Appendix A, Table 23).
At the time of the survey, a clear majority of all
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respondents,

61.3%, were still feeling family disruptions due to the storm; moreover,
·significantly more black than white families

reported continuing "up_

sets." Another stress examined was the feeling of temporal pressure to
"get things back to normal". Again, more black than white victims felt
this pressure (49.7% versus 45.3%), although the difference between
racial groups was not as great as with storm-related upsets. Similarly,
black victims were more likely to report impatience with other family
members due to overwork caused by the disaster (42.9% versus 32.1%).
When asked to assess general strains on family relationships caused
by the tornado, 15.7% more black than white families indicated such
strains. This effect was further analyzed by damage level and age of
victim (Appendix A, Table 24). Strained family relationships were clearly related to damage levels for white families, but only slightly related
for black families. When the effect of age was examined, more black
families

in all

age groups

reported such strain; and in both racial

groups, significantly more young than elderly families experienced this
effect. Other research has simil arly reveal ed that elderly vi ctims seem
less likely to experience psychosocial disturbances than others (see, for
example,

Kilijanek and Drabek,

1979;

Bolin

and Klenow,

1983).

Thus,

overall, it is clear that more black than white families were negatively
affected by the disaster.
However, if disasters disrupt family relationships, they may also
have positive effects. Three indicators of possible positive changes
were examined: perception of strengthened family ties, value changes
regarding material possessions, and happiness levels (Appendix A, Table
23.
When victims were asked if they thought "family ties were strengthened" by the disaster, most responded affi rmatively. Similarly, there
was a feeling that material possessions had become less important as the
value of personal relationships had been highlighted by the crisis.
These first two indicators of family strength are embedded in the traditional American ideology that families should pull together in times of
need and that "people" should be more important than "things." When
asked if levels of family happiness had changed since the tornado, a
minority of white families (24.7%) and a significantly smaller percentage
of black families (19.6%) said they found family life happier.
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It appears that the experience of the tornado did have some positive
impacts, although they were not as pervasive and significant as the negative ones. In comparing racial groups, it also appears that more black
than white families were affected negatively, reinforcing the pattern of
greater victimization of blacks.
Another impact on families is the disruption of daily routines, including loss of leisure time, loss of and change in recreational activities, and loss and disruption of time due to injuries and psychosocial
problems (Trainer and Bolin, 1976). As might be expected, 14.9% more
black than white families experienced such changes in family routines
(Appendix A, Table 25). When damage levels were controlled, moderate
damage level families in both racial groups were more likely to have
reported disruptions than those who experienced higher damage. However,
the percentage difference was substantially greater for white than black
families. Among white victims, there was little difference in family
disruption between age groups; all black age groups reported a higher
percentage of family disruption than the corresponding white groups, and
younger black families experienced significantly more disruption than
older ones.
Satisfaction with housing is important to family stability and wellbeing. Overcrowding in a new living space, displacement from a familiar
neighborhood, grief over a lost home, and displeasure with new or temporary housing may cause family tension and conflict. Respondents were
asked to compare their current housing with pre-tornado housing (Appendix
A, Table 26). A majority of respondents agreed that their current
housing was as nice as that before the tornado. However, 13.9% more
white than black families said they were satisfied with that housing. A
much smaller percentage (approximately one-third) of both racial groups
felt that their current housing was better built or safer than their pretornado housing, with slightly more white than black families satisfied.
Finally, more black than white victims (6.8%) believed that their current housing situation was making it difficult to recover. Again in the
area of housing, it appears that more black than white families were
negatively impacted by the disaster. Black families were less likely to
be satisfied with postdisaster housing in comparison to pre-tornado
housing, less satisfied with housing comfort, less satisfied with its
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construction and safety, and more likely to feel that housing was a
hindrance to their recovery.
The neighborhood is another social context whose disruption may
affect the emotional well-being of family members. In Paris, several
entire neighborhoods were disrupted by the disaster. Homes and churches
were destroyed, and many families were forced to relocate. In addition,
those families who remained or were able to return to their neighborhoods
were faced with extensive, disruptive construction and cleanup. Victims
were asked if this disruption was an impediment to their recovery (Appendix A, Table 27), and the majority indicated it was. When racial groups
were compared, 19.1% more blacks than whites said they felt this effect.
When victims were asked to compare the general aesthetics of their pre
and postdisaster neighborhoods, the majority were not satisfied with the
change--the differences between racial groups being particularly large;
thirty-one percent more black than white families felt that current
nei ghborhoods were not as pl easant as thei r predi saster nei ghborhoods.
Among blacks, 74% with high damage and 76% with moderate damage found
their present neighborhood environment less pleasant. There were no
significant differences in neighborhood satisfaction between age groups
for either racial group. Again, black families were found on all
measures to be more severely affected by neighborhood disruption than
white famil i es.
Psychosoci al Impacts
As already demonstrated, disasters can create stress and anxiety in
residents not directly affected as well as actual victims. Anxieties may
range from nervousness duri ng i ncl ement weather to deep-rooted phobi as
affecting sleep and dreams (see, for example, Gleser et al., 1981). When
respondents were asked if they became nervous with the approach of storm
clouds, an overwhelming majority (87.7%) said that they did (Appendix A,
Table 28) with virtually no difference between racial groups. When
damage levels, age, and family size were considered, the difference
between black and white families remained minimal (Appendix A, Table 29).
As may be expected, victims with high damage more often reported nervousness in stormy weather than those with moderate damage; however, the
percentage difference was slight, particularly among black victims.
Younger victims also reported a greater incidence of this kind of anxie39

ty.

While the

more

younger

weather.

percentage difference among whites was negligible, 9.7%
blacks

Family

nervousness;

than

size was

older
an

reported

additional

feeling
factor

slightly more large than small

nervous

in

stormy

correlating with this

families were emotionally

affected by stormy weather.
Although a large number of respondents reported nervousness, smaller
percentages were affected by their disaster experiences to the point that
they experienced bad dreams (35.6%) or sleep disturbances
differences between racial

(54.6%). The

groups were small with slightly more blacks

experiencing these more severe effects.
To explore the causes of these more severe effects, withi n each
racial

group a number of variables were considered:

damage level, age

group, family size, knowing others killed or injured, having relatives
injured, having relatives killed, having friends injured, having friends
killed, having neighbors injured, and having neighbors killed. Overall,
the differences between racial groups were slight. Among black victims,
X2 tests of the va ri ab 1es ment i oned above i ndi cated that several were
significantly related to experiencing bad dreams: knowing others killed
or injured; having friends killed; and having neighbors injured. Among
white victims, factors significantly related to experiencing bad dreams
were:

having

high

damage

levels;

being

a younger

rather

than

older

victim; belonging to a larger family; knowing others killed or injured;
and

having neighbors

killed.

Thus,

the only

variable

related to bad

dreams common to both racial groups was knowing others killed or injured.
The incidence of bad dreams among black victims was associated only with
deaths and injuries of persons who they knew;

whereas those of white

victims were also associated with several demographic factors.
Several variables were significantly related to sleeplessness among
black victims: knowing others killed or injured; having friends killed;
and having neighbors who were injured (the same variables related to bad
dreams).

Among whites

the significant

variables were:

knowing

others

killed or injured; and having neighbors killed.
Those surveyed were asked to assess the extent to which their children had been affected emotionally by the storm (Appendix A, Table 28).
Most

parents

agreed

(with

no

significant

difference

between

racial

groups) that their children were afraid to be away from their parents
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during stormy weather and that they were nervous in stormy weather. In
comparing these results with the respondents' self-reports of nervousness
in stormy weather, there was a slightly higher proportion of parents who
thought that their children were adversely affected by the disaster than
there were adults who viewed themselves as affected, possibly demonstrating the added vulnerability of children to such stressors.
A number of variables possibly related to separation anxiety and
nervousness in children were examined. Among black victims, separation
anxiety was positively related to family size, knowing others killed or
injured, and having a friend killed. Among white victims, the only factor significantly associated with separation anxiety in children was
family size.
In order to determine and compare feelinys of fatalism, a fourquestion index was used (Appendix A, Table 30). Three of the items deal
directly with persons' feelings about fate, and one item, the balancing
of bad and good, was used as an indicator of optimism.
In general, black victims were more fatalistic than white victims;
differences between racial groups were significant for all but the first
item on the scale. Although these findings support those in other sections, it is not possible to determine if such feelings can be attributable solely to the tornado experience, because no data assessing levels
of fatalism were gathered prior to the tornado. It is possible that
blacks as a group are more fatalistic than whites, irrespective of disaster experiences.
To further explore levels of fatalism, damage levels were taken into
account (Appendix A, Table 31). It was expected that victims incurring
greater losses would exhibit higher levels of fatalism. While true for
white victims, this relationship did not hold for black victims, but instead ran cont ra ry to expect at ions. Mode rate-damage blacks had hi gher
fatalism scores than those with greater losses. However, high-loss
blacks expressed significantly lower levels of optimism.
Findings: Aid Utilization and Recovery
A large number of aid programs and services were available to victims in Paris, including several from national agencies and organizations
(e.g., FEMA, SBA, Red Cross), and others from the state, local churches,
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and local civic organizations. The following discussion is limited to
major, widely available programs. Some programs and aid sources were
used by so few respondents that sample sizes precluded meaningful analyses.
The federal government provi ded several servi ces to vi ct ims of the
tornado, such as a Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) to aid victims in
applying for available relief programs, Small Business Administration
loans, Farmers Home Administration loans, Internal Revenue Service assistance, and temporary housing provided by FEMA. Most of these services
and coordination with other helping agencies were administered through
the Denton, Texas, office of FEMA.
The FEMA office in Paris provided temporary housing services and
took applications for assistance programs after the DAC was closed. The
temporary housing took several forms: subsidized rental homes and apartments, rent-free mobile homes, and financial compensation to families and
friends housing disaster victims. Because of this compensation" and because a sufficient number of rental properties were available in Paris,
only 88 mobile homes were needed as temporary housing. Of those victims
interviewed, only 35 utilized these mobile homes. Although FEMA sponsored the Individual and Family Grant Program (IFG), the program was admi ni stered by the Texas Department of Human Resources whi ch shared the
cost. Additionally, the Army Corps of Engineers aided in debris removal
so that rebuilding could be promptly started on family home sites, and
the Air Force provided services in rebuilding and repairing homes.
The most wi dely used program admi ni stered by the state was the
previously mentioned Individual and Family Grant Program (IFG). IFG
provided grants up to $5,000 to victims who had exhausted all other resources and been turned down for an SBA loan. Although some victims were
below the poverty line even before their tornado losses, the IFG was in
tended to cover only expenses incurred as a result of the disaster. The
State of Texas provided several other forms of assistance. For example,
the Texas Employment Commission helped process unemployment claim for
those who were out of work due to the di saster, and the Department of
Human Resources provided food stamps.
Four major national volunteer organizations were present in Paris:
the Ameri can Red Cross, the Mennonite Di saster Servi ce, the Chri st ian
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Public Service, and the Salvation Army. The Red Cross provided a number
of forms of ass i stance in Pari sand, among survey respondent s, was the
most widely used aid source. Duri ng its emergency phase, the Red Cross
set up a total of fi ve she 1ters to provi de food and she lte r and ass i st
with applications for aid. It provided direct assistance to families in
the

form

clothing,

of

credit

beds,

grants

with

merchants

shoes, eating and cooking

for

necessities

utensils,

and

rent;

such

as

and it

administered mobile and fixed food services for victims and volunteers.
As mentioned, the Red Cross found it necessary to enter an Additional

Assistance

Phase, during which

it provided assistance for medical

bills, home furnishings, appliances, prescriptions, and other supplies.
It also provided coordination and some funding of materials for home
repair

and

rebuilding;

construction

crews

were

Di saster Servi ces and Chri st i an Pub 1 i c Servi ce.

provided
In

by Mennonite

addit ion,

the Red

Cross coordinated services and funds of other church groups and local
civic organizations.
Under the auspices of Church World Services,

Interfaith Disaster

Services (IDS) was incorporated in May with funding coming from Church
World Services and local churches.

IDS provided a variety of services

including the payment of back taxes, payment of delinquent utility bills,
rent deposits, clothing, furniture, appliances, building materials, food,
and trees.

IDS worked closely with the Red Cross to provide materials

and furnishings for rebuilding and repair that the Red Cross could not
provide. The goal of IDS was to take care of those with needs that did
not qualify for other aid, or those who might have otherwise "fallen
through cracks."
As far as could be determined, no crisis counseling programs were
available

in

Paris,

although

it

probably an area of great need.
that they had
these,

experienced emotional

only 13.1%, or 35 victims

emotional

help.

appears
Of all

Of

the

majority (24 victims)

35

that

counseling

was

strain due to the storm, and of

received

victims

crisis

those interviewed, 60.1% felt

who

any

did

kind
receive

of counseling or
counseling,

the

received their counseling from a professional--a

counselor, a doctor, or a social worker. When the need for counseling
was compared between racial groups, significantly more white than black
victims indicated that they had experienced emotional
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strain. However,

both racial groups were equally as likely to actually receive counseling.
Victims of both racial groups were most likely to go to a professional
for counseling.

Only small percentages went to the clergy or to others.

Federal Aid
Two primary federal

agencies,

FEMA

and

SBA,

were

studied.

Al-

though FEMA offered a range of services and programs to municipal governments and related organizations, our focus is on programs available to
individual families--temporary housing, mobile homes, and compensation to
family and friends housing victims. Table III-1 presents data on aid
program user characteristics for each racial group.
Only a small

percentage of the respondents utilized federal

aid;

17.4% used FEMA and 4.4% used SBA. In comparing racial groups, differences in utilization rates of SBA were minimal; however, significantly
more black than white families used FEMA aid. Although blacks were as
likely as whites to obtain SBA loans, the average loan amount to whites
($19,430) was much higher than that to blacks ($9,400). Still, very few
persons from either group utilized these loans, most likely reflecting
the relatively low incomes of respondents, the large number of respondents on fixed incomes and public assistance, and the large number of
renters (the first two factors make it difficult to qualify for loans.)
Within both racial

groups, significantly more younger than c:Jer

families utilized FEMA and SBA aid.

In addition, more large families

utilized aid than did small families, although differences were slight.
For example, for temporary housing, large families were more likely than
smaller ones to seek help from FEMA rather than to stay with family or
friends. Thus, in the main, this greater utilization of aid probably
reflects the greater recovery needs of young and/or large families.
Utilization of federal aid was cross-tabulated with income, education, and occupational status, to assess the influence of socioeconomic
factors on utilization patterns. Families with moderate incomes in both
racial groups were somewhat more likely to use FEMA as an aid source than
were those with high incomes, poss i b1y because they had fewe r persona 1
resou rces to cont ri bute to thei r own

recove ry.

Among wh i te fami 1 i es,

those with lower incomes were more likely to get SBA loans, whereas the
opposite pattern occurs among black families where significantly more
high income blacks got SBA loans. This difference between racial groups
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TABLE III-l
RECIPIENTS OF FEDERAL AID
THOSE WHO USED:
FEDERAL AID (FEMA)
SBA
12.7% (27)
4.7% (10)

WHITE VI CTIMS
n = 212
BLACK VICTIMS n = 219 21. 9% (48)
4.1% ( 9)
WHITE VICTIMS
Under 60 years of age
16.0% (21)
n = 131
7.6% (10)
60 Years and Older
n = 81
7.4% ( 6)
0.0% ( 0)
BLACK VI CTIMS
Under 60 years of age
n = 136
23.5% (32)
5.9% ( 8)
60 Years and Older
n = 83
19.3% (16 )
1. 2% ( 1)
WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE
3 Persons or Less
10.8% (17)
n = 158
3.8% ( 6)
4 or More Persons
18.5% ( 10)
n = 54
7.4% ( 4)
BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE
3 Persons or Less
20.3% (27)
3.0% ( 4)
n = 133
4 or More Persons
24.4% (21)
n = 86
5.8% ( 5)
WHITE INCOME*
Moderate Income
n = 150
15.3% (23)
6.0% ( 9)
High Income
n = 62
6.5% ( 4)
1.6% ( 1)
BLACK INCOME*
Moderate Income
2.9% ( 6)
n = 209
23.0% (48)
High Income
30.0% ( 3)
n = 10
0.0% ( 0)
* Income has been categorized as Moderate Income = $0 - 1,299 per
month and High Income equal to $1,300 per month or higher.
WHITE VICTIMS: EDUCATION
12 Yrs. of School or Less
n = 148
13.5% (20)
4.7% ( 7)
More than 12 Yrs. of Educ.
n = 62
11.3% ( 7)
4.8% ( 3)
BLACK VICTIMS: EDUCATION
12 Yrs. of School or Less
n = 190
22.6% (43)
3.2% ( 6)
More than 12 Yrs. of Educ.
n = 28
17. 9% ( 5)
10.7% ( 3)

TABLE 111-1 (Continued)
THOSE WHO USED:
FEDERAL AID (FEMA)

SBA
WHITE EMPLOYMENT
White Collar Worker
n = 84
8.3% (7)
2.4% ( 2)
Blue Collar Worker
n = 116
15.5% (18 )
6.9% ( 8)
BLACK EMPLOYMENT
White Collar Worker
n = 14
28.6% ( 4)
7.1% ( 1)
Blue Collar Worker
n = 170
19.4% (33)
4.7% ( 8)
WHITE DAMAGE LEVELS*
Moderate Damage
n = 132
6.1% ( 8)
0.8% (1)
High Damage
n = 80
23.8% (19)
11.3% ( 9)
BLACK DAMAGE LEVELS*
Moderate Damage
n = 146
8.9% (13)
3.4% ( 5)
High Damage
47.9% (35)
n = 73
5.5% ( 4)
* Damage Levels are catagorized as Moderate Damage equal to 0 - 79%
damage to house and High Damage as more than 80%.
WHITE VICTIMS:
DOLLAR LOSSES
Moderate Losses to House
(Under $20,000)
n = 113
10.6% (12)
2.7% ( 3)
Heavy Losses to House
($20,000+)
n = 65
15.4% (10)
9.2% ( 6)
BLACK VICTIMS:
DOLLAR LOSSES
Moderate Losses to House
(Under $20,000)
n = 86
11. 6% (10)
1. 2% ( 1)
Heavy Losses to House
($20,000+)
n = 29
24.1% (7)
13.8% ( 4)

may be due to the relatively large number of black respondents on fixed
incomes and/or living in rental property.
Education levels appear to have no significant relationship to
federal aid utilization in either racial group. However, families with
heads of household having 12 years of education or less in both racial
groups were more likely to use FEMA than those with more education, and
among blacks, those with more than 12 years of education were slightly
more likely to receive an SBA loan than those with less education.
As with education levels, occupational status appears to have had no
significant effect on federal aid utilization in either racial group.
Among white families, those with blue collar heads of household received
FEMA and SBA aid more often than those with white collar heads of household. The opposite pattern held for black families.
Two independent measures, percent of damage to home and dollar loss
to home, were used to examine the effects of loss levels on aid receipt.
Consistently, both black and white families with high levels of loss were
more likely to use both types of federal aid than those with lower
losses. As would be expected, those with higher losses were more likely
to exhaust personal resources in recovery and then to turn to formal
organizations for additional aid.
In reviewing the demographic, socioeconomic, and disaster loss
characteristics in patterns of federal aid utilization, it appears that
the factor that has the best predictive validity among both racial groups
is disaster loss levels. Further, among specific characteristics, respondent age among white families appears to have good predictive value
for the use of federal aid, with young white families more likely to use
both types of aid.
Although the use of FEMA mobile homes was discussed previously,
additional information is pertinent at this point. Of the 35 families
living in FEMA mobile homes, 22.9% were white and 77.1% were black.
There were two FEMA mobile home courts. A large court was located in the
destroyed black neighborhood, and a smaller one was located in a
destroyed commercial mobile home park at the perimeter of the city.
Black families were much more likely to live in FEMA trailer courts than
to have their FEMA mobile home located on a private lot; 62.5% of white
families compared to 92.6% of black families lived in such courts. Amon9
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white families, only 20% of those living in FEMA courts lived near their
former homes, while 65.4% of black families did so. The majority of
respondents in -both racial groups living in FEMA mobile home courts (60%
of whites and 85% of blacks) felt that the courts were less pleasant than
their old neighborhoods. For both racial groups, most respondents felt
that the trailer application form was not difficult to fill out, that the
wait to actually get the trailer was reasonable, and that no extra or
unanticipated expenses were incurred. When asked to assess the disruption to family life caused by being temporarily housed in FEMA
trailers, 75% of both groups reported that it was very disruptive.
Victims who received federal aid (FEMA and/or SBA) were asked to
rate the importance of those aid programs in their economic and emotional
recovery. Due to the small number of SBA loan recipients among respondents, both aid sources are combined in the following discussion (Table
1II-2). In all, 53.5%, of the victims receiving federal aid rated aid
programs very important in their economic recovery, and 40.7% rated them
important in their emotional recovery. When racial groups were compared,
differences between groups were not significant, although a slightly
higher percentage of white than black victims rated aid programs as
important.
Other Ai~ Programs
The utilization of aid from the Red Cross, the Texas Department of
Human Resources, Interfaith Disaster Services (IDS), and from other miscellaneous sources such as employee, civic, and charitable organizations
(Lions, Elks, etc.) was examined and compared between racial groups
(Table 1II-3).
Of these aid sources, the most widely used was the Red Cross; over
half of the respondents said that they had received aid from that organization. Significantly more black than white families had received such
aid, and it was found that younger and/or larger families in both racial
groups were also more apt to use the Red Cross.
Approximately 25% of the respondents recei ved an Individual and
Family Grant from the Texas Department of Human Resources, with significantly more black than white recipients. However, the average grant to
black families ($2,294) was considerably smaller than that to white
families ($3,462). The higher recipient rate among blacks reflects their
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TABLE III-2
VICTIM ASSESSMENT OF AID IMPORTANCE FOR FAMILY RECOVERY
FEDERAL AID RECIPIENTS

VICTIMS n = 86
WHITE VICTIMS n = 33
BLACK VICTIMS n = 53

ECONOMIC RECOVERY
NOT IMPORTANT TO
VERY
MODERATELY IMPORTANT
IMPORTANT
46.5% (40)
53.5% (46)
42.4% (14)
57.6% (19)
49.1% (26)
50.9% (27)
X2 = 0.14
Si9. = .706
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY

VICTIMS n = 86
WHITE VICTIMS n = 33
BLACK VICTIMS n = 53

OTHER AID RECIPIENTS

VICTIMS n = 256
WHITE VICTIMS n = 108
BLACK VICTIMS n = 148

NOT IMPORTANT TO
VERY
MODERATELY IMPORTANT
IMPORTANT
59.3% (51)
40.7% (35)
(19)
42.4% (14)
57.6%
60.4% (32)
39.6% (21)
X2 = 0.0
Sig. = .975

ECONOMIC RECOVERY
NOT IMPORTANT TO
VERY
MODERATELY IMPORTANT
IMPORTANT
56.6% (145)
43.4% (111)
52.8% ( 57)
47.2% ( 51)
59.5% (88)
40.5% ( 60)
X2 = 0.88
Si9. = .348
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY

VICTIMS n = 256
WHITE VICTIMS n = 108
BLACK VICTIMS n = 148

NOT IMPORTANT TO
VERY
MODERATELY IMPORTANT
IMPORTANT
59.0% (151)
41.0% (105)
56.5% ( 61)
43.5% ( 47)
60.8% ( 90)
39.2% ( 58)
X2 = 0.32
Si g. = .571

TABLE II 1-3
RECIPIENTS OF NONFEDERAL AID
Percent Who Received Aid
RED CROSS

IFG*

I NTERFAITH**

LOCAL CIVIC***
ORGANIZATION

45.3% ( 96)
59.4% (130)

17.0% (36)
32.9% (72)

19.3% (41)
37.9% (83)

37 .3% (79)
35.6% (78)

WHITE VICTIMS: AGE
<60 Yrs. n = 131 48.1% ( 63)
~60 Yrs. n = 81
40.7% ( 33)

13.7% (18)
22.2% (18)

19.1% (25)
19.8% (16)

38.9% ( 51)
34.6% ( 28)

BLACK VICTIMS: A6t
<60 Yrs. n = 136 63.2%
~60 Yrs. n = 83
53.0%

86)
44)

33.8% (46)
31.3% (26)

41.2% ( 56)
32.5% (27)

39.7% (54)
28.9% (24)

WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE
~3 pers n = 158
42.4%
67)
~4 pers n = 54
53.7% ( 29)

16.5% (26)
18.5% (10)

17.1% (27)
25.9% (14)

33.5% (53)
48.1% (26)

BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE
~3 pers n = 133
54.1%
72)
~4 pers n = 86
67.4%
58)

29.3% (39)
38.4% (33)

34.6% (46)
43.0% ( 37)

31.6% (42)
41.9% (36)

WHITE VICTIMS: INCOME
Moderate n = 150 52.7%
High n = 62
27 .4%

79)
17)

22.7% (34)
3.2% ( 2)

23.3% (35)
9.7% ( 6)

40.7% (61)
20.0% (18)

BLACK VICTIMS: INCOME
Moderate n = 209 60.3% (126 )
High n = 10
40.0% ( 4)

34.4% (72)
0.0% ( 0)

38.3% (80)
30.0% ( 3)

35.4% (74)
40.0% ( 4)

WHITE VICTIMS: EDUCATION
High School Grad
or Less n = 148
48.0% ( 71)
College+ n = 62
40.3%( 25)

21.6% (32)
6.5% ( 4)

21.6% (32)
14.5% ( 9)

38.5% ( 57)
38.5% (22)

BLACK VICTIMS: EDUCATION
High School Grad
or Less n = 190
58.4% ( 111)
College+ n = 28
64.3% ( 18)

32.6% (62)
32.1% ( 9)

37.4% (71 )
42.9% (12)

34.2% (65)
46.4% ( 13)

WHITE VICTIMS
BLACK VICTIMS

(continued)

TABLE 111-3 (Continued)
Percent Who Received Aid
IFG*

INTERFAITH**

LOCAL CIVIC***
ORGANIZATION

34.5% ( 29)

3.6% ( 3)

6.0% ( 5)

31.0% (26)

51.7% ( 60)

24.1% (28)

30.2% (35)

41.4% (48)

8)

35.7% ( 5)

21.4% ( 3)

15.7% ( 5)

58.8% (100)

28.2% (48)

37.1% (63)

32.9% (56)

WHITE VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED
Moderate n = 132 28.0% 37)
High n = 80
73.8% ( 59)

9.1% (12)
30.0% (24)

11.4% (15)
32.5% (26)

25.0% (33)
57.5% (46)

BLACK VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED
Moderate n = 132 50.0% ( 66)
High n = 73
78.1% ( 57)

24.0% (32)
50.7% (37)

31.4% (42)
50.7% ( 37)

28.8% (38)
49.3% (36)

WHITE VICTIMS: LOSS IN DOLLARS
<$20,000 n = 113 35.4% ( 40)
t$20,000 n = 65
56.9% ( 37)

17.7% (20)
13.8% ( 9)

19.5% (22)
20.0% (13)

24.8% (28)
53.8% (35)

BLACK VICTIMS: LOSS IN DOLLARS
<$20,000 n = 86
44.2% (38)
t$20,000 n = 29
65.5% (19)

20.9% (18)
34.5% (10)

30.2% (26)
48.3% (14)

19.8% (17)
58.6% ( 17)

RED CROSS
WHITE VICTIMS:
White Collar
n = 84
Blue Collar
n = 116

EMPLOYMENT

BLACK VICTIMS:
White Collar
n = 14
Blue Collar
n = 170

EMPLOYMENT
57.1%(

*Individual Family Grants
**Interfaith Disaster Services
***Church, Civic, and Miscellaneous Organizations

lower socioeconomic status and their lack of personal resources.
Of all
aid

respondents, 28.8% used Interfaith Disaster Services as an

source,

again

with

significantly

greater

utilization

by

black

families.
Aid from the mi scellaneous sources was the second most frequently
used; 36.4% of all respondents reported receiving aid from their employers or local civic organizations. Unlike the utilization of other aid,
there were no significant differences between racial groups in the receipt of local aid. However, large families appeared to be more likely
to receive local aid than did smaller ones.
Overall, the most consistent demographic characteristic associated
with the use of these aid sources was race, with black families significantly more likely to use most

nonfederal

aid

sources.

Additionally,

among blacks, large family size was associated with increased utilization
of the Red Cross, and among whites large family size was similarly associated with the use of local aid.
For all the aid sources considered here, recipients were most likely
to be middle income, "blue collar" workers. Associations between socioeconomic status

and

aid were significant

for white

sources except 1 oca 1 aid, and the same general
black

victims,

although

associations

families

for

all

pattern occurred among

generally were not statistically

significant. (This may be due in part to the very small number of high
income, "white collar" blacks in the sample. Caution should be used in
interpreting the findings for blacks because of this small number.)
The association between the educational
household

and

aid

source use

background of the head of

is more complex.

Among white families,

those with a high school education or less were more likely to use all
four

aid

sources

than those with more education.

In

contrast,

among

blacks, slightly more families with some college used these aid sources
than those with lower levels of education.
As with federal aid, families in both racial groups with high damage
levels were significantly more likely to use state and local
those with moderate damage.

aid than

Indeed, severe damage appears to be one of

the most consistent indicators of probable use of nonfederal aid. When
damage was estimated in dollar amounts, two associations were significant
for both racial groups: high dollar losses and the use of both Red Cross
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and local aid.
In addition to the Individual and Family Grant Program, the State of
Texas administered a food stamp program for victims. Of the respondents,
22.5% received food stamps through this program. There were no significant differences between racial groups in receiving this aid, although a
slightly higher percentage of black families

(26%) than white families

(18.9%) received food stamps.
Although Mennonite construction aid was widely used by respondents
(9.5% of the total respondents received Mennonite aid), this aid was of
considerable importance to poor and older families who did not have the
financial

resources to repair and rebuild their homes otherwise. Among

whites, 12.3% said they utilized Mennonite labor, while 6.8% of the black
respondents did so.
Because three times as many respondents used these four aid sources
as

used

federal

programs,

they were

important

to

victim recovery

in

Paris. Since so few of the respondents obtained SI3A loans (particularly
the poor and elderly families) many had to rely on aid from nonfederal
programs
repairs

in the
and

necessities
clothing,

repair and

rebuilding of homes.

In addition to major

rebuilding,

these

particular aid

sources

provided

living

during

after

the

emergency

period,

including

food,

The

provision

of such

necessities may

and

and

household items.

have facilitated long-term recovery by helping to alleviate a sense of
extreme deprivation which sometimes occur with sudden and heavy losses.
As with federal

aid recipients, recipients of aid from nonfederal

sources rated the importance of those aid programs in their economic and
emot i ona 1 recovery. These data are presented in Table I I I -2. Some 43%
of nonfederal aid recipients rated those aid programs as very important
in their economic recovery. The difference between racial groups was not
large, although slightly more white than black families considered them
very

important.

recovery,

with

A similar
aid

pattern

programs

occurred

being

less

with

important

regard
to

to

emotional

emotional

than

economic recovery.
In comparing the responses of federal aid recipients with those of
nonfedera 1 aid, it appea rs that federa 1 aid rec i p i ents rated those p rograms more important in their economic recovery than did other aid recipients.

However,

with

respect

to
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emotional

recovery

both

federal

nonfedera1 aid recipients rated aid programs about equally.
Respondents were asked about the ways that they found out about the
available disaster aid programs in Paris. Of the 422 respondents who did
receive information, the most frequently mentioned source of information
was word of mouth. Approximately 70% of all respondents received informat ion in such a manner. The second most often used source of i nformation was from the newspapers which 44% of the respondents used.
There are clear differences between racial groups in the sources of
aid information. Black families were Significantly more likely than
white families to learn about aid programs from the disaster assistance
center and from word of mouth. Among black families, 32.5% learned about
the aid programs at the DACs, while 21.0% of white families learned about
them in this way. Since victims from both racial groups were equally as
likely to go to the DACs, the DACs seem to have been an especially important source of information about aid programs for black families. Of the
black families, 73% received aid program information by word of mouth,
while 61% white families did likewise.
White families were significantly more likely than black families to
learn about aid programs from the media. About 38% of white families and
21% of black families received their information from television or
radio. Similarly, about 52% of white families and 41.5% of black
famil i es reported readi ng about aid programs in the newspapers. On 1y
sma 11 numbers of respondents used i nformat i on sou rces such as posters,
clergy, disaster volunteers, the Red Cross, Salvation Army, and local
civic organizations. The differences between racial groups in the use of
these information sources were minimal.
Insurance
For those vi ct i ms who owned thei r own homes, insurance played a
major role in recouping economic losses suffered in the disaster. Since
few victims utilized SBA loans, IFG, or other aid sources in the repair
and rebuilding of their homes, reconstruction in Paris was primar'i1y
financed by insurance monies. Of the 315 victims interviewed who owned
thei r homes, 85.7% had household ins urance at the time of the tornado.
(Failure to have adequate insurance was one of the factors that determined the extent to which federal and other aid programs were utilized in
reconstruction of private homes.)
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TABLE 111-4
HOUSE INSURANCE:

USER CHARACTERISTICS
HOMEOWNER INSURANCE
AT TIME OF DISASTER
WHITE VICTIMS
BLACK VICTIMS
(n = 193)
(n = 122)

Total

88.5% (165)

86.1% (105)

Age
Under 60 Years
60 Years and Older

87 .4% (104)
82.4% ( 61)

83.1%
88.9%

49)
56)

Family Size
3 Persons or Less
4 Or More

85.?% (121 )
86.3% ( 44)

87.?%
83.31,

75)
30)

Income
Moderate
High

79.1% (10n)
100.0% ( 59)

85.1%
100.0%

97)
8)

Education
High School or Less
Coll ege +

81.6% (111)
94.6% ( 53)

88.2%
75.0%

90)
15)

Occupation
White Collar Worker
Blue Collar Worker

95.6%
75.8%

90.0% ( 9)
87.9% ( 87)

65)
75)

In Table 111-4, the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of
insurance users are presented. The characteri st i cs of race, age, and
family size were not Significantly associated with having household
insurance (although it is interesting to note that among whites, slightly
more young than elderly families had insurance, while among blacks, the
opposite pattern held). Socioeconomic variables, on the other hand, were
related for white victims; those with higher income, education, and occupational status were more likely to have household insurance. Among
black families these variables were not significantly associated. However, again, since so few black families interviewed in Paris were in the
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TABLE III-5
INSURANCE ADEQUACY
VICTIMS EVALUATING COVERAGE
AS Af)EOUATE*
WHITE VICTIMS
BLACK VICTIMS
(n = 193)
(n = 122)
Total

60.7% (116)

50.0% (58)

68.1% ( 81)
48.6% ( 35)

57.5% (42)
37 .2% (16)

61.3%
59.7%

73)
43)

45.5% (25)
54.1% (33)

50.0%
84.7%

66)
50)

4R.1% (52)
75.0% ( 6)

Damage Level

Moderate
High
Age

Under 60 Years
60 Years and Older
Income

Moderate
High
*80% to 100% of losses covered

higher socioeconomic stratum, these statistics should not be taken as
conclusive. Similar to whites, black victims with white collar jobs and
high income were slightly more likely to have insurance than those with
blue collar occupations and/or lower income. However, unlike white victims, blacks with some college were slightly less likely to have insurance than those with less education.
Although having insurance is important, the adequacy of insurance is
perhaps a more crucial factor. Table III-~ presents insurance adequacy
cross-tabulated with several victim characteristics. (Victims who had
80% or more of thei r losses covered by insurance were categorized as
having adequate coverage. The table includes only those victims who
owned their homes at the time of the tornado.)
Although black families were equally as likely as white families to
have household insurance, they were significantly less likely to consider
their coverage adequate. For both racial groups, those with moderate
damage were significantly more likely than those with high damage to have
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adequate insurance coverage, and, as might be expected, those with high
. income were more likely to

report adequate insurance than those with

lower income. The difference between age groups in insurance coverage
adequacy is minimal.
By the time of interviewing (eight months after the tornado), 99% of
all respondents having insurance had settled their claims with their insurance companies. Eighty-nine percent believed that their settlements
were fair and indicated that they had no problems with their insurance
companies. Among those 31 respondents who were unsatisfied (19 white and
12 black victims), 35.5% said that they did not

have enough coverage

(the most common complaint), followed by 25.8% who felt they were misled
by thei r insurance company about thei r coverage needs,

and 12.9% who

believed they had settled prematurely.
Concerning insurance coverage, there was one significant difference
between racial

groups. White families were much more likely than black

to have insurance covering additional

living expenses (A.L.E.). A.L.E.

provides di saster vi ctims with di rect payments for expenses encountered
due to their

inability to

live

in

storm-damaged homes.

Lacking this

resource, blacks were much more likely to utilize other aid and to use
personal resources to pay for temporary housing.
To

measure

family

recovery,

victims

were

asked

to

rate

their

families' level of economic and emotional recovery from the disaster, and
the responses were cross-tabulated with insurance (Table 111-6).
Among white victims economic recovery was significantly associated
with having house insurance, while no association was found for black
families. This difference is likely to be a reflection of the higher
incidence of inadequate insurance coverage reported by blacks. Emotional
recovery on the other hand, appears to have been unrelated to insurance.
Having adequate coverage appears to be a more important factor than
simply having insurance in explaining the difference between incomplete
and

complete

recovery.

As

indicated

in

the table,

families

of

both

racial groups who had adequate insurance were Significantly more likely
to have completely recovered, both economically and emotionally, eight
months after the disaster than those with inadequate insurance.
After major disasters, victims frequently obtain insurance if they
had

none

before,

or expand existing coverage
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(Drabek

and Key,

1983;

TABLE II 1-6
INSURANCE AND FAMILY RECOVERY
(Those who owned homes)
VI CTI MS WHO HAD
HOUSE INSURANCE
APRIL 1979

VI CTI MS WHO HAD
ADEQUATE HOUSE
INSURANCE

Incomplete Recovery

77 .9% (74)
n = 95

40.9% (38)
n = 93

Complete Recovery

92.9% (91)
n = 98

79.6% (78)
n = 98

X2 = 7.54
Si g. = .006

X2 = 28.41
Sig. = 0.0

Incomplete Recovery

86.0% (92)
n = 107

50.9% (54)
n = 106

Complete Recovery

84.9% (73)
n = 86

72 .9% (62)
n = 85

WHITE VICTIMS
Economic Recovery Index

Emotional Recovery Index

X2
Si g.

= 0.0
= .992

X2 = 8.67
Si g. = .003

BLACK VI CTI MS
Economic Recovery Index

Incomplete Recovery

84.8% (67)
n = 79

37 .8% (28)
n = 74

Complete Recovery

88.8% (38)
n = 43

71.4% (30)
n = 42

X2 = 0.07
Si g. = .778

X2 = 10.79
Si g. = .001

Incomplete Recovery

86.1% (62)
n = 72

40.9% (27)
n = 66

Complete Recovery

86.0% (43)
n = 50

62.0% (31)
n = 50

X2
Sig.

X2 = 4.25
Si g. = .039

Emotional Recovery Index

=

0.0

= 1.00

TABLE III-7
CHANGES IN HOUSE INSURANCE
(Those who owned homes)
PERCENT HAVING HOUSE INSURANCE
1982
Currently

A~ril

TOTAL
WHITE VICTIMS
BLACK VICTIMS

85.7%
85.5%
86.1%

(n
(n
(n

315 )
193)
122)

88.9%
89.6%
87.8%

(n
(n
(n

316)
193)
11.'3)

WHITE VICTIMS

Moderate Damage
High Damage

85.7% (119 )
85.1% ( 74)

87.5% (120)
93.2% ( 73)

84.6% ( 78)
88.6% ( 44)

87.2% ( 78)
88.9% ( 45)

87.4% (119)
82.4% ( 74)

93.3% ( 119)
83.8% ( 74)

83.1% ( 59)
88.9% ( 63)

84.7%
90.6%

BLACK VICTIMS

Moderate Damage
High Damage
WHITE VICTIMS

Under 60 Years
60 Years and Older
BLACK VICTIMS

Under 60 Years
60 years and Older

59)
64)

Bolin, 1982). In general, the survey found a slight increase in insurance coverage after the storm. As indicated in Table 111-7, this pattern
held across racial groups, damage levels, and age groups. The only
Significant difference occurred between age groups of white victims. At
the time of interviewing, younger white families were Significantly more
likely to have house insurance than older white families.
Si nce a cons i derab 1e number of respondents (116) rented apartments
or homes at the time of the tornado, ins urance cove rage of household
contents was considered separately. At the time of the disaster, 64.7%
of all respondents had insurance on their household contents. Whereas
the difference between rac i a 1 groups was not sign ifi cant for i nsuri ng
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homes, it was for insuring household contents. Among white respondents,
74.1% had insurance on their household contents, compared to 55.7% of
black families. The tornado prompted more families in both racial groups
to insure their household contents, with about the same percentage in
each racial group obtaining new insurance after the storm. Thus, the
difference between racial groups in insuring contents remained statistically significant. At the time of interviewing, 80.7% of whites and 61.0%
of blacks had insurance on contents.
When having insurance on household contents is cross-tabulated with
economi c and emoti ona 1 recovery, it appears that havi ng thi s insurance
did have a positive impact on both dimensions of recovery for both racial
groups.
?rimary Group Aid: Kin, Neighbors, and Friends
Primary groups--friends, neighbors, and kin--are an important source
of aid, comfort, and support for disaster victims (Bolin, 1983). Typically, primary group aid is offered without victims having to request it,
and recipients do not have to go through impersonal, bureaucratic procedures in order to obtain it. The immediate and relatively unconditional nature of such aid makes it parti cul arly appropri ate for stricken
families in the emergency period. Data on the extent to which families
in Paris utilized aid from friends and kin are presented in Table 111-8.
White families were significantly more likely than black families to
receive aid from kin (67.9% versus 47.9%). (Kin includes all relations
by blood or marriage who live outside of the immediate household of the
respondent.) On the face of it, this fact seems to disagree with previous findings on black kin groups in America (e.g., Stack, 1974). White
families were also significantly more likely to receive aid from neighbors (31.1% versus 8.2%) and/or friends (54.7% versus 22.8%). Since
black victims were of significantly lower socioeconomic status, the
differences in aid may be attributed to the lack of resources among
potential black aid givers. Thus, as already mentioned, this lack of
resources also explains why black victims had to rely on governmental
aid.
By age group, younger white victims were significantly more likely
than older ones to receive aid from all categories of the primary group.
However, slightly more older than younger black families received aid
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TABLE IlI-8
PRIMARY GROUP AID
THOSE RECEIVING AID FROM:
RELATIVES
NEIGHBORS
FRIENDS
WHITE VICTIMS

n = 212

67.9% (144)

31.1% (66)

54.7% (116)

BLACK VICTIMS

n = 219

47.9% (105)

8.2% (18)

22.8%

50)

78.6% (103)
50.6% ( 41)

38.2% (50)
19.8% (16)

68.7%
32.1%

90)
90)

46.3% ( 63)
50.6% ( 42)

7 .4% (10)
9.6% ( 8)

19.9%
27.7%

27)
23)

69.0% (109)
64.8% ( 35)

28.5% (45)
38.9% (21)

55.1%
53.7%

87)
29)

63)
42)

8.3% (11 )
8.1% (7)

24.1%
20.9%

32)
18)

63.3% ( 95)
79.0% ( 49)

22.0% (33)
53.2% (33)

48.7%
73)
69.4% ( 43)

48.8% (102)
30.0% ( 3)

7.7% (16)
20.0% ( 2)

23.0% ( 48)
20.0% ( 2)

63.5% ( 94)
77 .4% ( 48)

23.0% (34)
50.0% (31)

71)
48.0%
69.4% ( 43)

48.9% ( 93)
42.9% ( 12)

7.9% (15)
10.7% ( 2)

23.2% ( 44)
21.4% ( 6)

WHITE VICTIMS:

<60 Yrs.
~60 Yrs.

AGE

n = 131
n = 81

BLACK VICTIMS:

<60 Yrs.
~60 Yrs.

n = 136
n = 83

WHITE VICTIMS:
~3 pers
~4

pers

~4

pers

FAMILY SIZE

n = 158
n = 54

BLACK VICTIMS:
~3 pers

AGE

FAMILY SIZE

n = 133
n = 86

WHITE VICTIMS:

47 .4%
48.8%
INCOME

Moderate n = 150
High n = 62
BLACK VICTIMS:

INCOME

Moderate n = 209
High n = 10
WHITE VICTIMS:

EDUCATION

High School Grad
or Less n = 148
College+ n = 62
BLACK VICTIMS:

High School Grad
or Less n = 190
College+ n = 28

EDUCATION

(continued)

TABLE 111-8 (Continued)
THOSE RECEIVING AID FROM:
RELATIVES
NEIGHBORS
FRIENDS

WHITE VICTIMS: EMPLOYMENT
White Collar n = 84
Blue Collar n = 116

77 .4%
60.3%

65)
70)

45.2% (38)
22.4% (26)

61.9%
49.1%

52)
57)

BLACK VICTIMS: EMPLOYMENT
White Collar n = 14
Blue Collar n = 170

28.6%
48.8%

4)

28.6%
22.9%

4)

83)

7.1% ( 1)
8.2% (14)

39)

WHITE VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED
Moderate n = 132
59.1%
High n = 80
82.5%

78)
66)

26.5% (35)
38.8% (31)

48.5%
65.0%

64)
52)

BLACK VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED
Moderate n = 164
37.7%
Hi gh n = 73
68.5%

55)
50)

7.5% (11)
9.6% ( 7)

15.8%
37.0%

23)
27)

WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY INJURED IN STORM
None n = 186
68.8% (128)
One or More n = 26
61.5% ( 16)

28.5% (53)
50.0% (13)

55.4% (103)
50.0% ( 13)

BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY INJURED IN STORM
None n = 201
46.8%
94)
One or More n = 18
61.1% ( 11)

7.0% (14)
22.2% ( 4)

20.9%
44.4%

42)
8)

from tlw three categories. Recei pt of aid from primary group members
does not appear to be Significantly associated with family size for
either rdcial group.
I\nvllY white families, those in the higher socioeconomic categories
of income, education, and occupational status were consistently significantly more likely than others to receive aid from primary group members.
However, the relationship between socioeconomic status and receipt of aid
from primary group members among blacks was more complex. For example,
blacks with lower income or less education were slightly more likely to
receive aid from family and friends, while those with high incomes or
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more education were slightly more likely to receive aid from their neigh. bors. Black households headed by blue collar workers were more likely to
receive aid from relatives and neighbors, whereas white collar households
were more apt to receive aid from friends.
In both racial groups, families with high losses relied on primary
group aid more frequently than those with less severe losses.
Whether or not family members were injured significantly affected
the receipt of primary group aid. Among white victims, families who
experienced injuries were more likely to receive aid from neighbors than
those who had no injuries. Similarly, black families who had sustained
injuries were more likely than those who had not to receive aid from both
neighbors and friends. Injuries among disaster victims tend to reduce
their recovery potential while increasing demands and stresses on their
families. It is not surprising that injuries may increase the receipt of
aid and support from those close to the victims' families.

TABLE III-9
PRIMARY GROUP AID AND FAMILY RECOVERY
ECONOMIC RECOVERY INDEX
COMPLETE
INCOMPLETE
WHITE VICTIMS. RECEIVING:
Aid from Kin n = 144
Aid from Friends n = 116

54.2% (78)
50.9% (59)

45.8%
49.1%

BLACK VICTIMS RECEIVING:
Aid from Kin n = 105
Aid from Friends n = 50

19.0% (20)
22.0% (11 )

81.0% ( 85)
78.0% ( 39)

66)
57)

EMOTIONAL RECOVERY INDEX
COMPLETE
INCOMPLETE
WHITE VICTIMS RECEIVING:
Aid from Kin n = 144
Aid from Friends n = 116

43.8% (63)
42.2% (49)

56.3%
57.8%

BLACK VICTIMS RECEIVING:
Aid from Kin n = 105
Aid from Friends n = 50

28.6% (30)
34.0% ( 17)

71.4% ( 75)
66.0% ( 33)

63

81)
67)

Respondents' assessments of thei r economi c and emot i ona 1 recovery
were cross-tabulated with receipt of primary group aid. The results are
presented in Table 111-9.
Among white families, there were slight positive relationships
between receiving aid from kin and friends and subsequent economic recovery. In contrast, the relationships between aid from kin and friends
and economic recovery were negative among black families. The relationshi ps between emot i ona 1 recovery and aid from kin and fri ends were negative for both racial groups, although most relationships were weak--the
except ion bei ng for that between aid from kin and emot i ona 1 recovery
among black families.
Findings: Determinants of Recovery
Previous research on family recovery (e.g., Bolin, 1976; Bolin,
1982) has demonstrated that recovery outcomes may be affected by a number
of factors: victims' predisaster demographic and socioeconomic characteristics which affect a family's stress response capabilities, as well
as a complex set of impact and response characteristics.
Table III-1D demonstrates the influence of several factors on
economic recovery outcomes. As indicated, at the time of the interviews,
39.4% of the subjects reported that they were fully recovered economically. The differences in economic recovery between racial groups were
statistically significant, with white families more likely to be fully
recovered than blacks.
Although older families in both racial groups were more likely than
younger ones to be fully recovered economi cally, di fferences were not
large. However, for both racial groups, smaller families were more likely to report economic recovery than larger ones; families with higher incomes and lower loss levels were also significantly more likely to report
such recovery.
Tab 1e I II -11 exami nes factors affect i ng 1eve 1s of emot i ona 1 recovery. Approximately the same percentage of total respondents were
fully recovered emotionally eight months after the disaster as were fully
recovered economically. As with economic recovery, white families were
significantly more likely to be fully recovered emotionally than were
black families. Similarly, older families in both racial groups were
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TABLE III-II)
INFLUENCES ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY
ECONOMIC RECOVERY INDEX
INCOMPLETE
COMPLETE
n = 431
WHITE VICTIMS n
BLACK VICTIMS n

TOTAL

= 212
= 219

60.6% (261)
48.6% (103)
72 .1% (158)

39.4% (170)
51.4% (l09)
27.9% ( 61)
X2 = 24.06
Si9. = 0.0

WHITE VICTIMS: AGE
<60 Yrs. n = 131
~60 Yrs. n = 81

50.4%
45.7%

49.6% 65)
54.3% ( 44)

66)
37)

X2 = 0.27
Si9. = .600
BLACK VICTIMS: AGE
<60 Yrs. n = 136
~60 Yrs. n = 83

26.5%
30.1%

73.5% (100)
69.9% ( 58)

36)
25)
X2 = 0.18
Si 9. = .668

WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE
pers n = 158
~4 pers n = 54
~3

53.2%
46.3%

84)
25)

46.8%
53.7%

74)
29)

67.7%
79.1%

90)
68)

X2 = 0.51
Si9. = .48
BLACK VI CTI MS : FAMILY SIZE
n = 133
~4 pers n = 86

~3 pers

32.3% ( 43)
20.9% ( 18)
X2 = 2.83
5i9. = .09

(continued)

TABLE 111-10 (Continued)
ECONOMIC RECOVERY INDEX
INCOMPLETE
COMPLETE
WHITE VICTIMS:

INCOME

Moderate* n = 150
High** n = 62

58.0% ( 87)
25.8% ( 16)

42.0% ( 63)
74.2% ( 46)
X2 = 16.93
5ig. = .000

BLACK VICTIMS:

INCOME

Moderate n = 209
High n = 10

26.3%
60.0%

(

73.7% (154)
40.0% ( 4)

55)
6)
X2 = 3.84
5i g. = .05

WHITE VICTIMS: DAMAGE SUFFERED
Moderate n = 132
High n = 80

35.6%
47)
70.0% ( 56)

64.4% ( 85)
30.0% ( 24)
X2 = 22.23
5ig. = .000

BLACK VICTIMS:

DAMAGE SUFFERED

Moderate n = 146
High n = 73

35.6%
12.3%

(

64.4%
87.7%

52)
9)

= 12.()0
Si g. = .001
X2

*< $l,OOO/month
**~ $l,OOO/month

94)
64)

TABLE III-ll
INFLUENCES ON EMOTIONAL RECOVERY
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY INDEX
COMPLETE
INCOMPLETE
n = 431
WHITE VICTIMS n
BLACK VICTIMS n

TOTAL

= 212
= 219

60.8% (262)
56.1% (Ug)
65.3% (143)

39.2% (169)
43.9% ( 93)
34.7% ( 76)
X2 = 3.42
Sig. = .06

WHITE VICTIMS: AGE
<60 Yrs. n = 131
~60 Yrs. n = 81

38.2% ( 50)
53.1% ( 43)

61.8% 81)
46.9% ( 38)
X2 = 3.94
Si g. = .05

BLACK VICTIMS: AGE
<60 Yrs. n = 136
~60 Yrs. n = 83

33.1% ( 45)
37 .3% ( 31)

66.9%
62.7%

91)
52)

X? = 0.25
Si g. = .62
WHITE VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE
~3 pers n = 158
~4 pers n = 54

51.3'/' 81 )
70.4% ( 38)

77)
48.7%
29.6% ( 16)

X2 = 5.21
Si g. = .02
BLACK VICTIMS: FAMILY SIZE
~3 pers n = 133
~4 pers n = 86

63.9% 85)
67 .4% ( 58)

36.1% ( 48)
32.6% ( 28)
X2 = 0.15
Si9. = .69

(continued)

TABLE III-II (Continued)
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY INDEX
INCOMPLETE
COMPLETE
WHITE VICTIMS:

INCOME

Moderate* n = 150
High** n = 62

38.7%
56.5%

61.3% ( 92)
43.5% ( 27)

58)
35)
X2 = 4.94
Sig. = .02

BLACK VICTIMS:

INCOME

Moderate n = 209
High n = 10

66.5% (139)
40.0% ( 4)

33.5% ( 70)
60.0% ( 6)
X2 = 1.90
Si9. = .16

WHITE VICTIMS:

DAMAGE SUFFERED

Moderate n = 132
High n = 80

53.0% ( 70)
28.8% ( 23)

47.0%
62)
71.3% ( 57)
X2 = 10.96
Si g. = .001

BLACK VICTIMS:

DAMAGE SUFFERED

Moderate n = 146
High n = 73

59.6% ( 87)
76.7% ( 56)

40.4% ( 59)
23.3% ( 17)
X2 = 5.56
Sig. = .01

*< $l,OOO/month
**~ $l,OOO/month

TABLE 111-12
AID ADEQUACY
THOSE REPORTING TOTAL AID AS ADEQUATE*
WHITE VICTIMS
BLACK VI CTI MS
TOTAL
DAMAGE:
AGE:

Moderate
High

<60 Yrs.
~60 Yrs.

INCOME:

n
n

= 136
= 83

Moderate
High

FAMILY SIZE:

~3 persons
~4 persons

61.1% (124)

30.5% (62)

63.6% ( 82)
56.8% ( 42)

33.6% (45)
24.6% (17)

64.0% ( 80)
56.4% ( 44)

24.2% (30)
40.5% (32)

51.1%
83.9%

52)

30.1% (58)
40.0% ( 4)

60.9%
61.5%

92)
32)

34.9% (44)
23.4% (18)

72)

25 Missing Cases
*Adequacy is defined as at least 80% of incurred losses being covered by
aid from all sources.

more

likely

to

report

emotional

recovery.

Small

family

size

also

appeared to positively influence emotional recovery among white families,
but had a minimal influence among blacks.
Income and damage levels had similar affects on emotional recovery
in both racial groups. Those with high incomes were Significantly more
likely to be emotionally recovered,
among black families.

although the association is weak

Families with moderate

incomes

in

both

racial

groups were significantly more likely than those with high incomes to be
fully emotionally recovered--contradicting the findings of previous research (Bolin, 1982).
The effects of background factors on aid adequacy are presented in
Table III-12. Victims were asked to assess the percentage of all thei r
losses covered by formal

aid sources and insurance. Aid adequacy was

di chotomi zed into adequate (80% or more of the losses covered) and i nadequate (less than 80% covered). Only 45.8% of all respondents indicated that they recei ved adequate aid. Differences between rac i a 1 groups
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were significant, with half the percentage of blacks compared to whites
reporting having received adequate aid.
As may be expected, famil i es in both rac i a 1 groups with mode rate
damage were slightly more likely to receive adequate aid than those with
higher loss levels. Among white families, the association between age
and aid adequacy was not significant; however, among blacks the association was statistically significant, with more older families saying that
they received adequate aid. In addition, in both racial groups, families
with high incomes were more likely than those with lower incomes to have
received adequate aid. Family size had a minimal effect among white
families, but among blacks, smaller families were more likely to report
receiving adequate aid.
Table III-13 cross-tabulates the number of formal aid sources used

TABLE I II-13
NUMBER OF AID SOURCES AND FAMILY RECOVERY
ECONOMIC RECOVERY INDEX
COMPLETE
INCOMPLETE

Number of Aid Sources

WHITE VICTIMS:

BLACK VI CTI t~S:

~3 sources

>3 sources

n=152
n=60

64.5% (98)
18.3% (11)

~3 sources
>3 sources

n=139
n=80

38.8% (54)
8.8% ( 7)

~3 sources

>3 sources

BLACK VI CTI MS :

~3

sources
>3 sources

X2 = 21.42
Sig. = .000

61.2% (85)
91.3% (73)

EMOTIONAL RECOVERY INDEX
COMPLETE
INCOMPLETE

Number of Aid Sources

WHITE VICTIMS:

X2 = 34.84
5ig. = .000

35.5% (54)
81.7% (49)

n=152
n=60

51.3% (78)
25.0% (15)

n=139
n=80

43.9% (61)
18.8% (15)
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X2 = 11 .05
Sig. = .001

X2 = 13.07
S;g. = .000

48.7% (74)
75.0% (45)

56.1% (78)
81.3% (65)

and i ndi ces of economi c and emot i ona 1 recove ry, and i ndi cates that the
number of aid sources was negatively related to both economic and emotional recovery for both racial groups. The reason for this phenomenon,
also reported in other recovery research (Bolin, 1982), is that utilizing
a number of aid sources reflects a family's difficulty in recovering and
inability to get sufficient aid from a single source.
Multivariate Analyses of Recovery
In order to consider a number of factors in terms of their simultaneous and interactive effects on recovery, two different multivariate
analyses of the Paris data were conducted. First, black victim and white
victim recovery was compared utilizing discriminant function analysis--a
stat i st i ca 1 techni que that deri ves mathemat i ca 1 axes (di sc ri mi nant functions) that maximize differences between previously designated criterion
groups for a dependent variable (Cooley and Lohnes, 1971). The functions
represent linear combinations of independent variables that best measure
the differences between groups in the dependent variables (Snedecor and
Coch ran, 1976).
This study considers two dependent variables for each of the two
Paris sUbsamples--economic and emotional

recovery among black and white

victims. Questions concerning these variables used a 5 point (0-4) self
rating scale, where 0 represented no recovery and 4 meant complete recovery.

These

scales

were

collapsed

into

three

categories

for

this

analysis: complete recovery (4), intermediate recovery (3), and low recovery (0-2). The aim of this type of analysis is to determine a set of
independent variables which prove to be the best discriminators among the
three levels of recovery for each dimension (emotional and economic) for
each racial group. A number of independent variables were selected for
study based upon a review of previous research and upon a stepwise procedure in the statistical program used for the analysis that identifies
important discriminators.
Table 111-14 presents

the

standardized discriminant function co-

efficients for black victims regarding levels of economic recovery. The
relative size of the coefficients indicates their individual contribution
to each of the two discriminant functions. Correspondingly, each discriminant function may be verbally characterized by the pattern of variables that contribute the most to it (in this case, those with coeffi-
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TABLE II 1-14
STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF BLACK VICTIMS
VARIABLE LABEL
FUNCTION 1
Interfaith Aid
.723
Current Housing is Poor
-.994
Lived in FEMA Trailer
.266
Red Cross Aid
3.021
Total Number of Housing Changes
-.843
4.875
I FG Aid
.734
Percent Losses That Were Insured
Primary Group Aided Economic Recovery -.962
Primary Group Aided Emotional Recovery .461
Temporary Shelter With Family/Friend
.549
Weather Anxieties
.134
Number of Minor Children
.217

FUNCTION 2
.153
.343
.643
-.221

Percent of variance explained

18.22%

81.78%

- .073

.781
.174
-.123
.944
.0083
-.516
-.537

TABLE I II-15
STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
FOR EMOTIONAL RECOVERY OF BLACK VICTIMS
FUNCTION 1
VARIABLE LABEL
Loss of Mementos
.026
Interfaith Aid
.453
Visitation Frequency With Relatives
.281
Percent of Losses Insured
.284
Number of Close Relatives
- .172
Primary Group Aided Emotional Recovery .546
"I Have Little Influence Over Events"
.264
Experienced Emotional Strains
-.621
Family Life Is Still Disrupted
-.357
Sleep Disturbances
-.510
Storm Anxieties
-.822

FUNCTION 2
-.560
4.245

Percent of variance explained

26.84%

73.16%

3.998

.095
.703
.120
-.802

.078
.008
- .072

.432

cients of .500 or more). Thus function 1 may be characterized as a
combination of recovery aid and housing factors. Aid from the Red Cross,
family grants (IFG), and Interfaith Disaster Services all contribute
strongly. Significant housing factors include the number of postdisaster
residential changes (negative score), poor current housing conditions
(negative score) and obtaining temporary shelter from friends or relatives (positive score).
Function 2 includes several other variables that are significantly
associated--two having a psychosocial dimension: whether the primary
group aided in emotional recovery and whether victims had anxieties over
bad weather (negative score). In addition, having lived in a FEMA
trailer contributes positively to function 2, while the number of dependent children contributes negatively. This latter factor is the only
demographic variable identified as contributing to a function determining
black emotional recovery. It suggests that having a larger number of
dependents in a household inhibits or slows economic recovery from disaster.
Looking at the proportion of variance in economic recovery accounted
for by the two functions, the aid and housing function (#1) accounts for
the greatest amount (81.78%), although Function 2 also explains a statistically significant amount of variance (18.22%).
Table 111-15 presents the discriminant function coefficients for
emotional recovery of black victims. Function 1 may be described by four
key psychosocial variables: primary group aid in emotional recovery,
having storm related emotional strains (negative score), experiencing
storm related sleep disturbances (negative score) and anxieties over
weather phenomena (negative score). Function 2 may be described as a
combination of psychosocial disruption variables and aid and social
support variables. In the former, two negative variables stand out: the
loss of mementos in the disaster and a belief in the lack of personal
control over life events (a measure of fatalism). The aid variable that
most strongly contributes is help received from Interfaith Disaster
Services. The social support variables most strongly associated include
visitation frequencies and the number of close relatives in town. Of the
two discriminant functions, function 1 accounts for most of explained
variance (73.16%), although Function 2 also accounts for a statistically
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TABLE II 1-16
STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY OF WHITE VICTIMS
FUNCTION 1
VARIABLE LABEL
Total Losses
- .775
Losses Relative to Other Victims
-.599
-.506
Loss of Mementos
-.280
Temporary Shelter With Kin
Red Cross Aid
-.613
1.523
SBA Loan
.671
IFG Aid
Percent of Loss Covered by Aid/lnsur.
.155
Number of Close Relatives
-.373
Received Aid from Friends
-.070
Primary Group Aid in Economic Recovery -.161
Increases in Cost of Living
-.591

FUNCTION 2
-.154
.357
.222
-.453
8.730
5.075
3.588
.611
-.176
.501

Percent of variance explained

32.59%

78.41%

.722

.099

TABLE 111-17
STANDARDIZED DISCRIMINANT FUNCTION COEFFICIENTS
FOR EMOTIONAL RECOVERY OF WHITE VICTIMS
FUNCTION 2
.186
.287
.017
.480

Storm Anxieties
Respondent's Age

FUNCTION 1
.508
-.759
-.254
.224
.218
-.026
-.576
-.683
-.193
-.299
.458

Percent of variance explained

73.23%

26.77%

VARIABLE LABEL
Number of Close Friends
Household Member Injured
Knew Others Killed or Injured
Percent Losses Insured
Received Aid from Relatives
Experienced Emotional Strains
Poor Current Housing Situation
Family Is Still Disrupted
Sleep Disturbances

.372

-.542
.395
.060
-.652
-.580
.288

significant amount (26.84%).
Tables III-16 and III-17 present economic and emotional recovery
discriminant function scores for white victims. For their economic recovery, function 1 may be described by several disaster loss variables
all of which contribute negatively: total losses (in terms of percent of
home and possessions destroyed), losses relative to those around victims
(an indicator of relative deprivation), the loss of mementos and personal
possessions, and increased costs of living. Function 2 consists entirely
of aid variables that contribute positively: IFG, SBA, and Red Cross aid
as well as the percent of losses that the victim was able to cover by aid
and insurance. Additionally, aid from friends and the victim's evaluation of the role of primary group aid in economic recovery both contribute significantly. Function 1 accounts for approximately twice the
explained variance as function 2 (67.41% versus 32.59%).
For emotional recovery of white families, function 1, which explains
73.23% of the variance, is best described by four psychosocial/social
support factors: the number of close friends victims had in town, the
number of household members injured (negative score), poor housing conditions at the time of the interview (negative score), and continuing
storm-related family disruptions (negative score). Function 2, which
accounts for 26.77% of the variance, is characterized by three negative
psychosocial impact variables: emotional strains from the disaster,
storm-related sleep disturbances, and anxieties during threatening
weather. No demographic factors contribute at the .5 or higher level for
either function, although respondentJs age does load relatively strongly
on function 1. Past research has shown the positive effect of age on
emotional recovery (Bolin and Klenow, 1983).
The ability of the derived functions to separate the recovery group
centroids (mean scores for the groups) was also examined. Table 111-18
presents the group centroids for the discriminant scores on economic recovery (both for black and white victims) and Table 111-19 does the same
for emotional recovery. For each table the relative size of the difference between reported values of the centroids is an indicator of how well
the functions separate the levels of recovery of victims.
To test for the statistical significance of the differences between
recovery group means (centroids), a series of comparisons using an F test
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TABLE III-18
GROUP CENTROIDS FOR DISCRIMINANT SCORES ON ECONOMIC RECOVERY
(White scores in parentheses)
RECOVERY GROUP
Low Recovery
Intermediate Recovery
Complete Recovery

CENTROIDS FUNCTION 1
1.582
( -1.482)
-.142
(-.527)
(.965 )
-1.40

CENTROIDS FUNCTION 2
(-.723)
.415
(1.252)
-.447
.625
(-.226)

TABLE II 1-19
GROUP CENTROIDS FOR DISCRIMINANT SCORES ON EMOTIONAL RECOVERY
(White scores in parentheses)
RECOVERY GROUP
Low Recovery
Intermediate Recovery
Complete Recovery

CENTROIDS FUNCTION 1
-1.354
(1.413)
(- .531)
-.049
.858
(-.575)

CENTROIDS FUNCTION 2
( .017)
.453
(-.741)
- .607
.387
( .532)

TABLE III-20
F STATISTIC SIGNIFICANCE TEST BETWEEN GROUP MEANS
FOR EMOTIONAL RECOVERY
(White victim statistics in parentheses)
RECOVERY GROUP
Intermediate Recovery
Complete Recovery

LOW RECOVERY
2.96*
(4.34*)
4.99*
(4.80*)

INTERMEDIATE RECOVERY
2.57*

(1.95*)

*p < .05
TABLE III-21
F STATISTIC SIGNIFICANCE TEST BETWEEN GROUP MEANS
FOR ECONOMIC RECOVERY
(White victim statistics in parentheses)
RECOVERY GROUP
Intermediate Recovery
Complete Recovery
*p < .05

LOW RECOVERY
3.23
(2.40)
5.39*
(4.30)

INTERMEDIATE RECOVERY
2.23*

(2.93)

were run for both subsamples on each of the two recovery measures (Tables

111-20 and 111-21). In all

instances statistically significant differ-

ences between group means were found for both sets of victims. This indi cates that the di scri mi nant funct ions di st i ngui sh we 11 among recove ry
levels for both subsamples on each of the dependent variables (economic
and emotional recovery).
To summarize, the variables that proved to be the best predictors of
economic recovery were, as might be expected, aid received. It is interesting to note that primary group aid appeared as a negative factor in
economic recovery, suggesting that the primary group in this instance did
not functionally aid economic recovery. While the variables selected as
good discriminators of white economic recovery levels were similar to
those selected for blacks, some important differences did appear. SBA
loans figured prominently in white recovery but not for blacks, reflecting the inability of blacks to qualify for such loans. Other research
(e.g., Bolin, 1982) has shown low interest SBA loans to be an important
factor permitting families to rebuild homes and resettle promptly. Both
the elderly and the poor (including blacks) are typically not able to
qualify for such loans, hence their typically slower rates of economic
recovery.
Another important difference between the two subsamples is that for
whites, primary group aid contributed positively to one economic recovery
function,

while

for

blacks

the

same

coefficient

was

negative.

This

suggests that differences existed in the ability of the respective social
support

groups

to

provi de aid

that cont ri buted to economi c recove ry.

Again, this undoubtedly reflects the socioeconomic differences between
the two groups.

However,

it

bears noting that for neither black nor

white victims did the stepwise selection of independent variables pick
any socioeconomic status variables as important discriminators of levels
of economic recovery.
For black victims, emotional recovery was found to be determined by
a combination of social support and psychosocial

impact variables, the

latter having negative discriminant function scores. This role of social
support (buffering the effects of a stressor, such as a disaster) is well
documented

in

social

support

literature

(see,

for

example,

Kahn

and

Antonucci, 1980). In this study, the support of family and kin was found
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particularly important in black emotional recovery. Although psychosocial impact variables were also related to the emotional recovery of
white victims, whites differed from blacks in that fewer social support
items were selected as discriminators for white emotional recovery.
Negative effects of having family injured in the disaster and knowing
others killed or injured were found among white but not black victims.
Tables 111-18 and 111-19 also demonstrate possible differences between black and white recovery. The test of significance for group mean
differences (Tables I II -20 and I I 1-21) show that fo r both blacks and
whites, the functions are successful in obtaining Significantly different
recovery group means. Within each racial category the functions also
discriminate well between the three recovery levels of both emotional and
economi c recove ry. Thi s suggests that the selected va ri ab 1es and the
functions derived from them constitute a good set of factors determining
both dimensions of recovery for each racial group.
Thus, this analysis illustrates that differences exist between the
two racial groups ~~~ ~_~ the factors that can predict recovery levels.
Those differences were not found to di rectly i nvol ve demographi c or
socioeconomic differences, but rather differences in losses, psychosocial
impacts, aid received, and social support.
Modeling the Recovery Process
The preceding tabular and discriminant analyses illustrate a number
of differences between blacks and whites in terms of their aid utilization and their overall disaster recovery. In this section, a multivariate model of the recovery process is presented and tested. In it,
race and the utilization of aid programs will be considered as part of a
network of variables acting in concert to determine recovery outcomes of
disaster victims.
As noted in Chapter II, numerous models of the family recovery process have been developed, beginning with Hill's (1949) A,B,C,-X schema.
Conta i ned in any such model must be the not i on of process: a system in
an initial state is disrupted by an event, precipitating changes in the
organizational features of the system as it adjusts to the disruption;
subsequently, the system recovers from the disruptions and establishes
more normal organizational patterns over a period of time.
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In terms of family recovery, the "initial state" includes such fac-tors as the family's demographic and socioeconomic characteristics prior
to the disaster. The "disruptive event" is, of course, the disaster and
is generally measured by such impact indicators as losses to home and
contents,

physical

injuries

and/or death,

psychological/mental

health

impacts, and disruptions of normal interaction patterns of the family.
"Changes in organizational features" include the activities that families
engage in to acquire aid, to make insurance claims, to begin rebuilding
homes, and to re-establish normal living patterns. "Recovery" refers to
the family's evaluation of the outcomes of the complex social processes
initiated by the disaster.
This

general

outline was

followed

to develop

a model

of

family

recovery for Paris as well as the sites described in Chapters V and VI.
The model

is deri ved in part from the previ ous work of both authors

(Bolin, 1982; Bolton, 1979), although there are important differences.
It should also be noted that the model as applied in Paris differs in
some ways from that applied to the Kauai and Coalinga sites: the latter
studies include a measure of unemployment which the Paris model does not,
whereas the Paris model includes family size as an independent variable,
a variable not found to be useful
analysis was

in the other studies.

Because path

used to describe the processes at these three different

sites, we have attempted to simplify the models somewhat by looking at a
single measure of recovery--economic recovery.

Of course,

as

we have

noted, there are other important dimensions of recovery, but for the sake
of parsimony these are not included as part of the multiple regression
analysis. In this chapter as well as Chapter V, separate regressions are
done for each ethnic sample, and then path models are developed and presented

to

facilitate

easy

visual

comparison

of

the

determinants

of

economic recovery for the different groups.
The model

has three levels of variables, arranged in chronological

sequence from predi saster factors to

recovery outcome.

The antecedent

variables include general background characteristics of victims as well
as disaster impact. The mediating variables (those chronologically after
impact, but antecedent to and determining recovery) include the various
response strategies that victims used. The dependent variable is economic recovery.
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TABLE III-22
OPERATIONALIZATION OF PATH MODEL OF FAMILY RECOVERY
VARIABLE

DESCRIPTION OF MEASUREMENT

Family Size

Numbers of related persons in household

SES

Standardized index of head of household's
income, education, occupation

% of Damage

Percent of home destroyed by tornado

Age

Head of household's age in years

Marital Status

Marital status of respondent
(married/nonmarried)

Use of Disaster Assistance

Number of aid sources used (0-5) (FEMA,
SBA, Red Cross, IFG, IDS)

Insurance Adequacy

Percent of losses covered by insurance

Aid Adequacy

Percent of losses covered by formal aid

Primary Group Aid

Whether respondent received aid from kin
and/or friends

Household Moves

Total number of post-disaster residential
changes made

Economic Recovery

Five point self assessment scale of extent
of victim's economic recovery

For Paris, the independent variables selected are family size,
socioeconomic status, percent of damage to the home, respondent age, and
marital status (the latter being a measure of primary social support and
coded as married/not married). The mediating variables are use of formal
disaster assistance, primary group aid, insurance adequacy, formal aid
adequacy, and number of household moves. The dependent variable for all
models is economic recovery, as perceived by the victim. The operational
measurement of all variables is described in Table 111-22 and a general
schematic of the model is illustrated in Figure III-i.
Multiple regression was used to assess the fit of the proposed model
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FIGURE III-l

MODEL OF FAMILY RECOVERY
(arrows indicate causal flow)

Use of
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~
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~
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------~)
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) Time ----------------~)

+

8 months

with the Paris data. Tables 111-23 and 111-24 present the results of the
analyses in terms standardized coefficients or beta weights. These coefficients permit comparison of the strengths of association for theoretically specified relationships of variables. This, in turn, allows the
identification of causally significant relationships within a complex web
of variables (Figures 111-2 and 1II-3). Table 111-23 presents findings
from data on white victims in Paris, while 111-24 does the same for black
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TABLE II 1-23
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
OF THE PATH MODEL OF FAMILY RECOVERY
WHITE SAMPLE, PARIS (n = 212)
ERROR
VARIANCE

DEPENDENT
VARIABLE

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

Use of
Disaster
Assistance

Famil y Si ze
SES
% of Damage
Age
Marita 1 Status

-.13*
.14*
.22*
-.25*
.04

.21

.79

Primary
Group
Aid

Family Si ze
SES
% of Damage
Age
Marital Status

-.01
.11
.06
-.04
-.14*

.09

.91

Insurance
Adequacy

Family Size
SES
% Damage
Age
Marital Status

-.06
.21*
.28*
.17*
.02

.24

.76

Aid
Adequacy

Family Size
SES
% Damage
Age
t4arita 1 Status

-.21*
.34*
.22*
-.09
.03

.29

.71

Household
Moves

Famil y Si ze
SES
% Damage
Age
Mari ta 1 Status

.21*
-.19*
.10
.14*
.02

.19

.81

Economic
Recovery

Family Size
-.21*
.29*
SES
% Damage
.07
Age
-.08
Marital Status
.03
Use of Disaster
Assistance
.37*
Primary Group Aid -.09
Insurance Adequacy .30*
Aid Adequacy
.36*
Household Moves -.03

.39

.61

*Significant at .05 level.

PATH
COEFFICIENT

EXPLAINED
VARIANCE (R2)

TABLE II 1-24
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS
OF THE PATH MODEL OF FAMILY RECOVERY
BLACK SAMPLE, PARIS (n = 212)
DEPENDENT
VARIABLE

INDEPENDENT
VARIABLE

Use of
Disaster
Assistance

Family Size
SES
% of Damage
Age
Marital Status

-.12
.10
.23*
-.20*
.16*

Primary
Group
Aid

Family Size
SES
% of Damage
Age
Marita 1 Status

-.33
.09
.14*
-.17*
-.18*

Insurance
Adequacy

Family Size
SES
% Damage
Age
Marital Status

-.04
.38*
.24*
-.17*
.04

Aid
Adequacy

Family Size
SES
% Damage
Age
Marital Status

-.29*
.30*
.06
-.19*
.01

Household
Moves

Famil y Si ze
SES
% Damage
Age
Marital Status

.19*
-.28*
.04
- .29*
.09

Economic
Recovery

Family Size
-.41*
.34*
SES
% Damage
.12
Age
-.09
Marital Status
.03
Use of Disaster
Assistance
.20*
Primary Group Aid -.25*
Insurance Adequacy .19*
Aid Adequacy
.24*
Household Moves -.19*

*Significant at .05 level.

PATH
COEFFICIENT

EXPLAINED
VARIANCE (R2)

ERROR
VARIANCE

.23

.77

.24

.76

.31

.69

.34

.66

.30

.70

.44

.56

Size

Family

SES

% Damage

Age

Harital
Status

Use of
Disaster
Assistance

Moves

FIGURE III-2
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Recovery

Economic

victims (see Tables V-22 to V-26 for a comparative analysis of the other
ethnic groups included in this report).
For each dependent variable in Tables 111-23 and 24, there are significant convergences and divergences between blacks and whites. The use
of disaster assistance for both groups is determined by disaster losses

(% of damage) and age. Higher losses increase the likelihood of members
of either group using formal aid, while, for both groups, older victims
were less likely to use such aid. For blacks but not whites, marital
status was

pos it i ve ly assoc i ated with us i ng ass i stance. On the other

hand, larger white families were less likely to use formal

aid, while

those

to

with

higher

socioeconomic

status

were

more

likely

do

so.

Neither of these factors were found important in affecting aid receipt
for blacks.
Primary group aid for whites was determined by only one factor,
marital status. Married whites were less likely to receive

inf~rmal

aid,

indicating that marriage may function as an intrafamily social support.
The same was found to hold for black victims. In addition, older blacks
and those with

larger families were less

support than other blacks.

Damage 1 eve 1 s,

likely to receive
however,

informal

were found to be

positively associated with receiving primary group aid; blacks with high
losses were likely to turn to the primary group for assistance.
Insurance adequacy is determined by the same variables

for both

subsamples, but not always in the same way. Persons with higher socioeconomic status and higher losses were more likely to assess their insurance coverage as adequate. The fact that higher losses are pos it i ve ly
associated with insurance adequacy reflects the fact that those with high
losses tended to have thei r homes "written off" by thei r insurers and
thus were able to build completely new homes with their insurance (see
Bolin, 1982, for additional discussion). The divergence between the two
groups comes with the variable "aye"; older whites were more likely to
have adequate insurance compared to other whites while the reverse held
for black victims.
Two of the determinants of aid adequacy were the same for both
groups. For both, large families were more likely to report having received inadequate aid, reflecting the greater needs of such families.
Likewise, and perhaps ironically, families of higher socioeconomic status
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were more likely to report receiving adequate aid. The data also indicate that older blacks were less likely to receive adequate aid than
other blacks, and that whites with higher losses were more likely to
report aid as adequate than those less severely affected (perhaps reflecting a similar dynamic to that noted for insurance adequacy).
The number of household moves was determined by the same three
variables for both groups. Generally family size was positively related
with number of household moves while socioeconomic status was negatively
associated, indicating that larger families were more likely to change
residences while those with higher socioeconomic status were more likely
to estab 1i sh a permanent res i dence soon a fter the disaster. Age was
positively associated with the number of household moves for white victims, but negatively for blacks.
Looking at overall economic recovery as measured eight months after
the disaster, the two samples are similar, but with a few divergences.
For both blacks and whites, recovery is negatively associated with family
size and positively associated with social class, disaster assistance,
and the adequacy of aid and insurance payments received. However, as
shown earlier, it was found that blacks were much less likely to have received adequate aid compared to whites. Given that the dependent variable is economic recovery, it is not surprising that socioeconomic and aid
factors contributed heavily to variation in the dependent variable. The
important divergences between black and white victim recovery are associated with the black mOdel. The number of postdisaster moves was found to
contribute negatively to recovery as was primary group aid. While, as
shown earlier, primary group aid contributed positively to the emotional
recovery of blacks, it was found to be negatively associated with economic recovery in the path model. This possibly suggests that in some
portion of the sample, primary group aid was used as an inadequate substitute for formal aid, and thus had a negative association with economic
recovery. In some instances it was the failure to qualify for aid
sources that forced victims to rely on the primary group for recovery
resources. Lastly, having to make relatively frequent postdisaster residential changes had a negative effect on black economic recovery,
suggesting that the expenses involved prevented rapid economic recovery.
Overall, the two models of economic recovery show similar causal
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patterns, suggesting that di sasters create stresses on vi ctim famil i es
that are generally uniform across social categories and that responses to
those stresses are somewhat similar. The final chapter examines convergences and divergences in patterns of aid utilization and family recovery
for all of the sites studied.
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CHAPTER IV
FLOODING IN UTAH
Introduction
----.-This chapter presents an analysis of the Utah flooding of 1983,
focusing on a small sample of victim families as well as a survey of
organizations involved in aid and recovery. The disaster presented a
unique opportunity to examine the relief and aid operations of a well
established religious organization.
Because the Mormon Church (Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day
Saints [LOS])

is a dominant and affluent institution in Utah with a

history of self-reliance among its members, research on the Utah floods
differed from the victim surveys described in other chapters. The nature
of the disaster itself also prompted deviation from the "standard"
surveys; because flooding and mudslides occurred in numerous, sometimes
isolated areas around the state, research was focused on the hardest hit
Wasatch Front communities in Davis County north of Salt Lake City. In
Davis County, 13 homes were destroyed and 40 sustained major damage. The
studies reported in other chapters of this book involve far greater
numbers of homes and higher levels of damage. In order to study recovery
and aid, a significant number of subjects must have experienced losses
sufficient to create a condition from which to recover. Because the
number of victims in Davis County was small, it was decided to focus indepth on some of the harder hit fami 1i es. That info rmat i on was supp 1emented by an examination of the role of the LOS Church
traditional disaster aid organizations.
The

Wasatch

Front

communities

of Bountiful

and

~ ~ ~

more

Farmington were

selected as the sites to be examined. Although a case study approach
does not result in statistically significant conclusions, the experiences
of victims and the organizational activities in these communities seemed
reasonably representative of other flooded areas in the state. In addition, the opportunity to examine unique social and religious forces
outweighed the need for statistical precision. Therefore, before describing methods and findings, a general description of the social and
cultural features of the LOS Church in Utah is presented.

89

The Mormon Church
The LDS Church is intricately bound to the social structure, economics, and politics of Utah. The population of Utah is approximately 75%
Mormon, and the church itself is rapidly expanding as a result of national and international missionary efforts (Campbell and Campbell, 1978).
Additionally, the emphasis on large families as part of church doctrine
results in an inevitable increase in church membership (Skolnick et al.,
1978) •
The features of the church most affecting disaster recovery are its
structure and its involvement with the family and local communities. The
complex hierarchical organization of the Mormon Church essentially requires all males to be active within the priesthood. There are two
orders of priests (higher and lower), and each order contains a number of
ranks whi ch each pri est ascends accordi ng to the amounts and types of
church activities he pursues (Kephart, 1980).
The church is organized and administered both vertically· and horizontally (O'dea, 1957). Horizontally, the key organizational entities,
and those that figured most prominently in disaster response, are stakes
and wards. Wards are a basic geographical unit consisting of, on the
average, around 600 persons in a contiguous area. Each ward is administered by a bishop. All Mormons must belong to a ward (Kephart, 1980).
The bishop, through reports of subordinates, is kept informed of possible
needs or problems among ward families. Groups of wards are organized
I;'
. into a larger structural unit known as a stake. Each stake is di rected
by a president who in turn appoints ward bishops. Presidents, like
bishops, manage their respective domains and attend to emerging problems
(0' dea, 1957).
While the church has an elaborate hierarchy, a feature more salient
to this research is the church's participatory nature. Starting at age
twelve, Mormons begins taking an active role in ward and stake activities
as well as in the symbolically significant temple ceremonies. Families
in wards are periodically visited by traveling teachers of the church as
well as their bishops.
.--------- - - - - -

There are annual and semiannual conferences and visits by the
apostles ••• There are weekly social events and Mormon holiday
celebrations ••• There are a host of subsidiary organizations:
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women's relief society, young men's and young women's mutual improvement associations, scout troops, and Sunday school union, the
Genealogical Society, the church welfare plan, and so on (Kephart,
1980, p.220).
All participation is voluntary, but participation rates are nevertheless
high, creating an important social cohesiveness amony members and maintaining an organizational structure in which large numbers of members can
be mobilized in response to any untoward event.
A major focus of church doctri ne is the strength and stabi 1ity of
the fami ly. LOS members tend to have 1arger than average fami 1i es and
also tend to maintain active kinship networks well

beyond the nuclear

family, although three generation families are not more frequent than
among non-LOS membe rs

(Campbe 11

and Campbe 11, 1981). Fami 1 i es a re en-

couraged to meet once a week (Monday night) for a "family home evening"
(Campbell and Campbell, 1981), and on such evenings to engage in various
recreational activities (Kephart, 1980).
Mormon famil i es typi ca 11y gi ve 10% of thei r income to support the
church

("tithiny").

In addition,

once a month families

are asked to

forgo a meal and donate the money they saved to the church welfare system. The church is therefore able to maintain stores in which Mormons
may obtain foodstuffs and other items if they cannot provide them for
themselves. Thus, although self-sufficiency is stressed (O'dea, 1957),
the LOS church provides a support system for those who cannot provide for
themselves.
This brief overview of the cultural and organizational features of
the church illustrates the structures and networks that provide individuals and families with support and social cohesiveness. These features
resulted in somewhat unique response strategies when the Utah floodiny
commenced.
Resea rch _Q.es i gn
Eleven victim families in Davis County were interviewed in depth.
Three lived in Farmington and eight lived in Bountiful. In addition, ten
officials from disaster relief and emergency organizations were intervi ewed--two representing the LOS Church, one representing the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), one representing the State of Utah's
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Department of Social Services' Individual Family Grant program (IFG), one
representing Davis County Emergency Services, two representing the Salt
Lake Area Chapter of the American Red Cross, one representing the Governor's Task Force on Flood Relief, and two representing the Salt Lake Area
Chamber of Commerce's Flood Recovery Committee.
Inst ruments
Two in-depth interview schedules were constructed. One was administered

to

victim

victim

families,

interview

schedule

the

other

contained

to
104

organization
questions,

officials.

the

The

organization

schedule, 25. All questions on both interview schedules were open ended
and designed to provide the maximum opportunity for respondent and interviewer to pursue issues in depth. All

interviews were recorded on cas-

sette tapes, transcribed, and their content subsequently analyzed.
Victim interviews asked basic family demographic characteristics:
age and sex composition of families, family size, family type, resident i a 1 hi story,

and

income,

educat ion,

occupat ion,

marita 1 status,

and

religious affiliation of heads of household and respondents. A second
series of questions asked victims to describe their flood experience-including events leading to and following the disaster, injuries, deaths,
family

disruptions

resulting

from

residential

dislocations,

temporary

housing, and repair work. That section also included questions relating
to employment and effects of the floods on work patterns. A third series
of questions asked victims to describe the percentage and dollar amounts
of property losses to home, home contents, and vehicles. A fourth set
asked about the amount and types of aid received from formal disaster
relief organizations and from primary group members.

In addition, vic-

tims were asked to describe how important each type of aid was to their
emotional

and economic recovery and how the they felt about accepting

such aid. A fifth series asked about
percent

and

amount

of aid

and

home

insurance

insurance coverage and the
recei ved

from

insurance and

disaster relief organizations. A final

set of questions dealt with the

disaster's

cohesion, day-to-day activities,

effects

on

health,

family

neighborhood, community, family members' emotional well being and feelings

of

optimism

and

pesslmlsm.

In

general,

to

permit

comparisons,

questions asked of the Utah respondents directly paralleled the questions
used at the other sites.
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Di saster re 1i ef organi zat ion i ntervi ew schedul es obtained i nformation on the chronology of operations, services provided (including types
of services, number of victims reached, and dollar amount of operations),
the organization's outreach to victims, staffing, funding, community
interest, coordination with other organizations, program assessment, and
plans for program activities in the future.
SampJ i ng
The representativeness of the sample relative to any larger group
cannot be statistically determined. The interviews were conducted simply
to gain insight into the effects of a strong, pervasive church organization on communities experiencing disaster. Potential respondents were
selected from computer lists of victims supplied by the city manager
offices of Farmington and Bountiful. Victims with moderate to total
property losses were selected at random and contacted by telephone to set
up interview appointments. None of the persons contacted refused an
interview, and all of the appointments resulted in complete interviews.
In th ree instances more than one adult was present fo r the i nte rvi ew;
however, i ntervi ews were conducted so that in each of these instances,
there was a single respondent who was designated as a representative of
the family.
Those relief organizations typically present in disasters and those
referred by other organization officials were selected for interview.
Officials interviewed were those in charge of the disaster relief function for the Salt Lake-Davis County area for their respective organizations. They were contacted by telephone to set up interviews one to two
weeks prior to the actual field visit.
Interviewing and An~
The project's research associate, an experienced interviewer, conducted all interviews. Interviews with both officials and family respondents were conducted duri ng the 1ast two weeks of September 1983,
approximately three months following the floods and mud slides; they took
approximately two to three hours to complete.
The cassette tapes of the i ntervi ews were t ransc ri bed, and the
transcriptions were coded by preselected variables to provide summary
statistics and descriptions. In addition, content was analyzed according
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to subjects mentioned by respondents in order to identify and develop
salient issues for further examination.
!.98~J!.!.a~£~~~~ __A

Summary of Events

In recent times, Utah's climate has lacked moisture; it is an arid
1and with dry soil s.

Events 1 eadi ng to the extens i ve

fl oods

and mud

slides in the spring of 1983 began in the previous September. At that
time, northern Utah experienced an unusually heavy rainfall that saturated the Wasatch Mountains and did

not dry before the winter snowfall

began. Duri ng the wi nter, up to ei ght feet of snow accumul ated on the
peaks.

Most

of

the

principle

cities

of

Utah,

containing

90% of the

population of the state, lie at the base of the Wasatch Front.
spring,

the mountains'

snow usually melts

slowly

In the

into the dry

soil.

However, a late thaw brought rapid melting on top of the already saturated soil. Consequently, heavy runoff and dislodged mud and rock poured
into the drainage canyons and continued on toward the cities below.
Flooding occurred along the Wasatch

Front

from

the

beginning

of

Apri 1 through the end of July. The fi rst major fl ood began on Apri 1 12
in Thistle, a small town located about 60 miles south of Salt Lake City.
Mud slides washed out roads and created a dam across the canyon in which
Thistle was located. Flood waters filled the canyon to depths of up to

185 feet deep, and, by April 30, the 22 families living in Thistle had
all

been evacuated and relocated. They were still displaced by Thistle

Lake at the time of interviewing.

The

lake

and

flooding

in

counties

south of Salt Lake City not only displaced families, but also cut off
hundreds of coal miners from their jobs.
The next major flood took place during the last week of May in Salt
Lake City and directly to the north in Davis County (discussed below).
As flood waters came down the mountains to the east of Salt Lake City, a
major city storm sewer became jammed with debris. To save residences and
businesses, flood waters were redirected to the Jordan River through two
sandbag can a 1s

erected on

city st reets.

One two mi 1e-l ong canal

was

located thirteen blocks south of Temple Square. Another mile-long canal
was erected on State St reet in the heart of the cent ra 1 bus i ness di st ri ct.
The last major flood occurred near Delta, Utah, when the D.M.A.D.
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Dam broke on July 23. Two small towns, Oasis and Deseret, and other
parts of Millard County were evacuated.
It is estimated that over 5,000 famil ies were affected in some
fashion by the spring and summer floods in Utah. Of the 29 counties in
Utah, 22 received federal disaster declarations. All 22 were eligible
for public assistance, and eleven were declared eligible for individual
assistance as well. The first federal declaration came on April 30, and
counties were added to this declaration through July as the flooding
continued. Disaster Assistance Centers were set up in Spanish Fork,
Ogden, Salt Lake City, Farmington, and Delta. The centers were supported
by a state-wide hotline that could be used to apply for assistance.
Because of their dense population and the severity of their flooding
and mud slides, three communities in Davis County just north of Salt Lake
City--Bountiful, Centerville, and Farmington--were considered the hardest
hit in Utah. They have a combined population of approximately 45,000 in
a county of 146,000.
At the time of interviewing, the director of emergency services in
Davis County estimated public damage at approximately $15,000,000 and
pri vate los ses at $8,250,000. Damage to pri vate res i dences included 13
homes totally destroyed, 40 homes with major damage, and 375 homes with
minor damage. There were no deaths or serious injuries due to the flooding. Utility services were affected for short periods of time, and the
water supply was affected for several weeks. In various areas water had
to be shipped in or boiled.
The problems for Davis County began in the last week of May when an
unusually cool spring ended abruptly with temperatures climbing into the
nineties. Small creeks originating in mountain canyons suddenly overflowed and threatened nearby homes. Persons living along the creeks used
sandbags to protect thei r homes, and geol ogi sts began flyi ng over the
canyons twice a day, looking for cracks and changes in the snow. In
addition, on-site "technical committees" (groups of technicians monitoring streams) watched the creeks around the clock, reporting changes in
water color and level. On May 28, Davis County Emergency Services activated a 24-hour staff.
Major flooding began on May 29 in Centerville and Farmington.
Basements of homes were flooded, and roads, bridges and culverts sus95

tained damage. In the early evening of May 30, Memorial Day, a major
mud, rock, and debris slide came down Rudd Creek into Farmington. It
gathered a great amount of speed with its plunge, and when it reached the
town, it knocked homes from foundations, and partially smashed or destroyed them. With only the actual mud slide to warn them, residents had
little time to evacuate.
Later that night and early into the next morning, Bountiful was hit
with major floods and slides from three canyons. The most severe mud
s 1 i de came from Stone Creek; water enteri ng the town eroded roads and
culverts and eventually formed a 30-foot high wave of mud and water. The
s 1 i de of rock and debri s cut a gorge 50 feet deep and 150 feet wi de in
some areas. As it came down the creek, it smashed some homes, fi 11 ed
others with mud, and knocked down a power station, cutting off power and
communication in Bountiful. Some victims were warned to evacuate by
neighbors and friends, some were warned by the police, and others received no warning. They were awakened by mud smashing into their homes.
A total of approximately 200 to 300 people were evacuated from the
three affected cities (Committee on Natural Disaster, 1984). One evacuation center was set up at Farmington Junior High School. The location of
evacuation centers in Bountiful had to be changed several times to avoid
fl ood paths and 1ack of ut i 1i ty servi ce--a center fi na 11 y bei ng established at Woods Cross High School in a city adjacent to Bountiful. Less
than half of the evacuees stayed overnight at the centers. LDS bishops
were present at the centers to relocate victims to emergency housing in
the homes of church ward members. In addition, residents of two nursing
home facilities were temporarily evacuated to a Council on Aging Center.
At these centers, the Red Cross provided necessities and set up mass
feeding operations.
After the initial emergency period, debris removal and cleanup by
public agencies and the LDS Church began. The cleanup of private homes
was, for the most part, accomplished by volunteer LDS work crews. At the
same time, disaster relief organizations began operations to provide
victims with longer-term assistance. The federal government provided
support for temporary housing, household necessities, and furniture
through the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) and low interest
loans through the Small Business Administration. Individual Family
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Grants were made available through Utah's Department of Social Services.
The American Red Cross provided emergency assistance and then entered
into its Additional Assistance Phase to provide support for major repair
and rebuilding of private homes.
A number of new disaster relief groups emerged to provide stricken
families with assistance not available from other organizations. The LDS
Church provided several types of aid, including money, labor, household
necessities, and emotional support. The governor of Utah organized a
Task Force on Flood Relief to coordinate the activities of the various
disaster relief organizations providing assistance to victims state
wide.
The response to the disaster, both organizationally and in terms of
volunteers, was the result of planning and monitoring by federal, state,
county, and local organizations that began a number of months prior to
the actual flooding. The potential for flooding in the Wasatch Front has
been recognized for at least 15 years (Committee on Natural Disasters,
1984). Thi s awareness has 1ed to numerous preparedness act i vi ties and
the designation of a full-time flood control director in Salt Lake
County.
Contingency plans were in place, and flooding potential had received
wide media publicity for several months prior to the actual flooding.
Thus equipment, materials, and personnel (both voluntary and paid) were
ready and eas il y mobil i zed in Sa lt Lake City and the cit i es of Da vi s
county (Committee on Natural Disaster, 1984). The Mormon Church, as will
be seen, was of key importance in mobil i zi ng vol unteers for both emergency period activities (sandbagging, etc.) and for clean-up in the
aftermath. The church not only used its organization of wards and stakes
to mobilize volunteers, it also developed an active media campaign.
It was this preplanning of hazard response by organizations at all
levels as well as the ready recruitment and management of volunteers that
restricted the potentially devastating damage of the floods and mud
flows in Utah.
Findings: Effects on and Responses of Victims
Demographic Characteristics
The 11 victim families were interviewed in-depth in September 1983.
97

The majority of respondents (seven) fell between the ages of 30 and 59.
One respondent was under 30, and three were in thei r 60s. All of the
respondents were married, except for one who had been divorced just prior
to the flood.
All of the respondent families could be described as having middle
socioeconomic status, although monthly take-home income for the families
ranged from $200 to $2,500,

with a median

income of $1,780.

The low

income of $200 could be attributed to loss of employment rather than to
persistent low socioeconomic status. The head of that household had some
co 11 ege educat i on and normally was

emp 1oyed

at

a

hi gher occupat i ona 1

level. Income loss related to the disaster was not a problem for any of
the

respondent famil i es except

for one el derly head of househol d who

chose early retirement in order to have time to rebuild his home.

In

three households, one spouse was employed, and in two households, both
spouses were employed. Of the six households without employed members,
four heads of the households were retired,

one was disabled,

and one

unemployed.
All

heads of household had at least a high school education with

eight having some college, a college degree, or post-graduate education.
In terms of occupation or former occupation of the heads of household,
three held professional positions, four were in managerial positions, two
were in skilled services and sales, and two in unskilled services and
labor.
Six of the respondent families had at least one child under 18 year
old

in

the

household,

while

the

other

five

families

contained

only

adults. Family sizes ranged from two to nine members. Four families had
two members, four had three or four members, and three families had over
four members.
The cities of Bountiful

and Farmington

are predominantly Mormon.

Ni ne of the respondents were members of The Church of Jesus Chri st of
Latter-Day Saints (LOS), and all of the LOS respondents were active in
their church and considered religion very important in their lives. One
elderly man was not active in the church but still considered religion
somewhat important.
l~~~~~~~~esponse

Material losses experienced by victims were divided into four types:
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housing damage, home content losses, losses of personal possessions, and
. damage or loss of motor vehicles. Respondents estimated the percentage
of damage to the structure of their homes and yards and the dollar amount
needed to repair or replace them. Typically, estimates were based on
estimates already prepared for disaster relief agencies. All of the
respondent families owned their homes, and several had paid-up mortgages.
They had lived in their homes anywhere from two to 43 years, with a mean
of 15 years. Similarly, they had lived in their communities from ten to
53 years, with an average of 24 years.
Regarding estimated home and yard damage, one family lost less than
50%; six families lost from 50% to 90%; and four families had their homes
completely destroyed. Dollar losses to houses and yards ranged from
$13,000 to $125,000, with a mean of $54,000. Three families had less
than $20,000 damage, three families had $20,000 to $50,000 in losses, and
five families sustained over $50,000 in damage.
Structural losses may have been more severe than one might normally
expect from mud slides and flooding of this type due to housing styles in
the Davis County area. Except for the four houses that were totally
destroyed, damage was limited to yards and basements. However, in that
area it is fashionable to entirely finish basements into bedrooms, family
rooms, and work rooms. The homes of all of the families interviewed had
completely finished and furnished basements, and damage restricted to the
basement, therefore, resulted in significant losses.
Damage to respondents' home contents and furnishings were lower than
that reported to home structures--both proportionally and in absolute
doll ars. Three fami 1i es lost 1ess than 50% of thei r contents; seven
lost from 50% to 99%; and one family lost 100%. Dollar losses ranged
from $2,000 to $50,000, with a mean of $19,000. Three families had less
than $5,000 in losses; four families had $5,000 to $25,000; and four
families sustained losses of over $25,000.
Loss of motor vehicles was substantial. Almost half of the respondents reported cars or motorcycles so severely damaged they could not be
used, and losses ranged from one to four vehicles per household. Dollar
losses ranged from $100 to $6,000, with a mean of $1,660.
Respondents were asked about the loss of mementos or personal possessions--losses that were particularly upsetting. Since it is difficult
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to place dollar values on losses of this type, respondents were not asked
to est i mate va 1ue, but rather to discuss the los s. Although all respondents reported losses of this type, the kinds of items mentioned varied
greatly. Interviewees typically mentioned antiques, photographs, genealogies, travel souvenirs, family heirlooms, awards, musical instruments,
and valuables, such as furs, jewelry, and art. Many respondents thought
of these items as irreplaceable pieces of their lives. For example, one
elderly man spoke of his loss saying,
And I had my mother's--she's been dead since 1945--1 had her kitchen
table down there and three chairs. They were battered up. Sure,
they were old. I have no family left. I'm the only one left in my
entire family ••• So that was important to me.
Others mentioned the loss of lawns, flowers, shrubs, and trees. One
woman described her yard and the years of work and effort put into it:
We had a beautiful stream in our backyard ••• The house was okay,
but it was actually the lot, why we bought it. And my husband had
spent four years lining the creek with rocks--just beautiful--even
the streambed. (We) made little waterfalls and things and had all
these trees ••• Everything--those stone-lined things I told you
about--they went the first day ••• And we kept losing the banks all
that week, and our trees kept falling in.
All but one of the families managed to save their pets. The mother
of that family described how the loss affected her teenaged son:
My youngest son really hasn't shown any emotion at all ••• When we
got home he was so worried about the dog, and everyday he'd call the
dog pound. And I kept sayi ng, 'She's run away. • • She was areal
good dog. Somebody probably found her.' He was there. He found
her ••• He'd just look at the dog and walk off and then come back
and look, just to make sure it was her.
Although respondents felt a sense of loss for sentimental, personal
possessions, they also clearly valued their families' safety over the
loss of "material things." In describing her feelings, one mother of a
large family said, "When we drove down the street and had all of our
children ••• I just knew in my mind that our house was gone ••• We were
so thankful that we escaped with our lives and our children that at that
point we made the decision that the rest didn't matter."
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Respondents were asked to compare thei r losses to those of other
. persons in the area who were affected by the flooding. Seven respondents
felt "worse off", four felt "better off", but none felt that their losses
were the "same" as others. Of the four respondents who felt "better
off," two were the only ones among those interviewed who had flood insurance. Interesti ngly, another woman who felt "better off" had her home
totally destroyed. She explained,
Well, some of the homes were.
covered with mud in basements,
and so they lost a lot of things, and it was such a terrible mess.
Then they have to muck it out, clean it, and restructure it. So in
some ways I'm better off starting out new--with everything new. I
even feel guilty at times because I didn't have mud in my home.
'personal Injuries
In Davis County, there were no deaths and only minor injuries related to the disaster, and none of the respondents knew anyone who was
injured. Therefore, this group of respondents did not have to deal with
the psychological and social effects of death and injury and their attendant family disruption. However, many of those interviewed recounted
experi ences that came very close to resulting in death and i nj ury. In
Farmington, where the mud slide occurred in the evening, one woman talked
about her fears of what coul d have happened if it had occurred 1ater.
Her children and a grandchild were staying in the house while she was
vacationing. "Well ," she said,
when we went digging in our bedroom, we found the rocks that broke
in through our bedroom ••• ripped the headboard off our bed, and
that's where they (her daughter and son-in-law) would have been
sleeping. The baby's bassinet was just bits and pieces of
wicker ••• if it hit at night, we'd lost them all.
Another elderly man described his escape from his house which was hit by
a mud avalanche:
The only means of escape was across that bridge in the front of the
house here. There's no other doors or exit that we could get out.
The mud was a·1 ready gushi ng in every room of the house. •• My wi fe
slipped and fell ••• and I had to reach down and grab her.
we
struggled our way on out to the street ••• by some miracle that
bridge withstood that terrific impact that hit it.
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~~~~~~~ti~~_~~~~ocation. Psycnological Impacts

The cities of Bountiful, Centerville, and Farmington lie at the base
of the Wasatch Mounta ins. Flood waters of me lted snow came down those
mountains, picking up mud, trees,

rocks, and other debris. The waters

followed the paths of normally gentle creeks into the cities where homes
lined those creeks. The extent of damage to individual homes depended on
proxi mity to the fl ood path, 1 ocat ion re 1 at i ve to path bends, and the
amount

and

type of debris

being

carried.

Therefore,

variation in the damage sustained by individual
water

in the

basements,

others were

there was

great

homes. Some homes had

inundated with mud,

whil estill

others were knocked from their foundations.
In most

instances,

affected nei ghborhoods were evacuated for the

night because the situation was unpredictable. Afterwards, a good number
of famil i es we re 1eft with

uni nhabitab 1e

homes

because of

st ructura 1

damage and/or the mess created by the mUd. Many fami 1 i es had to fi nd
emergency shelter, and some had to find

longer-term temporary housing

until their homes could be cleaned, repaired, replaced, or new permanent
housing could be obtained.
A11 of those i ntervi ewed had to 1eave thei r homes for at 1 east one
ni ght.

Temporary residenti al

changes

ranged

from one to

seven moves,

with most families moving two or three times. The typical progression of
moves was a first night's emergency stay in a shelter or the home of
family or friends, a short stay with family or friends, and then a longer
stay

in

private,

temporary

housing.

At

the

time

of

the

interviews,

(approximately five months after the flood), five families were still not
living

in

permanent

housing.

Four

of

those

had

their

homes

totally

destroyed and had not started building new homes. The other family had
their home nearly destroyed and was in the process of rebuilding it.
Nine families lived in temporary housing for at least two months.
Two families moved back to their damaged homes almost immediately following the flood,

even though

living conditions were uncomfortable;

mud

remained in the lower levels of the homes, and some utilities were not in
service. One of these respondents did not want to leave his home unattended, and the other wanted to live on site so that repair work could
be continuous.
Emergency

shelters

were

set

up

102

by the Red

Cross

and LDS

Stake

Houses. Three respondent families made use of these shelters from one to
three nights. Two (both LOS members) went to LOS Stake Houses, and one
non-LOS member went to the evacuation center. All of the respondents had
the problem of not knowing where to go once they evacuated their homes,
whether they left of their own accord or were officially evacuated. Of
the three who went to emergency shelters, two said that they stumbled on
them, and the other said he was given the information by a policeman
directing traffic. Other respondents said that the police would not let
them stop for information. Most drove around making their way through
roadblocks and flooded streets until they could reach the homes of
friends or relatives. Of the eight families that did not use public
emergency shelters, two went to the homes of friends and six stayed with
relatives.
In the course of their moves, nine families ultimately ended up
staying with relatives, usually their parents or children, and two
stayed with friends. These stays ranged from several days to six weeks.
Seven respondents reported that thei r fami 1i es had to sp 1it up at some
time during their moves while longer-term housing was being secured.
Of the nine families that had to find this type of housing, one stayed
with parents, three rented apartments, and five rented houses.
Subsidies for longer-term temporary housing were available to victim
families through FEMA. Of the nine who needed long-term housing, one did
not qualify because the family stayed with relatives. Three families had
their rent partially subsidized by FEMA, and initially, four families
received full subsidies from FEMA. However, one of those families had
their subsidy withdrawn by FEMA after two months. That respondent reported that FEMA told them that because their destroyed home had a paidup mortgage, the family could afford to pay their own rent. The respondent said he felt "betrayed," because a temporary house had been rented
and financial plans for rebuilding had been made based on FEMA's promised
support. One family refused temporary housing support even though they
qualified for it. That respondent explained, "Because the government had
its own problems.
mean, they're trying to take care of a lot of
people. We thought by doing that, that we could help other people, and
then if we needed the help, we could call them."
For two principle reasons, FEMA did not bring in mobile homes for
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temporary housing in Davis county. First, only a small percentage of
county residents were affected by the flooding, and second, sufficient
rental housing was available in the area to meet the needs of victims.
As was discussed in Chapter II, the frequency of residential changes
and the fact of living in temporary housing have both been found to have
emotional/psychosocial effects on families (see, for example, Gleser et
al., 1981). Respondents were asked to discuss the disruptions that their
families experienced in making residential changes. Of the ten families
who made sign ifi cant changes (one couple was away from thei rhome fo r
only one night), six said that the disruption was extreme and four said
that it was moderate. The number of res i dent i a 1 changes di d not appear
to be associated with each respondent's assessment of disruption.
The most frequently mentioned disruption was families' having to
split-up and stay in different places. This was particularly difficult
because they felt they were in a crisis and wanted to be together to
support one another. Another frequently mentioned disruption involved
the loss of belongings necessary for day to day life; victims were expected to carryon routine activities without those essential belongings.
Other disruptions were caused by the work involved in moving, the difficulty of making friends in new areas, and the anxiety of having unattended homes and property.
Respondents were also asked to assess and discuss the disruptions
caused by living in long-term temporary housing. These circumstances did
not appear to be as disruptive as the residential changes. Of the nine
families who lived in temporary housing, two said that the disruption was
extreme, four said it was moderate, and three said that is was slight.
The most frequently mentioned positive aspect of temporary housing
was the privacy it afforded families in crisis. One woman explained,
I just could not have lived with other people because we were upset
as it was. And, when you go in with other people, you feel like
company, and it's disruptive in itself, for them and you ••• I
would have died if I hadn't of had a place to go to be alone.
Other positive aspects mentioned were proximity to the damaged home,
safety in the new locale, and the ability to keep belongings and family
together.
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The negat i ve aspects of temporary hous i ng that we re ment i oned i n. cluded the loss of and difficulty in managing belongings, and the sense
of impermanence and never feeling "settled in." A young woman (the only
one to find long-term housing with relatives), although appreciative of
her parents' help, described what it was like to live with them:
"You don't go back home, after living 18 years away, with three kids
and a big dog ••• It's little things that really get to you.
Mother would come home [and say], 'Where is this, I never put that
there' ••• I wanted to be good. I was again the little child."
Because on ly the basement 1eve 1s of many homes we re damaged, six
families were able to live in upper levels while repair work was in
progress. All, however, found that situation disruptive. One common
probl em was a desi re to restore such homes as soon as possi bl e; the
families seemed to feel that only then could normalcy be restored to
their lives. One man described the effects on him and his wife: "Terrible, terrible, we couldn't sleep, just could not sleep. We sat here,
we'd getup, listen, we'd go to bed • • • in an hour or two we was wide
awake, couldn't sleep, and so we'd get up ••• It went on like that for
weeks." Another man explained that his zeal to finish repairs resulted
in mistakes and delays. "It's been a pain," he said,
because I'm not a carpenter ••• I wish that I would've taken time.
Like I just worked here day after day, and I got more and more
frustrated. I got working on something all day long, and then I'd
find out that I should have done something else first, because I was
going to screw up what I'd just done.
Other common frustrations included the constant dirt and the necessity of
the family having to live in cramped quarters.
Respondents were asked to di scuss di saster impacts on aspects of
their social lives including changes in visiting patterns with relatives
and friends, changes in leisure and recreational activities, and changes
in neighborhood relationships.
Of the 11 respondents, eight reported that visiting patterns had not
changed as a resu 1t of the di saster experi ence, one reported increased
visits, and two reported decreased visits. Most of those reporting no
change attributed the stability of those patterns to the LDS Church. In
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order to remain active in the church, members are obliged to participate
in church activities and routines. Therefore, even though victims were
undergoing dramatic disruptions in other aspects of their lives, obligations to and activities within the church provided stability.
In contrast to this stability, eight respondents reported that their
family's leisure and recreational activities were severely curtailed,
while the remainder reported that they had not changed. Of those reporting negative impacts, most attributed the curtailment to limits on time
and economic resources; families concentrated their efforts on repairing
and rebuilding homes and had little time or money available for vacations, sports, club activities, or nights out. Most said that they "just
worked." One young man felt that limiting all of his time to working on
his home may have been a mistake:
That would be what I'd do differently, if I had to do it again. I'd
do as much as I could for awhile then go and have a leisure activity ••• I think that was the frustrating thing [misSing leisure
activities] ••• Then instead of doing it [working on the house]
because it was important to me, I was doing it because I had to, and
then I would get mad.
Most of the respondents felt that the di saster experi ence had a
positive impact on neighborhood relationships. Nine felt that relationships had become closer, one felt that they had become strained, and one
said they remained the same. The closer relationships appear to be the
result of neighborhoods working together to protect property and lives.
One woman explained that since her family is not LOS, they did not know
their neighbors prior to the flooding:
We feel better about it. We know people now, whereas we didn't know
them before ••• by us not being active in their church ••• I never
could get the people straight. I didn't know who lived where, and
so now we do know. It's amazing.
For those who shared LOS membership, relations became even closer. One
woman church member reported,
And, even though we lived there for some time and we were all good
friends, we weren't that close. But now we're really close, like
sisters and brothers, practically, and we look out for each other.
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Victims

families experienced considerable economic hardship due to

. the fl oodi ng. Because Davi s County was not des i gnated as a flood a rea,
National

Flood

Insurance could not

be obtained,

and few families

had

private insurance covering floods. Most families depended on public and
private aid to cover losses, as well as their own incomes and savings.
Two of the families interviewed had obtained flood insurance from Lloyd's
of London. However, their insurance did not cover all of their structural losses nor did it cover any home content losses.
None of the respondent fami 1 i es had members lose thei r jobs as a
result of the flooding. However, one elderly man retired early so that
he could devote his time to rebuilding his home. In two other cases, a
construction worker chose not to pursue jobs, and a physician closed his
office for a short time so that they could work on their homes. In these
situations, the families

lost considerable income.

Two female spouses

quit work for short periods of time so that they could tend to thei r
homes. One was compensated for the time by her employer, and the other
was not. Only one member of the respondent families obtained an additional job to help cover losses.
Respondents were asked to di scuss the impact of the di saster on
several

areas

of

family

functioning:

disruption

of

family

routines,

family stresses and strengths, and lasting effects still present at the
time of interviewing (approximately three months after the flooct).
As discussed above, the majority of respondent families experienced
disruptions

resulting from residential

repair and rebuilding of homes.

changes, temporary housing, and

It is not surprising, therefore, that

these disruptions, along with property losses, would affect family functioning. All of the respondents reported that their families' day-to-day
routines

were disrupted,

and

only one

respondent

felt

that they

had

returned to normal at the time of the interview. There was great variety
in reported disruption of family routines, with many disruptions centering on time and financial

constraints resulting from the flood. Other

disruptions mentioned included the sense of living out of boxes, hassles
with aid officials, the time spent traveling to the damaged home, children's loss of playmates, and the suspension of leisure and family act i vit i es.

The disaster experience appears to have strengthened family ties for
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the majority of respondent families. Seven reported closer family ties,
three said that the disaster had no affect on family relationships, and
one said that relationships had worsened. A young woman explained how
the loss of their home strengthened her family relationships:
It's been something very positive in our life. It's reaffirmed our
love for one another ••• We know that we're important to each other
and more important than house or other things ••• I think it's nice
to have a point in your life where you decide what is important. I
don't think a lot of people ever face that ••• We know basically
what we want, what happiness is, so other things, we'll get through
them. We'll figure this out. We'll work on it.
Most respondents spoke of closer family relationships occurring in
the long run, while recognizing that the experience did cause tension
among family members at times. Typically, arguments centered on what to
do about the situation and on what work should be done and who should do
it to repair and rebuild homes. One woman complained that it was difficult to make her teenagers understand that they had to give up some
recreational activities in order to help with the clean up and repair.
Another young respondent described the tension between him and his pregnant wife:
I wanted to get the house done for her, so she could get back in,
but she wanted me to spend more time with her, so I'd get frustrated ••• and she'd get frustrated because I wouldn't take time
for her ••• I kind of felt sorry for myself because I was here
doing it all by myself ••• And I forgot that she COUldn't be
here.
And as I saw the house, 1itt1e-by-1itt1e, improving, she
never saw it improve.
Respondents were asked if their families were still feeling effects
of the flood at the time of interviewing. All of the respondents mentioned negative residual impacts. The most frequently mentioned negative
impact was that family life was still not back to norma1--work still had
to be done on repairing and rebuilding their homes. Other frequently
mentioned impacts were inadequate housing, waiting for city drainage and
street repairs to complete yard repairs, financial problems, debris and
dirt in homes, lost possessions, and lingering emotional effects. A
woman described the day-to-day effect of lost possessions: "Of course,
we feel the impact. Every time
go to get something, I realize that I
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don't have it anymore. And that comes up almost daily. That's going to
be hard for a long time, yes."
Residents were also asked to discuss several types of psychological/
emotional impacts on their families, including: emotional strain, storm
anxieties, disaster impacts on children, and feelings of optimism/pessimism about the future.
All of the respondents reported that they experienced emotional
strain at times following the flood, and all but one respondent reported
emotional strain at the time of interviewing. Three respondents received
formal counseling for disaster-related strain, two at a mental health
center and one from a private psychologist. All three had terminated
counseling by the time of interviewing, but they still complained of
emotional strain.
When asked to discuss what they personally did to reduce such
strain, the majority of respondents mentioned "work." One man explained
how working on his damaged property helped:
You work.
let's put it this way, your yard is full of mud, your
basement's full of mud. And I suppose that your goal, your
immediate goal is to get the damn mud out to the streets, where
somebody will haul it off ••• Your long range goal is to put it
back like it was before ••• And the closer you get to reaching that
particular goal, the less emotional strain you have.
Other strain-reducing techniques mentioned were not thinking about the
disaster experience, getting away from the house and the work, and participating in sports and religious activities. Only two respondents mentioned talking over their problems with family and friends.
Ei ght fami 1i es had returned or were p1anni ng to return to thei r
former homes or home sites; all expressed concern for personal or property safety. Two said that they wanted to sell their homes, and that if
they could not sell them by the following spring, they would not live in
their homes during the spring thaw. One woman explained,
I will not be able to be here in the spring. I'll either have to be
on vacation or moved. I couldn't sit here and listen and wait
again. Now I know what the neighbors have felt for all these years.
I can't go through it again.
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Although others made the decision to remain in their homes, they did
admit to anxieties about having their homes damaged again or their families injured. Three families had their homes totally destroyed and their
property bought by the city as a site for construction of a remedial
catch basin. Understandably, those persons said they would not have
wanted to rebuild on their former home sites.
Only two respondents reported anxieties during rain storms. However, fi ve res pondents sa i d that they st ill had n i ghtma res about the
flood. Some dreamed of cleaning homes and shoveling mud. Others had
more emotional dreams. A woman described her recurring nightmares:
They told me the mud was coming and I'd holler at the kids to come
on, and you know how kids are, 'just a minute, I'm coming,' and they
wouldn't come. The mud was and they wasn't ••• I'd be trying to
pull them out, and they kept sinking, and I couldn't get them out of
the mud.
Four respondents had only adult children. However, three reported
that their adult children were still feeling the effects of the flood,
even though they were not directly involved. The effects were manifested
primarily in emotion and anger over the loss of family home and possessions. Of the six respondents who had minor children, two said that the
fl ood had no 1i ngeri ng effects on thei r chi 1dren, two were not sure if
thei r chil dren had been affected, and two thought that thei r chil dren
were still feeling its effects. One woman said of her teenage children
They don't want people asking them about it. They just want to be
normal Joes ••• They don't like that label (mud slide victims) •••
Adults enjoy that, some really enjoy it, but teenagers don't want to
be victims ••• They don't want to stand out.
Respondents were asked to di scuss thei r fami ly' s future--whether
they were optimistic or pessimistic. Eight felt optimistic, two felt
pessimistic, and one held mixed feelings. The most common sources of
optimism were that they were actively restoring their homes, that they
were taking precautions against future damage, and that they had confidence in their ability to handle another disaster. One woman felt that
things could only get better:
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When you're at the bottom of the barrel, the only way out is up.
They've got to get better, they can't get worse • • • I think that if
you're stuck in one place, and you're stuck there permanently,
that's your own fault. I think if you want to get out of something,
you can work at it.
Both of the respondents who felt pessimistic about their future were
elderly.

One

spring thaw.

thought

her

home would

The other had problems

be

flooded

in

several

again with the
other aspects

next

of

her

life, and the loss of her home was the additional life event that made
her feel hopeless about the future.
Findings:
A number of
families

in

included

the

aid

Davis

programs

County.

Federal

Aid Utilization and Recovery
and

services were

National

Emergency

level

available to

agencies

Management

Agency

and

victim

organizations

(FEMA),

the

Small

Business Administration (SBA), and the Red Cross. At the state level,
Individual Family Grants were administered through the State of Utah's
Department of Social Services. The LDS Church provided aid and services
primarily at the ward and stake levels.

Local

community and emergent

flood organizations included Chambers of Commerce, service groups, the
Governor's Task Force on Flood Relief, churches, merchants, and employers.
Respondents were asked how they found out about the available disaster aid
informed
bishops

programs,
by the
and

and

a majority of respondents

LDS Church.

stake

presidents

When

said that they were

reviewing cases

typically

for

informed

LDS

victims

aid,

ward

about

the

presence and location of the Disaster Assistance Center. Most respondents also received information about available aid through the media;
newspapers appeared to be the most frequently consulted source. Other
information sources mentioned were kin, friends,

insurance agents, and

officials at the evacuation centers.
FEMA set up a Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) at Farmington Junior
High School

for victims in Davis County.

organizations, including FEMA, SBA,
the Red Cross,

IFG,

had tables at the DAC.

Major disaster agencies and
Internal

Revenue Service, and

LDS was not present formally;

although respondents reported that ward bi shops were present and gi vi ng
informal advice and information to their ward members.
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All of the respondents reported that they went to the DAC in Farmi ngton at 1east once. Seven sa i d that they had no prob 1ems gett i ng to
the DAC, nor did they have any problems understanding available programs
or applying

for

aid.

The

four who did have problems most frequently

mentioned confusion about exactly who was eligible to apply for programs
(e.g., how could an individual apply for a Small Business Loan?), questions about family resources and losses that could not be immediately
answered, disappointment over the amount and types of aid available, and
frustration over the impersonal, routinized way that agencies dealt with
victims.
Formal Aid
Although many organizations were involved in providing aid to victims,

only the most frequently mentioned organizations are considered

here.

These were

FEMA,

SBA,

IFG,

LDS,

American

Red Cross,

and

local

community and service organizations. Respondents were asked to list the
organizations from which they received aid and to describe the types of
aid they recei ved. They were al so asked if they found any of the programs unsatisfactory.
FEMA provided two types of aid to victim families: financial

sup-

port for temporary housing and aid to meet individual needs. Subsidies
for temporary housing for up to one year were provided for those who
qualified financially and needed rental

housing until

their homes were

repaired or rebuilt. The amount of support was based on family size and
need. No support was gi ven to those who chose to stay with fami ly or
friendS. Available rental

housing in the area was utilized, and it was

not necessary to bring in trailers.
Aid to meet individua"1 needs included money to begin the process of
cleaning and repairing homes. This included providing necessities such
as cleaning supplies, electrical
naces.

supplies, hot water heaters, and fur-

In addition, furniture packages were loaned with the option to

buy at minimal cost.
Nine
frequent ly
respondents

respondents
recei ved

received

was

aid

tempo ra ry

received furniture,

from

FEMA.

hous i ng

three

replacement, two received living kits

The

(seven

type

of

aid

res pondent s).

most
Three

received water heater repair or
(mops, brooms,

plates, utensils,

etc.), one received a refrigerator, one received bedding, and one re-
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ceived electrical fixtures.
Two respondents found FEMA unsati s factory. One respondent who was
handicapped was offered support for temporary housing, but FEMA made no
effort to assist her in locating such housing--a task she was unable to
perform herself. She therefore felt she had no choice but to live with
her parents unti 1 her own home was repai red. FEMA gave her no other
assistance. Another respondent felt "betrayed" by FEMA. FEMA approved
support for temporary housing for her family for one year, but then
withdrew from the agreement after only two months. According to the
respondent, no explanation for this action was offered by FEMA officials.
For families who could qualify, SBA offered low-interest loans up to
$50,000 to repair and rebuild homes. At the time of the interviews,
eight respondent families qualified for loans, but only two families had
decided to accept them--one for a small amount and one for the maximum
amount. Two others were sti 11 not sure if they woul d borrow the money.
Of all of the formal aid programs, SBA was most frequently criticized by
respondents. The three families who did not qualify for loans wanted
them and thought that they had been treated unfairly. They complained
that SBA was inflexible and had not considered the special circumstances
of thei r cases. The six famil i es who qual ifi ed fo r loans but had not
accepted them at the time of the interview felt that interest rates were
too high, and that they could not afford the loan on top of continuing
mortgage payments. Other problems included required detailed inventories
which were difficult to compile, the temporary status of caseworkers that
resulted in having to deal with someone new at each contact, and the
long waiting period before receiving any money. One young woman explained her frustrations:
You know, they want down to a bobby pin what was lost in order to
get any financial assistance or anything and you can't do that.
They want you to rebuild and get back in so that they can spend less
money on you, but they won't give you any money so that you can do
that until you answer their questions, which you can't answer •••
They could've even come over and look ••• The place is a total
wreck. 'We don't live like this normally, sir. We need some help.
Whi 1e shari ng the cost with the federal government, the State of
Utah, through its Department of Social Services, administered the Family
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Grant Program. Grants up to $5,000 were awarded to victim families,
cont i ngent upon needs and fi nanc i a 1 resources. IFG is a program of 1ast
resort; victims must have exhausted other resources and programs to be
eligible for a grant. Thus, to receive IFG aid, victims first had to
apply for an SBA loan. If they received a loan or were turned down for a
loan, they were eligible for a grant. However, if they did not accept a
loan after qualifying for it, they were disqualified.
At the time of interviewing, only one respondent had received a
grant, three were initially disqualified, and three were disqualified
after refusing SBA loans. Four applied for grants but never heard about
the disposition of their applications. Not being able to get information
on the status of applications was the major criticism leveled against the
IFG program.
LOS provided aid to victims through the organizational lines already
mentioned. Each ward was expected to take care of its own members affected by the disaster. If this proved too burdensome, the bishop' could go
to the stake president for assistance, and the president in turn could
appeal on up the church organizational ladder. No new committees were
organized to deal specifically with the disaster, and at the time of
interviewing, no extraordinary funds had been allotted from general
church funds for di saster re 1i ef. LOS admi ni strat i on made recommendations to bishops and presidents concerning disaster relief, but no specific directives were handed down. Aid and services were available to both
members and nonmembers of the church.
All of the respondent families received aid from the LOS Church. Of
the programs considered here, LOS provided the greatest variety of aid.
Before the actual mudslides, it provided large work crews to sandbag and
protect homes; duri ng the eme rgency, it provi ded vi ct i ms wi th shelter,
food, clothing, and other necessities; and afterwards, it was particularly important in providing work crews to help remove mud and clean homes.
In fact, all of the respondents, except for those with totally destroyed
houses, had LOS crews clean and remove mud from their homes. In describing the mud removal and cleaning process, one woman said,
One Sunday, right after all of this happened, to get the mud out
they had a bucket brigade ••• They just kept shoveling the mud
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right into the buckets ••• and they were throwing it out of the
family room downstairs window.
Another man said,
They came and first it was the teenage kids that came and they
squirted it down ••• and then the women came and scrubbed it up,
and then the men came down and disinfected it free. In about a day
and a half it was fully done.
These work crews also helped victims to salvage and store their possessions.
In aiding victims to recover losses, LOS provided building materials, repair labor, money, other items (such as grass, sprinkler systems,
carpeting) as well as emotional support. Most of the respondents whose
homes were not totally destroyed received some help from LOS in repairing
their homes; however, there was great variation in the amount and type of
help received. Labor ranged from small jobs to major repairs, but the
amount and type of work received was not associated with the amount of
damage sustained.
LOS offered to rebuild the homes of the four respondents whose homes
were totally destroyed. Church aid was to include both materials and
volunteer labor, but at the time of interviewing no planning or work had
begun on any of the homes.
Most of the respondents were grateful for the hel p that they received from LOS. Without this aid, much of the cleaning and repair work
a1ready done wou 1d not have been accompli shed. Howeve r, not all were
completely satisfied. A few respondents felt that the volunteer workers
were not sensitive to doing the work the way the owner wanted it done.
One woman said that she felt like a "prisoner" of the volunteers. Volunteers kept comi ng to hel p and she never had time to rest. LOS had
promi sed he 1pin repa i ri ng the i r home to one non-LOS f ami 1y but neve r
fulfilled it promise. The respondent for that family was angry and
disappointed:
They were there for awhile, but then they continued to say how their
building program was so good and everything ••• it (the disaster)
got low keyed and everybody started putting their homes back together.
then we could ask for something and somebody else would
get it, but we wouldn't.
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The Red Cross provi ded many types of aid to di saster vi ct i ms in
Davis

County.

Particularly

important

were

mass

feedings,

emergency

shelters, and aid to individual families. Only five respondents received
aid from the Red Cross. Types of aid included food, clothing, cleaning
supplies,

furniture,

and

bedding.

Red

Cross

aid

was

most

important

during the emergency period; it did not provide significant aid during
recovery once the critical emergency had passed.
Community,

service,

and

church

relief funds for disaster victims.

groups

(non-LOS)

In some cases,

also

organized

those organizations

had funds and therefore acted to disburse the money to victims; in other
cases, they organized efforts to solicit funds for victims. Six respondents

received aid from such organizations. Types of aid received in-

cluded clothing, children's toys, money, furniture, and yard items.

In

addit ion, employe rs helped two of the famil i es by provi di ng 1abor for
sandbagging and clearing property.

Five

respondents

received aid from

local merchants in the form of free merchandise and discounts.
Respondents were asked to discuss the importance of aid programs in
terms of both thei r economic and emotional recovery from the flood. For
economic recovery, five respondents said that aid received was not important, one said that it was somewhat important, and five said that it
was very important. For emotional

recovery, six mentioned that none of

the aid programs were important, two said that they were somewhat important,

and three said that they were very

important.

Therefore,

in

both cases, aid programs were helpful to only about half of the respondents.
Respondents were also asked to discuss their feelings about getting
help from aid organizations. When asked about receiving aid from federal
and state agencies, five respondents said that they felt all right about
receiving such aid, but six felt that it was difficult to do so. Those
who thought it was acceptable typically said that the aid was justified
because they had contributed to the service by paying taxes. Those who
had difficulty in accepting the aid usually referred to their upbringing
and belief in an ethic of "pride and independence." Respondents found it
even more difficult to accept aid from LOS than from the federal government. One thought it was acceptable, while the remainder had difficulty
accepting LOS aid. As with taxes, contributions are routinely made to
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LOS services through tithing. However, as church members, most respondents were used to giving and found it difficult to receive. Four respondents thought that it was reasonable to accept aid from local community and service organizations, while seven mentioned that they had
difficulty in accepting such aid.
One large LOS family lost everything in the flood, and the male
spouse lost his job shortly thereafter. In explaining her positive
feelings about accepting aid, the female spouse of that family said:
People should be able to get aid ••• If they (LDS) can help you to
rebuild and put you back where you were, then you're gOing to be a
contributor. If you don't, you're going to be on welfare or something ••• They'd spend a lot more money on our family with seven
children than they would to help us rebuild.
But most respondents accepted aid with reticence. Thei r church and
families had taught them to "help themselves"; to ask others for help was
difficult and embarrassing. One young man explained what it was like to
apply for aid:
It was the hardest thing, because I love independence. I don't like
to be dependent on anybody ••• I hated going to those meetings. It
was offensive to me to fill out the papers. It was kind of like
going on welfare or something like that •• It was kind of embarrassing to sit down at the tables, and I hated it.
The femal e spouse of an elderly coupl e that had accepted cl othi ng
from a local merchant explained her feelings in shopping for the
clothing: "We just looked like a poor, old, decrepit couple--you know-walking through that store. We were so downhearted, and we'd never taken
anything from anybody, and to shop like that was horrible."
Informal Aid: Kin, Neighbors, and Friends
The primary group is frequently an important source of aid and
emotional support in helping families to recover from disaster. It is
particularly important in a Mormon community where the church teaches,
"When in need, first look to yourself. If the need is beyond your scope,
then look to your family. If the need is beyond thei r scope, then look
to the Church."
The social context of primary group aid is different from that of
formal aid. Typically it is offered without the recipient having to
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request it. It is usually immediately forthcoming after a crises, in
contrast to the lengthy waiting periods involved in acquiring formal aid.
Additionally, one does no have to qualify for it, and no red tape is
involved.
All respondents, except for one, had relatives in the Davis County/
Salt Lake City area, and those with relatives received a wide variety of
assistance from them. The type of aid most frequently given was shelter;
nine families stayed with relatives at some time after the flood. Emotional support from relatives was also important for those families who
were interviewed, with eight receiving such support. Six families were
given money by relatives; five received labor assistance; five received
food, clothing, and household necessities; and three received help with
child care.
All of the respondents received aid from friends and neighbors as
well. The most frequently received aid was labor. At the onset of the
fl ood, fri ends and nei ghbors worked together to protect thei r- homes by
sandbagging and removing possessions to safe locations. After the floodi ng subs i ded, they he 1ped each other clean and repa i r homes and ya rds.
All respondents received help with the cleanup work.
Emotional support from friends and neighbors was also important,
with eight respondents receiving such support. In talking about her
feelings, one woman said, "Oh yes, they just stand and cry with you, just
as easily as they help you financially. They feel helpless, but it's
just nice to know that people are concerned."
Six families received food, clothing, and household necessities
from friends and neighbors; two received money; two received storage room
for their salvaged possessions; and one received shelter.
One woman discussed the role of friends and neighbors in her
family's recovery:
Friends, we always thought we had a lot of friends, but it turns out
there's a lot more really close friends than we thought. They sent
us home to bed at nights because we were just wrung out, and they
stayed here all night long. And they ran themselves down. There
was a lot of them that had bad backs, bad this, bad that, run
down ••• but they stuck it out here.
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When asked to discuss the importance of aid from kin, friends, and
neighbors in their recovery, respondents rated such aid slightly more
important than the formal aid programs in economic recovery. Four said
that it was not important to their economic recovery, while the remainder
said that it was important. As might be expected, respondents rated the
support received from primary groups as much more important to emotional
recovery than that received from formal organizations. Furthermore, it
was readily apparent that the respondents were more comfortable accepting
aid from primary group members than from formal organizations. Seven
respondents thought it was proper to accept aid from relatives and
friends, while the others found it difficult. One woman explained that
she could not take money from her parents:
I've sneaked some money back in Oadls bill drawer ••• I really feel
like I should repay in some way, but I also know that, myself, I
don't want to have people hurry and repay me for acts that I've
done. But I've never had the money to give, so money is my hardest
thing.
Another woman felt that family and friends should help each other:
Like I say, I'd rather be on the giving end rather than the receiving end, but I mean that's what family and friends are for. If you
can't help emotionally and with stuff when somebody needs you, to me
that isn't a friend or a family.
Another felt that accepting help bonded people together:
It's
with
have
then

a greater love because they have been able to share something
you, and therefore, the bond between you is greater ••• So you
to allow that ••• If you say, 'No, no, we won't take that,'
you've stopped something very sweet between you.

Economic and Emotional Recovery
At the time of interviewing, five months after the flood, repairs
and rebuilding were not complete for any of the respondent families. For
those who had to make repairs, most had begun the work with their own
fi nanci a1 and 1abor resources. However, the comp 1et i on of these repa irs
would require financial and labor assistance from SBA, IFG, and LOS. For
those four fami 1i es whose homes were tota 11 y dest royed, no p1ann i n9 or
rebuilding had begun. Two had received commitments for aid from SBA and
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LOS, but two were still not sure how they would finance rebuilding or if
rebuilding would be possible.
coverage was

lacking,

It appeared that because flood insurance

repair and

rebuilding would

progress

slowly

in

Davis County.
Respondents were asked to estimate the total amount of financial and
labor aid committed to them by insurance and formal aid programs (additional
period).

aid

commitments

Three

may

have

been

respondent families

received

after

the

interview

received no aid commitments, three

received less than $10,000, two received from $10,000 to $25,000, and
three received over $25,000. The average amount of aid received by the
eleven respondent families was approximately $17,000. Thus the percentage of losses covered by aid and insurance seems to have been generally
low. Six respondents expected to recover less than one-fourth of thei r
losses, four from 26% to 75%, and one 87%.
When asked to assess thei r famil i es'

recovery, no respondent felt

that they had completely recovered, either economically or emotionally,
from their losses. In assessing economic recovery, eight said that they
were not at all

recovered, while the remainder indicated only partial

recovery. Emotional recovery progressed somewhat more rapidly. Only one
respondent said that no progress had been made emotionally, and of the
others, six said that they were somewhat recovered, and four said that
they were mostly recovered.
Findings:

Response of Aid Organizations in Utah

Because of the pervasi veness of the LDS Church and its anci 11 ary
organizations in Utah, it was expected that their presence would affect
the

response

Federal,

strategies

state,

and

of

traditional

private disaster

disaster

aid

organizations.

relief organizations established

operations in Utah with preplanned and tested procedures for dealing with
disasters. In contrast, the LOS Church entered the emergency with established operations and procedures for dealing with families in need.
The following discussion covers the major organizations involved in
the flood response--LOS Church, FEMA, Individual Family Grants, American
Red Cross, Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce, Flood Recovery Committee,
and Governor's

Task

Force

on

Flood
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Relief--and

reviews

major

issues

resulting from the interactions between the LDS aid system and the other
disaster-specific systems.
LDS and its Program
The presence of LDS affects the everyday lives of most families in
the Salt Lake City area, whether they are members of the church or not.
As already noted, LDS is well organized to respond to the social and
financial problems of its members, and LDS disaster assistance followed
those traditional lines of response. No new groups or committees were
formed to deal specifically with disaster assistance.
Also as al ready noted, the church provided a variety of types of
aid before, during, and after the floods. Although statistics were not
available specifically for Davis County, LOS estimated the number of
persons who provided labor and the number of man-hours expended in prevention and cleanup of the flooded areas in Utah during the emergency
period from April 12 to June 4, 1983:
Individuals Donating Time or Equipment
Donated Labor Hours
Donated Equipment Hours

97,125 persons
824,327 hours
80,730 hours

Besides providing building materials and general work crews, LOS
provided skilled workers, such as electricians and plumbers, to repair
homp.s. Also, depending on the victim family's financial resources and
losses sustained, LDS provided money and specific items, such as carpeting, furniture, household goods, and windows. In cases where the church
offered to help in rebuilding homes with volunteer labor and materials,
the rebuilding was typically a joint effort, with the victim families
providing whatever financing and labor they could, and LOS providing the
rema i nder. Repa i rand rebu il di ng ass i stance was offered to church members and nonmembers alike, and volunteer labor and equipment was likewise
donated by both members and nonmembers.
Beyond the ward and stake level of the church, the highest level is
the general authority which is headed by a full-time executive administrator who is a member of the LDS priesthood. However, as discussed, the
response of the church began, as tradition and organization dictated, at
the lowest level (the ward). The general authority did make procedural
recommendations to the stakes and wards, but no orders or directions were
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passed down. Each ward was expected to provide the necessary assistance
to both members and nonmembers alike, and the stake was to assist if
local

financial

and

labor

resources

were

depleted.

Typically,

a

un-

affected ward took on the complete responsibility for aiding one family
in

an

affected

uniform across
individual

ward.
wards.

In

no way

The

could church

quantity

and

type

response
of

victim families was dependent on ward

be considered

assistance

given

to

resources and bishop

decisions.
The outpouring of volunteer labor may be attributed to the basic
teaching of LOS which emphasizes the moral responsibility and obligation
of individuals to aid those in need. LOS members are taught to respond
to a call to service from their leaders, no matter how menial the task.
Thus, this service is both a personal

response and an organized church

response; the organizational structure is in place to call one worker or
a group of workers for a job, and personal

responsibility ensures that

those called will comply.
The chu rch has two pri ma ry sou rces of income. Each family tithes
(contributes 10% of its income) and additionally makes fast offerings-that is, once a month they abstain from food and drink for two meals and
make a donation to the care of the poor and needy. The money used to
assist victim families came from such fast offerings made at the ward and
stake levels. Although funds were set aside at the general church level
to aid victims, no ward or stake had requested general church assistance
by the time of interviewing.
Because traditional lines of response were used to assist families,
there was

little need to publicize available LOS services.

(However,

some respondent families reported that they had read articles in newspapers stating that the church planned to help families recover.) The
church used its organization of home teachers and visiting teachers to
seek out needy fami 1 i es; each ward has mal e home teachers and femal e
visiting

teachers

who

have

the

responsibility

of watching

over each

family in that ward. Periodically and as necessary, the teachers visit
families

in

their

homes.

Among

other

responsibilities,

during

these

visits teachers assess family problems and needs and then report back to
the bishop. He in turn talks with the family head, and together they

122

decide what can be done about the family's needs and what the church's
involvement will be.
Although
system,

church

outreach

during

officials

the

disaster

believed that

was

handled

through

this

in many cases the system was

altered; families went directly to the bishop, and members reported the
needs of other members and nonmembers in the ward bypassing the home
teachers. In addition, bishops were available at the DACs, although not
in official capacity, to advise and support their members.

In some of

the affected wards, an LDS survey was made of damaged homes.
When asked to evaluate their response, LDS Social Service officials
identified three problem areas. First, there was clearly a need to set
up communi cat i on between church and pub 1 i c offi cia 1s and to des i gnate
respective domains of responsibility before a disaster occurs in order to
avoi d confusi on and confl i ct between these groups. Second, there was a
need to establish an emergency communication system among key church and
community leaders so that telephones could be bypassed in an emergency.
Third, although some wards and stakes tried to form new committees to
deal specifically with the emergency, officials believed that those wards
following traditional lines of response were more successful; they wanted
to impress on their wards the importance of following those traditional
procedures in an emergency.
Overall, the LDS officials assessed thei r response as successful.
Large numbers of volunteers were organized and used effectively, and many
individual

families

received

assistance

in

cleanup

and

recovery.

The

officials felt that church efforts had brought community members, both
LDS and non-LDS, closer together.
Federal Aid
Of the 29 counties in Utah, 22 were declared disaster areas by a
federal

disaster declaration that extended

from April

12 to June 30,

1983. Twenty-two counties were declared eligible for public assistance
and 11 for individual assistance; Davis County was eligible for both. At
this time, five Disaster Assistance Centers were set up--in Spanish Fork,
Ogden, Farmington (Davis County), Salt Lake City, and Delta--and a telephone hotline was established to take applications for individual assistance.

Ultimately,

about

1200 applications

were received.
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for

individual

assistance

As mentioned, services provided by the federal government to individual families were small business loans (SBA), temporary housing, amended
tax returns, and farm home loans. By mid-July (two weeks prior to the
application deadline), approximately 400 applications for SBA loans had
been taken and 11 accepted.

At the same time, FEMA had taken in 458

applications for temporary housing assistance, and 258 had been accepted.
There was extensive media coverage publicizing the particulars of
federal assistance. Announcements were made in all newspapers and on all
television and radio stations through May, June, and July. Flyers were
distributed prior to the opening of the DACs, and public meetings were
held explaining the kinds of assistance available to victims.
FEMA estimated that 5,000 families were affected in some way by the
flood.

Yet despite the extensive publicity, only one-quarter of these

families

applied

for

assistance.

Federal

and

state

representatives

believed that the poor response was due in part to LOS emphasis on family
self-sufficiency.
In addition to providing aid to families,

FEMA compiled computer

lists of all applications and verifications and made the lists available
to other helping organizations, such as the Red Cross and the Governor's
Task Force. This cooperation eliminated victims having to make separate
application to different organizations and, likewise, those organizations
having to make separate verifications.
Indi vidual Fami l~~ran!2.~
The Individual Family Grant Program was administered by the State of
Utah th rough its Department of Soc i a 1 Se rvi ces. As already noted, IFG is
an aid program of last resort. Depending on losses,

needs,

resources,

and other aid, families were eligible for grants up to $5,000.00 that
could be used for a variety of purposes--repairs, rebuilding, necessities, ext ra t rave 1 expenses to and from work, funera 1 expens es. At the
time of the interviews, 684 applications had been submitted for grants
statewide;

189 had

been

approved,

59 withdrawn,

207 denied,

and the

remainder pending.
When the federal

government conducted an assessment of the damage

due to the first flood in April 1983, a technical assistant also arrived
to train the designated grant program coordinator. That person and her
staff were already employed by Utah's Department of Social Services, and
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no new people were hired to administer the program. The coordinator had
the authority to utilize people from any of the Social Services district
offices.

These

personnel

were experienced

in taking

verifying information for eligibility. The total

applications

and

staff numbered about

30.

Training was done quickly, under the pressure of time. After the
coordinator was trained, she trained additional staff and they in turn
trained others as new disasters developed. Typically, those taking aid
applications

were trained the day

prior to the opening of each DAC.

Verifiers spent one day in the field with a trained verifier and the next
day began working alone.
Although the day-to-day operations of the program were overseen by
the coordinator, a state administrative panel, consisting of the coordinator and supervisory level personnel from the state offices and divisions,
State

made decisions
of

Utah

covered 75%.

funded

A total

on

grant

awards

25% of the

and their dollar amounts.

program and the

of $400,000 was

federal

committed to

the

The

government

program,

and

$167,000 was expended at the time of interviewing. Because IFG partici-

pated in the DACs and the hot 1 i ne, out reach was s i mil a r to that of the
federal programs previously discussed; it utilized the media and public
meetings to advertise its services.
In an interview, the coordinator of IFG discussed her feelings about
the strengths and weaknesses of the program.

With the probabi 1 ity of

floods the following spring (1984), she felt there was a clear need for
advanced and more detailed training for prospective staff members. Also,
new staff members needed to be hired to alleviate work pressure created
by existing social

services assistance

programs.

In order to

improve

cooperation and coordination with FEMA, the coordinator felt that the
administrative offices of the

IFG program should be located with the

federal di saster offi ceo For the 1983 fl oods, the programs were located
in two different cities. Along with lesser changes in administration,
the coordinator felt strongly that the management structure of the program had to be changed.
Social

Duri ng the 1983 di sasters, the Department of

Services administered the program, while the state's Emergency

Management Servi ces managed the program. The coordi nator felt that the
separation

between

administration

and
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management

was

cumbersome

and

ineffective. She wanted the Department of Social Services to have complete control of the program with the possibility of a liaison arrangement wi th Emergency Management Servi ces. In 1 i ght of the Department of
Social

Services inexperience in administering the IFG program, the co-

ordinator felt that it moved quickly and efficiently. She also felt that
cooperation within the department and with federal personnel was successful.
American Red Cross
The

American

Red

Cross

is

specifically

organized to

respond to

emergencies. At the time of flooding, the Red Cross in Salt Lake was
being reorganized from a divisional to a key resource structure, thereby
putting the entire state under the jurisdiction of the Salt Lake Area
Chapter.
The Red Cross provided two categories of aid to victims in Utah-emergency and additional assistance. Emergency assistance consisted of
providing mass feedings to victims and workers, sheltering vittims, and
providing emergency care to victims.
The Red Cross served 55,000 emergency meals to victims and work
crews--a

large

number to sandbagging volunteers

who were

redirecting

flood paths to city streets in the Salt Lake City area. Food was also
provided in emergency shelters set up to house evacuees.
These shelters were established around tile the state as needed. In
Davis County several shelters were opened, closed, and reopened as flood
waters and mud slides threatened various parts of the county. Approximately 1,700 persons utilized the shelters in Utah, with about 700 staying for at least one night. Typically, LDS bishops met their affected
ward members at the shelters and arranged to place them in the homes of
other members.
In Davis and Salt Lake Counties, emergency assistance to individual
families (including food, shelter, clothing, bedding, household supplies,
furniture, nursing care, minor home repair, and small appliance repair)
did not begin until about one week after the flood. Approximately 537
families throughout the state received such assistance.
The second major category of assistance provided by the Red Cross
was "additional assistance"--aid in rebuilding or making major repairs to
destroyed or damaged homes. At the time of interviewing, the Red Cross
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had entered its additional assistance phase but had helped only two
families with this kind of aid. The Red Cross was in the process of
working with LOS to come up with a rebuilding plan for destroyed homes.
Red Cross officials said that they expected to pay for building materials
and LOS to provide the labor to reconstruct homes, and that there was the
additional possibility that LOS would provide both labor and materials
for their affected members. However, no final plan had been developed.
The Salt Lake Area Chapter responded to the fl oods wit h mi ni rna 1
assistance from national Red Cross staff. Initially, three national
staff personnel worked to set up the assistance centers and to develop
public relations programs. Twelve local staff members (approximately
half paid and half volunteer) worked on the flood relief effort. The
staff was supported by 550 additional persons with little or no previous
Red Cross experi ence who vol unteered for the fl ood effort. There was
inadequate time to train these volunteers, and those who did receive
training were generally used in supervisory positions.
There were no guidelines for the interorganizational relationship
between the Red Cross and LOS. Apparently the relationship differed from
flood site to flood site, and it was most often the Red Cross that had to
change its procedures accordi ngly. In some areas, LOS provided most of
the emergency assistance with the Red Cross supporting their efforts. In
Oavis County, Red Cross officials seemed more satisfied than in some
other areas with their relationship with LOS. In contrast, the Red Cross
and FEMA have a long record of mutual cooperation in disasters, and
according to officials, that tradition was maintained in Utah.
The Red Cross is funded by donations, and thousands of dollars of
donations were received, both at the local and national levels, specifically for the Utah flood effort. By September 1983, the Red Cross had
expended approximately $160,000 on mass care and family service in Utah.
The Red Cross was present at all of the OACs, providing information
and service to victims. Similarly, they were represented on the Governor's Task Force in reviewing individual assistance cases. Their services were publicized in the newspapers and on television and radio
during and after the flooding.
Victims had to initiate contact with the Red Cross to receive assistance. Thei r res i dence was then verifi ed using the Red Cross's damage
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assessment, a caseworker was sent to evaluate needs, and the disbursal of
aid was made based on that evaluation. In addition, FEMA's computer list
of victims was used to assist in the verification and evaluation of
victim needs. For the most part, the Red Cross saw the same victims as
FEMA; Red Cross officials estimated that 95% of the victims they helped
came through the OACs or sought help from FEMA.
Red Cross as was well as FEMA and IFG officials were disappointed
with the small number of vi ctims that sought thei r hel p. One Red Cross
official said, "I think we could have met other needs, but they didn't
choose to come and seek assistance from us. We can't go and bat them over
the head and tell them we want to give you something, so we didn't."
The small victim response was attributed to the "independent nature"
of the people, their reluctance to ask for help, and the LOS promise to
return members' homes to their pre-flood condition.
In discussing their agency's weaknesses and strengths, Red Cross
officials expressed the need for a pool of trained volunteers to draw
upon in an emergency. In Utah, they worked with local churches and local
service groups to find and organize volunteers, and they were constrained
by inexperience and pressing time. In the future they intend to seek a
clarification of emergency roles and procedures relative to the county,
city, and LOS church.
The Red Cross's greatest strengths were its abil ity to provide
immediate emergency service and its ability to amass money and volunteers
to support those services. They felt that the cooperation within their
chapter and with other helping agencies, as well as their ability to do
an effective job without significant support and direction from national
Red Cross personnel indicated the soundness of their organization.
Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce Flood Recovery Committee
The Flood Recovery Committee of the Chamber of Commerce was representative of the many organizations in the Salt Lake area that emerged to
give aid to disaster victims. Although the Chamber of Commerce is an
organization of business people, no Flood Recovery Committee funds were
used to aid businesses, all money going instead to aid fami Iy recovery.
Having no initial formal guidelines, the Chamber was flexible in the
types of services it was able to provide. It primarily became involved
in replacing furnaces, landscaping, and clothing. Central to its effort
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was its attempt to ensure that needy fami 1 i es who mi ght have otherwi se
"fallen through the cracks" of the traditional disaster aid system received help. Thus Chamber officials directed their efforts toward families who could not qualify for aid from other organizations or who needed
things that the other agencies could not provide.
Services

were not

limited to Salt

Lake City

residents

but were

offered to victims all over Utah. At the time of interviewing, only a
few families had received aid from the Chamber. Officials felt that they
would deal with more cases once rebuilding was further along and public
decisions were made on the disposal of damaged properties.
Chamber officials felt that they were "invited" into the role of
providing recovery aid to flood victims by business people and individual
citizens. Initially, they received donations both from local and national

businesses

Chamber

and individuals,

di st ri bute

the

funds

usually with the stipulation that the
di rect ly,

independent

of

government

and

traditional disaster organizations.
In June 1983, the Chamber decided to organize a formal committee on
flood

recovery.

Shortly thereafter,

the Chamber

employed

a

part-time

volunteer coordinator, whose job was to contact victim families,

bring

their needs to the Chambers' committee, and to provide funds and services
to those accepted for aid.
I n it i a 1 fundi ng for the

COlllillit tee

came from a 1a rge donat i on by a

1oca 1 bank and vari ous sma 11 donat ions at bot h the 1oca 1 and nat i ona 1
levels.

Subsequently, the committee mounted a large media campaign to

solicit additional donations for its fund.
tions

in the

form

of

goods

and

servi ces.

It also received many donaInteresti ngly,

because the

Chamber is an organization of businesses, it could request from members
specific types of materials or labor that its flood clients needed. For
example, if a client needed a yard landscaped, the Chamber called on one
of its member landscape architects to donate his services.
Along with its media campaign to solicit donations,

the Chamber

advertised its services and requested victims to contact them. It also
received the names of victims in several other ways. In some instances,
friends

and

neighbors

of

victims

gave

the

names

of

victims

to

the

Chamber. Additionally, the Chamber was a member of the Governor's Task
Force on Flood Relief, which also referred names of victims to the vari-

129

ous helping agencies. The Chamber, as well as the Task Force, verified
the needs of the prospective clients through FEMA's computer list of
vi ct i ms.
As with the other helping organizations, the Chamber was disappointed in the number of victims seeking their aid. Obviously, the Chamber
had a great deal of resources at its disposal, but apparently few victims
were willing to ask for its help. The Chamber attributed this lack of
interest to the "pioneer spirit" of the people in the area and their
reluctance

to

ask

for

help--especially

from

the

federal

government.

Thus, because victims were asked to apply first to FEMA and to get on
their computer list before applying for aid

from other organizations,

such as the Chamber, the number of persons requesting aid was greatly
decreased. The coordinator felt that it would be advantageous for the
Chamber to compile its own list of victims in order to bypass FEMA, that
there were victims who would use the Chamber's help, if it were not for
this obstacle.
The Chambe r

i ndi cated that

it wanted to do mo re preparat i on and

pl anni ng in advance of another emergency in order to better assume a
helping role in organizing the community and responding to victim needs.
At the time of interviewing,
across

the

country

it was corresponding with other Chambers

concerning

emergency

preparedness.

appears that the Salt Lake Chamber wanted

to make

Therefore,

disaster

it

relief a

permanent function.
Governor's Task Force on Flood Relief
With

both traditional

and

emergent

organizations as well

as LDS

providing aid to flood victims, there was a need to coordinate relief
efforts--both to ensure that

all

victims

received

help and to avoid

dup 1 i cat i on of aid. The Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce fi rst began
organizing the various groups in the beginning of June 1983. Within a
few days of the announcement of the Chamber's effort, the Governor of
Utah

announced that

his

office

would

coordinate

the

various

helping

organizations. The Chamber of Commerce gave up their effort and became a
member of the Governor's Task Force.
Although the Governor's office's primary function was to coordinate
the work of the other aid organizations--FEMA, IFG, American Red Cross,
Thistle Relief Fund, Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce, Salvation Army,
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area churches, and LDS (which participated in an advisory capacity)--and
to ensure again that victims who might otherwise have been ineligible for
aid from the traditional aid organizations received help. The Task Force
met periodically to review cases and figure out which organization could
best help in a given case. In reviewing cases, the organizations also
had the opportunity to "compare notes" and avoid duplication of services.
The Governor's office did receive approximately $8,000 in unsolicited donations for victims, but at the time of interviewing, none had been
allocated • All cases under revi ew had been passed to the other member
organizations. The Governor's representative on the Task Force suggested
that donations to the Governor's office would be held until the following
year in the event of further flooding. The actual administrative and
coordinating activities of the Task Force were funded by the Governor's
office and not by donations.
The Task Force did not publicize its services. In most cases,
victims or their acquaintances contacted the Task Force, and in a few
instances FEMA referred cases that did not qualify for its services.
However, before the Task Force would review a case, the victim had to
first apply to FEMA and be placed on its victim list.
Again, as with the other helping agencies, the Task Force was disappointed in the number of victims requesting its help, and again the
small numbers were dttributed to LDS emphasis on self reliance.
In discussing potential improvements, the Task Force coordinator
stressed the importance of improving communication and cooperation among
disaster organizations and emergency personnel and clarifying procedures
and domains of authority. She also stressed the need to improve public
relations so that people in the community would know who to contact to
meet particular needs. The coordinator felt that a basic strength of the
Governor's Office and Task Force was its ability to work with federal
disaster personnel to provide emergency assistance to victim families.
Issues in the Response of Aid ~rganizations
During the interviews with the major aid organizations, a number of
issues emerged--severa1 particularly dealing with the interaction between
LDS and the other relief organizations. Specific issues centered around
the initiation of the aid process, emergent disaster relief organiza131

tions, domains of authority, community response, and emergency and longer
term recovery response.
Initiation of Aid
In order to receive aid from disaster relief organizations, victims
had to apply for it--they had to "ask for help." All of the officials
interviewed noted that affected residents were reluctant to make such a
plea. Some attributed this to the general character or "pioneer spirit"
of the people,

others

to the LOS tenet of self-rel iance. These same

officials expressed disappointment in the small number of victims applying for their services, believing that there were many people who needed
help

but were not

asking

for

it.

FEMA estimated

that

they

received

applications from only one-quarter of the victims in Davis County. FEMA
serviced those who applied for its aid and closed its field operation by
September. Other disaster

relief organizations,

particularly the

new,

emergent ones, cont i nued to so 1 i cit donat ions and to seek out vi ct i ms,
even though they recognized that there were few willing recipients.
addition,

In

although they recognized victim reluctance to apply for aid

(particularly from the federal
organizations still

government), each of the disaster relief

required potential clients to begin the aid process

by applying to FEMA so that those victims would be on FEMA's computer
list. (Since most of the disaster relief organizations, except for the
American Red Cross, did not have their own verifiers, they took advantage
of FEMA's system.) Thus, this procedure probably discouraged some persons from applying to other sources of aid. However, only one official,
the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce coordinator, mentioned a need for
establishing a list outside of FEMA.
Despite their reluctance, many victims did apply to FEMA for aid.
Still, some felt initial guilt and humiliation, while others were easily
rebuffed by personal

questions and impersonal

bureaucratic procedures.

Some members of the Chamber of Commerce and the Governor's Task Force
mistakenly believed that their groups saved victims the "humiliation" of
waiting in DAC lines. In fact, victims had to queue up at the centers
before applying to either group.
Many of the officials of the disaster relief organizations assumed
that LOS would take care of the victims not reached by disaster organizations. This assumption was not supported in actual practice for several

132

reasons. Although the LDS outreach system of home teachers and visiting
teachers was effective with victims reluctant to request official help,
it seems to have been i neffect i ve in reachi ng nonmembers and i nact i ve
members who were not integrated into the pre-existing system. Ostensibly, emergency protection and cleanup crews were provided by the church
without having to be specifically requested, but more expensive and time
consuming

repair

and

rebuilding

work

had

to

be

requested

from

ward

bi shops by vi ct ims. Thus, the LDS out reach system di d not complete 1y
mitigate the problem of victim reluctance to request aid. Moreover, as
the interview data show, respondents were less willing to request aid
from the church than from the government. Since LDS aid was not uniformly provided,

victim visibility,

initiative,

and personal

beliefs were

apparently important in determining aid from the church.

Official

aid

programs, of course, did not rely on such individual traits in providing
aid.
Despite the extensive publ icity and outreach
organizations,

each official

LDS,

that

believed

reached.

The

there

interviewed,

were

interview data

victims

indicated

efforts

including those

"out
that

there"

who

respondents

of

all

the

representing
had

not

been

expected

that

only small amounts of thei r losses coul d be recovered through aid from
organizations

including LDS.

Thus,

it

appears that

overcoming

victim

reluctance to solicit aid may be critically necessary in disaster areas
where victims are not culturally predisposed to do so.
Emergent Disaster Relief Organizations
In Utah, many new disaster relief organizations (or new committees
within established organizations) emerged following the floods. The ones
most often mentioned during interviewing were the Thistle Relief Fund,
the Salt Lake Area Chamber of Commerce Flood Recovery Committee, the
Governor's Task Force on Flood Relief, the Salt Lake City Bank Association, and the Bountiful Chamber of Commerce. Apparently, other service
organizations and churches also initiated their own projects.
these organizations

Most of

formed after receiving unsolicited donations given

with the stipulation that the aid go directly to victims and not to
official disaster relief organizations. It was not clear to the organization

officials

interviewed

donations. Apparently,

why

such

stipulations

because no central

133

were

attached

to

organization was established

specifically to accept donations for the flood victims of Utah, potential
contributors feared their donations would be mixed with resources to be
used for

other philanthropic

interests.

Hence,

the

new organizations

accepted the donations and set up operations for dispensing that aid.
Most of these organizations publicly solicited additional donations, but
their funds were minimal compared to those of the larger relief organizations and LOS. Typi cally, these emergent groups were staffed by vol unteers and did not have enough funding or expertise to employ caseworkers
to verify needs. Thus, they also relied on FEMA for these services and
could not provide aid to victims who had not applied for federal aid.
The emergent organizations all shared the goal of trying to insure
that victims in need did not "fall through the cracks" of the traditional
aid

system.

They also sought to

provide

services

that

would

not

be

offered by others. These goals, along with a concern for avoiding duplication of aid, underlay the effort to coordinate the activities of the
new organizations with those of the traditional

ones. As noted, that

effort resulted in the formation of the Governor's Task Force on Flood
Relief--a group that itself aided few victims directly (the Department of
Social Services representative on the Task Force complained that she had
to sit through the review of a few individual cases by the Task Force,
while she had hundreds of cases to be reviewed on her own desk).
The Task Force did not seem to be very successful in meeti ng its
goal of providing aid to "hard luck" cases. Its dependence on FEMA for
verification of need, made it almost impossible to reach victims who were
not being cared for by the formal aid programs. In addition, the Task
Force's attempt at eliminating duplication of aid to individual victims
was somewhat thwarted by LOS. Although LDS sat on the Task Force in an
advisory capacity, its representatives refused to give specific information about the aid they extended to victims, and it was therefore impossible for the Task Force to know if aid had been duplicated. Thus it
appears that the coordinating activities of the Task Force could have
been more successful if 1) there had been a central receiving site for
donations, 2) the coordinating group had had its own verification system,
and 3) the LDS church had cooperated more fully.
Each of the emergent organi zat ion offi ci a 1 s i ntervi ewed expressed
the

desire

to

perpetuate

their

own
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disaster

relief

activities.

In

September, individual organizations were making plans to improve operations and to hold over funds for the next disaster. However, little
attention was being paid to improving interorganizational cooperation.
Domains of Authority
On the face of it, LDS cooperated with federal and local governments. LDS administration advised stakes and wards that local governments were in charge of emergency operations, and the church made every
public effort to cooperate with emergency and relief personnel. However,
LDS is historically a very independent organization, and this ethos
brought about complications and rivalries concerning domains of authority.
Each of the disaster relief organization officials interviewed,
while grateful for the many contributions of LDS during the disaster
effort, mentioned the need for better cooperation and coordination with
the church. The Governor's Task Force and the IFG officials felt that
their services were hindered by the unwillingness of LDS to share information on specific individuals. The Red Cross mentioned conflicts with
LDS over leadership in every flooded area. In some areas LDS took charge
of emergency services and the Red Cross supported their efforts; in other
areas, these roles were reversed. But in all areas, LDS appears to have
decided how leadership and support would be organized, and the Red Cross
followed. This occasionally made relationships between the two organizations difficult. By September, the Red Cross was still unsure of what
its role would be in the major repair and rebuilding of homes, because
LDS had not finalized its own plans. It is not surprising that the Red
Cross saw a need to coordinate emergency and long-term recovery activities with LDS prior to the occurrence of another disaster in Utah.
During the emergency in Bountiful, Davis County Emergency Management
Services and LDS officials also had conflicts over manpower, emergency
facilities, and emergency operations. Respondents in Bountiful complained that Civil Defense (Emergency Management Services) neither warned
them nor directed evacuation. According to the officials interviewed,
this inadequate response probably resulted from confusion over spheres of
authority.
The LDS Church certainly aided emergency and relief organizations in
Utah by providing emergency manpower and aid to victims. However, by
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maintaining its separate, independent operations, it was also disruptive
during certain phases of the emergency and during the period of aid and
recovery. Therefore, it appears that an emergency preparedness plan is
needed in Utah whi ch inc 1udes not on ly 1i nes of aut hori ty among the
va ri ous gove rnments, agenc i es, and organi zat ions i nvo 1ved in di saster
response, but also takes into account the involvement and cooperation of
the LDS Church. It is not at all clear that such a plan is possible-particularly because the church's response begins at the lowest levels
(the wards) where decisions and actions can vary widely.
Comlll.un i ty Re~ponse
A significant benefit that LDS brought to the disaster situation was
a sense of community. People indicated that they cared about each other
and worked together, whether by ward or neighborhood, to save their own
and each other's property. Local work groups were formed to perform the
heavy 1abor of fi rst sandbaggi ng and then c 1eani ng mud and water from
homes; and after cleanup, neighbors and ward members were available to
help with emotional problems. Victims reported that there were always
people present who would discuss problems or check to see how they were
doing. Several women gave parties for victims to which guests brought
gifts, such as towels, sheets, blankets, and other household necessities.
Local merchants offered gifts, discounts, and wholesale prices to victims. Many disaster relief organizations noted that they had more volunteers and donations than willing recipients.
Despite personal tragedies, victims were expected to maintain their
LDS obligations. Some of the victims interviewed felt that maintaining
these obligations gave a sense of continuity in their lives, even though
other aspects had been disrupted. Participating in the church also
allowed them to maintain social contacts and thus provided diversion from
the work brought on by the disaster.
As mentioned, this sense of community was fostered by the ideology
of the LDS Church. Members are taught to help others; when a ward bishop
requests help, members are expected to respond, regardless of the task,
and a portion of members' tithings go to an elaborate welfare system that
provides aid to needy members. Moreover, those members are encouraged to
become i nvo 1ved in nei ghborhood and communi ty proj ect s. Although peop 1e
everywhere may "pull together" in an emergency, the sense of community
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displayed

in

Utah was

definitely

an

outgrowth of the

local

culture;

church organization was essential in developing the sense of community
which facilitated a strong collective response to the emergency.

In a

sense it may be said that a therapeutic community (Barton, 1970) was in
place prior to the actual emergency.
Emergency Versus Longer-term Response
From the interviews with both victims and officials, the immediate
emergency response seems to have been more successful than the longerterm

recovery

involving

major

repairs

and

rebuilding.

As

indicated

above, respondents said they expected to recover only small percentages
of their losses through the available aid programs.
At the time of the interviews, this perception seemed to be correct.
Although immediate emergency response by federal, state, and local groups
had been effective, most victims did not have flood insurance, and federal loans and state grants covered only small percentages of losses for
victims who were eligible. The

limited

resources

of

smaller disaster

relief organizations did not permit them to enter into major repairs and
rebuilding activities. And,

although the Red Cross did enter into an

Additional Assistance Phase, its efforts appeared to be deadlocked in
negotiations with LOS over the rebuilding process.
As discussed, the LOS Church was also certainly an asset during the
emergency period. It was able to recruit and organize large numbers of
volunteers to sandbag streets and private homes. Through its network of
church members, it provided emergency and longer-term temporary housing.
Teams of church members removed mud and water; scrubbed walls, floors,
furniture,
that

would

and

rugs; cleaned lawns; and performed a myriad other jobs

have

been

overwhelming

for

an

individual

family.

But

in

comparison to these LOS successes during the emergency period, in later
months help with major repairs and rebuilding was much slower in coming.
All of the families interviewed whose homes had been totally destroyed
were relying on LOS to supply materials and perform a major portion of
the work. However, at the time of this study several months after the
disaster, no plans had been developed for the work. Rebuilding handled
by the church was expected to i nvo 1ve vo 1unteer 1 aborers, cont ractors,
plumbers, electricians, and other workers, and would most likely be done
on a part-time basis. Given that volunteer interest would no doubt fall
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off in the months after the disaster, it appeared that rebuilding would
be a slow and frustrating process.

Unfortunately, this study did not

encompass that period of rebuilding. It was clear, however, that longterm recovery was not proceeding as well

as the initial emergency re-

sponse, and, moreover, that the reluctance of victims to seek aid from
formal sources resulted in significant delays and indecision regarding
rebuilding despite the sheer amount of aid available.
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CHAPTER V
KAUAI, HAWAII AFTER HURRICANE IWA
This chapter and the next report on two disasters that struck several months after the Paris, Texas, tornado. Both the sites examined
(Kauai, Hawaii and Coalinga, California) were surveyed by the same researcher, so there is an opportunity to review them comparatively. Some
of differences and similarities will be pointed out in the discussions of
each disaster, and, in addition, the quantitative data for the two
studies are presented side by side to facilitate further comparison.
Between October of 1982 and April of 1983, the authors monitored all
United States disasters for the purpose of selecting sites in which to
study further the use of disaster assistance. Eventually it was decided
to use communities affected by Hurricane Iwa, which had hit the Hawaiian
Islands in November, 1982. The researchers had some reservations about
the site, based on perceived logistical problems and the complexity of
the ethnic make-up of the communities. Both features turned out to be
manageable, and the site has offered several interesting features to the
overall study.
The di saster had major consequences for the bui It envi ronment and
the daily economic and social activities of the affected area. The event
and the official response to it are described here only briefly. This
chapter is mainly about findings from our survey of the disaster victims
several months after the event. Detailed reports on the physical effects
and governmental response activities are available elsewhere.
The Disaster and the Community
Tropical Storm Iwa was identified on November 18, 1982, at 2:00 a.m.
and upgraded to hurricane status at 5:00 p.m. on November 22, 1982, as it
moved northward 500 miles southwest of Honolulu. A hurricane watch was
issued at ll:OO a.m. on the 22nd; Iwa was considered to be of moderate
intensity. Hurricane warnings (generally announced when sustained winds
are expected to reach about 75 mph in 24 hours' time) were posted at 8:00
a.m. on the 23rd.
Most of the severe damage caused by heavy wave action happened in
the 24 hours following the warning. The islands of Oahu, Kauai, and
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Niihau were battered by swell waves throughout the day of the 23rd. At
its closest, the eye of the hurricane was 30 miles to the northwest of
Kauai. Winds gusted to 85 mph, and sustained winds of 65 mph were recorded. Winds of approximately 65-70 mph were felt in coastline areas
and diminished to about 50 mph 1.5 miles inland. Very little rain (less
than three inches) preceded or accompanied the storm.
While portions of Oahu sustained damage, the Islands of Kauai and
Niihau were the most severely damaged. Kauai lies 95 miles northwest of
Oahu at the northwestern edge of the major island chain. The island is
32 miles

in

diameter

and

has

Although under the political

a

population

of

approximately 40,000.

jurisdiction of Kauai

County,

the small

island of Niihau (population 260) is privately owned and not accessible
to the public. To increase manageability of the field efforts, only the
is 1 and of Kaua i, wh i ch is tota 11 y subsumed by the County of Kaua i, was
selected as the study area. Oahu, and thus Honolulu, was excluded from
consideration.
Impacts of Hurricane Iwa
Prior to Hurricane Iwa, only one other hurricane had passed through
the Hawaiian Islands in modern times. Only August 6, 1959, Hurricane Dot
came into direct contact with the islands,

causing an estimated $5.7

million in damage, mostly on Kauai. At most, two additional hurricanes
are known to have approached the islands in the past 150 years. Direct
impacts have been relatively rare, with most tropical storms turning west
before reaching the islands.
Fl oodi ng, rather than hi gh wi nds, has posed a more frequent threat
on Kauai. Caused by tsunamis and intense rains, and an occasional high
surf, most flooding has been in poorly drained, low-lying areas and along
the shorelines. The March, 1957 tsunami produced damages totaling $1.5
million on Kauai. Hurricane Iwa was the most costly disaster to hit the
island in recorded history. Most of the damage was caused by swell waves
and, to a lesser extent, violent winds. Wind damage was sporadic and was
island-wide. The most extensive wave-related damage occurred along a 20mile stretch on the southwest shore, including 1,170 acres between the
communities of Kekaha and Poipu Beach.
Extensive property damage along the southwest shoreline extended up
to 600 feet inland. The acceleration of the storm as it moved through
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the i sl ands and the act i on of hi gh wi nds and waves over shallow reefs
were

responsible

for

creating

coastal

flooding.*

Impacts

were

especially severe where land protruded into the sea, since wave action
converged at these points. Property damage was notably higher in these
areas due to thei r proximity to the ocean and the appea 1 to i ndi vi dua 1
builders and developers.
Residential

damage

varied

widely.**

destruction of beach front homes and

It

ranged

apartments,

from

to minor

the
losses

total
from

water damage to household furnishings and wind damage to roofs and windows. Much of the wind-induced damage was caused by flying debris and
the inadequate attachment of

roof materi a 1s. Where wi nd produced more

substantial destruction, rainfall

damaged the interior of homes.

t~ajor

damage from high winds was primarily limited to older wood frame residences with corrugated metal roofs and to buildings without foundations.
There

was

substantial

flooding

up

to

150 yards

inland.***

In

many

cases, it was difficult to distinguish between the effects of wind and
the effects of wave action along the shoreline.
Damage reports varied from report to report,

and across time as

estimates were revised. (See Appendix B, Table 1 for estimate of damage.
These figures, drawn from a variety of sources, may have changed since
they were

initially compiled from documents

available.

However,

they

give an indication of the magnitude of losses and damage related to the
hurricane.)
Disaster Assistance
On Kaua i, the State Ci vil
nat i ng

evacuat ion,

immedi ate

Defense had

ass i stance

and

respons i bil ity for coordithe

se rvi ces of the Red

*The debris line mapped by the Kauai County Planning Department
exceeded the 100-year floodline and the 100-year wave level by 30U yards.
Due to the infrequency of hurricane events in the area, flood-lines
established by FEMA are based on tsunami studies and do not take into
account the effects of storm surge associated with hurricanes.
**Residences are commonly of wood frame construction,
concrete foundation, and have roofs of metal sheeting.

set

on

a

***Many sections of beach road and shoreline residences were transported off their foundations and carried inland up to lUO yards, causing
further damage to inland homes.
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Cross, the Salvation Army, and the Armed Services (including National
Guard and Coast Guard). The Presidential Declaration of the event as a
maj or di saster was made on November 25th, thereby mobil i zi ng federal
resources to assist the state. Official Disaster Assistance Centers
(DACs)**** were established in three locations--Lihue, Kaloa, and
Kilauea--on December 2, 1982.
In the three days fo 11 owi ng, 1,622 persons regi stered at the DACs.
The Kaloa center processed the greatest number of applications and had
the most return applicants. This was due either to the more severe
damage in that district, or to the socioeconomic characteristics of the
inhabitants. Although the DACs closed on December 16, 1982, offices
representing some of the assistance agencies (e.g., Salvation Army, FEMA)
opened in Waimea and Lihue and were still open at the time of our interviewing eight months after the disaster.
Ihe Coml!!.un i ty
When Kauai is described as a "community", the entire "island is
included. Persons 1 ive a a variety of settings, from fairly densely
developed resort and vi 11 age centers, to somewhat more i sol ated sets of
dwellings clumped around agricultural or scenic areas, to scattered
individual dwellings. However, the inhabitants of Kauai, and in particular those in the southeast sector of the island, can be considered as a
community with respect to the impact of Hurricane Iwa and the response to
it. When not on Kauai, these residents seem more typically to represent
themselves as "from Kauai," and not from the particular sub-jurisdiction
in which they might live within the County and Island of Kauai.
Kauai is typically reached by airplane, so the setting must be
considered somewhat inaccessible, particularly to persons of lower socioeconomic levels. Portions of the western half of the island are virtually uninhabited due to the ruggedness of the terrain. The east and south
coasts have resort developments scattered along them near the ocean, and
a variety of agricultural pursuits are located inland. Sugar cane has
been a main industry there for many years. Lihue, the country seat, is
****Established by FEMA, DACs are typically opened within a week of
a federally declared disaster. Representatives of disaster assistance
agencies are present to provide information on available aid, eligibility
requirements, and the application process.
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the major commercial district and contains the various state and local
government offices.
A few general

popul at i on characteri st i cs (taken for the most pa rt

from 1980 census fi gures) are presented here to provi de an idea of the
general demographic character of the community. These figures represent,
of course, conditions prior to the disaster. Two-thirds of the island's
population inhabits the three southern districts of Waimea (8,593), Koloa
(8,734), and Lihue (8,590).
(25%),

Filipino

(26%),

Predominant ethnic groups include Japanese

Caucasian

(29%),

and Hawaiian

(15%).

Although

most residents can speak English, about 29% of all residents five years
of age and older speak a language other than English at home. Japaneseorigin residents tend to be considerably older than the other residents
(median

age,

43),

while Hawaiian

residents

are

substantially younger

(median age, 21). Hawaiian and Filipino families are likely to have a
greater number of persons per family

(4.29 and 4.30) than the average

(3.62) •
The median

age of Kauai

residents

is 29.8 years.

About 32% are

under the age of 25 and 11% are at least 65 years of age. Of all families 84% consist of married couples, and 45% consist of married couples
with children under 18 years of age. Over 1/4 of all residents 15 years
of age and older are Single. The median income of households ($19,066)
and families

($20,882) was slightly less than that ot the state as a

($20,473 and $22,751,

whole

respectively). About 9% were living below

the poverty line compared to about 10% for the entire state. A relatively small portion (3%) was unemployed. Major employers include retail and
wholesale

trade

(22%),

public

administration/government

(16%),

agri-

culture (10%), and construction (7%). About 64% of all Kauai residents
25 years or older are high school

graduates compared to 74% for the

state.
There

are

proportionately more year-round

single

family

housing

units on Kauai than in the state overall (81% vs. 60%). Over one-half of
all year round units are owner occupied.

The vacancy

rate

(21%)

for

rentals was over double that of the rest of the state (10%). The state
as a whole has over four times the number of structures with five or more
units than does Kauai

(which has under 9%). At the time of the census
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interview, about 22% of the residents had lived at their current dwelling
less than a year.
The Study Method
For the most part, the study was similar to the Paris, Texas, survey
descri bed

in

Chapter II 1. The

i ntervi ewi ng

arrangements

and sampl i ng

will be discussed here briefly.
Interviewing
The interview schedule contained 175 items and took an average of an
hour to complete, with the interviewer reading the items and recording
the responses. Most of the items were of a closed-response choice format,

including

Likert-type

purposes in mind:

items.

It

was

designed

with two specific

the continued refinement of a model

of family

re-

covery, and a detailed analysis of formal and informal sources of assistance following a disaster.
A full-time field director stayed in the community throughout the
survey. This permitted daily monitoring of progress and the replacement
of interviewers when necessary. Interviewers were recruited and trained
on site by this person. Although there are trade-offs for using local
interviewers

(respondents may be reticent to provide certain types of

information) in the types of communities studied, the project benefited
in ways beyond the economy uf this arrangement. Local interviewers, many
of whom had first-hand experiences of the disaster, or had served as
postdisaster volunteers, had a great deal of information to share about
the events

surrounding the disaster.

This

information

was

especially

useful in locating respondents who had been displaced by the disaster.
Locals also seemed to be better accepted by older, long-time residents. For example, on Kauai, many islanders have typically maintained
some distance from mainland culture and institutions. This has been due,
in part, to a distrust of outsiders and partly to an upsurge in attempts
to increase self-sufficiency and cultural pride. A small proportion of
residents were non-English speaking, and a number spoke English as a
second language. The interviewer was instructed to conduct the interview
in the language preferred by the respondent. The language barrier was
not considered great enough on Kauai to translate the interview schedule
into any of the other languages used.
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The need for some degree of bilingual capability in order to assure
understanding of various items in the schedule was most evident with the
more recent Filipino immigrants and elderly Japanese. Seven of the 17
Kauai interviewers were bilingual; three Japanese, two part-Hawaiian, and
two Filipino. They were permitted to do what translating was necessary.
This was not considered to be of great concern for the bulk of the items,
which were purely descriptive in nature ("What percent.
? How
often • • • ? How many • • • ?). Admittedly, reliability of the Likerttype att itude items was compromi sed to some extent by thi s somewhat ad
hoc translating arrangement, but the method was necessary; the costs of
three or four different language translations for relatively small numbers of respondents would have been prohibitive.
Sampling
Of the five districts on Kauai, the three southernmost districts-Kaloa, Lihue, and Waimea--were included in the survey. The site was
restricted to these adjacent districts primarily to cut transportation
costs and to reduce administrative efforts. The districts chosen are
representative of the island as a whole and include an urban area (county
seat) as well as a tourist community and several more rural outlying
communities, both inland and coastal. Thus the sample is most appropriately characterized as representative of victims in three districts of
Kauai.
Samples were drawn from each of the three districts separately and
were proportionate to the number of damaged units within each district.
A larger sample was drawn than in Coalinga, due to the complexity of the
ethnic group characteristics, although budget constraints also limited
the size. Beg i nni ng at random, every seventh 1i st i ng was drawn from
those houses showing some level of damage on the Red Cross damage assessment list. A 14% sample, or 521 residences, was selected from the 3,722
victim households.
A minor deviation from this procedure was used for assuring inclusion in the sample of residents from the community of Poipu Beach in
the Kaloa district. This area was the most heavily damaged, and many of
the residents were still dislocated from thei r pre-hurricane addresses.
The maj ority of units in the Poi pu Beach a rea are condomi ni ums. Except
for those units that were obviously hotel rooms or apartments, usually no
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di st i nct i on was made in the Red Cross damage assessments between yearround condominium residents and those staying in time-share condominiums
or other tourist facilities. Due to the difficulty of locating respondents who had been present at the time of the hurri cane, i ntervi ewers
were instructed to conduct interviews with victims on each street proportionate to the number of units damaged. Because of the extreme level of
destruction in this area, many of these households had moved to another
residence,

often

in another community further inland. The efforts of

interviewers familiar with the residents were valuable in tracing displaced respondents.
Several

criteria governed the substitution of households in cases

where the potential
viewed.

respondent was unavailable or refused to be inter-

If the potential respondent could not be reached on the first

call, two callbacks were required before substituting another household.
Substitutions were selected by interviewers from houses to the immediate
left and second left, and then to the immediate right and second right.
Residents living on the same street tended to be fairly homogeneous in
their demographic composition and to have suffered a consistent level of
damage due to similar types of building construction within each neighborhood. Thus, bias in making substitutions among available residents did
not appear to be great.

(Completion rates are described in Appendix B,

Table 3.)
Characteristics of the Sample
The sample for Kauai was gathered from a set of scattered towns and
vi 11 ages, so some respondents have a 1 ivi ng and worki ng pattern whi ch
makes them more rural than those that live and work in the county seat,
Lihue. The mean age of the respondents was 48.7 years. About 28% of the
sample

was

age

60

or

over.

Family

size

averaged

3.59.

Eighty-five

percent of the sample had lived in single-family dwellings prior to the
disaster, and 51% of the Kauai

respondents owned their dwellings. The

mean number of yea rs that vi ct i m fami 1 i es had 1 i ved in the predi sa,ster
dwelling was 12.9 years. Since damage patterns followed housing quality,
which was

related to when the

longest-term

home was

res i dents to be included at

built,

one would

a hi gher

rate.

expect the
The average

number of years of residency on Kauai for the respondent households was

29.6.
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Almost 20% of the sample declined to reveal their monthly incomes to
the interviewers, but the average predisaster monthly income (after
taxes) was put at $1287. On Kauai, 56% of the househol d heads were in
unskilled or skilled occupations, 28.9% in management or professions,
and 23% were retired. This level of retirement is probably more a reflection of the long-term residency of the sample, and in particular the
Japanese. In the sample, 52.8% of the heads of household had at least a
high school diploma and 23.7% had at least a college degree.
Sample Ethnic Groups
The intent of the site selection process was to find towns in which
there would be an adequate degree of ethnic difference in the population
to provide for comparisons by ethnic grouping. Kauai represents considerable diversity. The sample of victims was 33.2% Caucasian, 25.1%
Japanese-descent, 19.7% Filipino descent, and 9% Hawaiian, with the
remaining 16% being Chinese or those representing themselves as being of
mixed ethnic backgrounds (mostly various combinations of Asians and
Pacific Islanders). This distribution can be taken as representative of
the distribution of damage, by ethnic group, for those districts sampled.
Ethnic group figures from 1980 for the island as a whole were 29% Caucasian, 29% Japanese descent, 26% Filipino descent, and 15% Hawaiian.
The religious affiliations of the respondents reflect the general
pattern of religions among the various ethnic subgroups. About 12.5% of
the heads of household claimed no religious affiliation, 37.7% were
Catholic, 19% were Protestant, 18.8% were Buddhist, and the remaining 17%
were a mix of other religions and sects.
With respect to age, the Kauai ethnic subgroups differed from each
other: the Caucasian respondents tended to fall into the lower age
groups; the Japanese heads of victim households were most likely to be 50
years old or older; and the Filipino heads were only somewhat less likely
to be that old (Appendix B, Table 4). This reflects the latter group's
long-term residency on the island. The Japanese have lived and worked
for many decades in all of Hawaii and are well established in governmental positions and in the commercial life. As other indicators of this
long-term settlement, 43% of the Japanese heads of household had lived in
the same dwelling for 16 years or more, and 74% had lived on the island
of Kauai for 20 years or more (Appendix B, Table 5). About 71% of the
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Japanese respondents owned rather than rented their predisaster dwellings
(Appendix B, Table 6).
The Caucasian sample is apparently the most transient of the four
groups, with 58% of them renting their predisaster dwelling rather than
owning it and over half of them not having lived in their predisaster
dwellings more than five years. The lowest percentage of Caucasian
victims (31.6%) had lived on the island 20 years or more. A fairly large
proportion (59%) of the Filipinos also had been on the island 20 years or
more, but the Filipinos as a group had moved around more than the
Japanese. The Filipino victims were more likely to rent than to own (58%
to 42%, respectively); 20% of the Filipino respondents had some special
arrangement such as renting housing located on the plantation where they
worked (included with the other rentals in Appendix B, Table 6).
With respect to family living arrangements, the Filipinos were the
1east 1 i ke ly to res i de in one-person househo 1ds (Appendi x B, Table 7).
The Caucasian victim households were more likely than the others, and in
particular more likely than the Japanese, to contain minor children.
This is probably due to a greater concentration of older heads of household in the other two groups. A greater proportion of large famil ies
were found among the Filipino group (Appendix B, Table 8).
The Filipino heads of household were more likely to be working, or
to have worked, in an unskilled occupation than were respondents in the
other groups (Appendix B, Table 9). The Japanese were 1ikely to have
skilled occupations or to be in managerial or professional occupations,
but the Caucasians were the most likely of any of the groups to have
managerial and professional occupations.
With respect to employment status, the Fi 1i pi nos were the 1east
likely to have been unemployed at the time of the hurricane (Appendix B,
Table 10). The largest proportion of retirees were found among the
Japanese and Filipino group in the sample, again reflecting the generally
higher age of those groups. It appears that the Fil ipinos have tended to
remain more in agricultural work--in particular on the sugar cane plantations--than have the Japanese, and they have less of a presence in the
political and commercial life of the islands than the other groups. The
Caucasians are more linked with the resort developments on the island,
the more recent arrivals having moved there to work in resort communities
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and businesses or, to a lesser extent, perhaps to retire.
The income distribution among the three ethnic groups in this victim
sample was fairly similar, with the Japanese victim respondents being
somewhat more likely than the other two groups to fall in the middle of
the distribution (Appendix B, Table 11). About 20% of the respondents in
the Kauai sample declined to give their income, this information being
most frequently withheld by Caucasians and Japanese.
The Filipino victims had the lowest educational level of the three
groups (Appendix B, Table 12). The Caucasian victim group had the highest education level. About equal portions of the Japanese and Caucasian
respondent heads of household had a least a high school education, but
the Caucasian sample was somewhat more likely to have had educational
levels above high school, probably reflecting their younger average age
compared to the Japanese.
Comparison of Ethnic Subgroups
The sample was very complex

on

Kauai.

Caucasian, Japanese,

or

Filipino groups accounted for 78% of the total sample. Other identifications given were Hawaiian, Chinese, mixtures of other Pacific Islanders,
and Portuguese, but none of these groups was present in 1arge enough
numbers to permit analysis. Thus, this analysis of ethnic group differences for Kauai will concentrate only on the Caucasian, Japanese, and
Fi 1i pi no subgroups. Thi s means that the total number of cases used for
ethnic comparisons is smaller than the total Kauai sample size indicated
on tables describing all the victim households in the sample.
Effects of the Disaster
Damage and Loss
The extent of phys i ca 1 damage wrought by a nat ura 1 event is an
interact i on between its dynami cs and the characteri s tics of the bu i It
environment in its path. For example, the damage was not total for any
of the communit i es selected. The pattern of the damage di st ri but ion
in each community reflects the location of the built environment relative
to the force of the event. In the vi 11 ages on Kauai, the amount of
damage was far greater where the structures were exposed not only to the
high wind velocities of the hurricane, but to the storm surge as well.
Location was the major key to the amount of damage, although building
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construction could mediate to some extent the damage caused by either
wind or water. Generally, only dwellings in the path of the high waves
and

storm

surge

suffered

total

destruction.

Wind

damage

also

was

patterned by topography, so that similar dwellings in the same community
might have suffered differing levels of damage depending on their location in relation to ridges and valleys. Thus, the social distribution of
the damage follows the social distribution of dwelling location.
Following

disasters,

communities

typically

are

surveyed

for

the

purpose of estimating damages. These estimates provide the basis for the
provision

of

disaster

relief

supplies

and

programs.

Some

rough

"boundary" of the disaster-affected portion of a community can be assumed
from these

surveys.

On

Kauai,

portions

of the communities were

left

vi rtually undamaged. Respondents in thi s study were selected from among
households designated as having had, or having been likely to have had,
damage of any kind. Levels of damage for the respondents, thus, could
range from

very

little to total.

This

variety

makes

it

pos·sible to

examine the importance of levels of damage and loss for eventual success
of recovery. It can be hypothesized that the need for and use of disaster assistance will
eventual

be related to levels of damage and loss, and that

recovery wi 11 be rel ated to 1 evel s of damage and loss on the

part of individual families.
I n some disasters, such as the Rapi d City fl ood and many fo rei gn
disasters, families also are affected by the death and injury of members
and relatives. The most devastating kind of loss--loss of life--did not
occur duri ng the di saster on Kaua i, and the percent of fami 1 i es in the
sample with injured members was small on Kauai (1.1%), eliminating this
as an important variable in the analysis.
With respect to property losses (Appendix B, Table 13), the average
level of structural damage to the individual dwelling of each respondent
family was 32.8%. The average doll ar loss reported by the respondents
for structural damage was $21,489, probably reflecting, in general, high
average value of a residence on Kauai and, in particular, the types of
dwellings destroyed in each community. The average percentage loss to
the contents of an individual dwelling was 24% on Kauai; the mean dollar
loss to contents was $7,025.

Kauai

residents had the additional

loss

(typica"lly in the $100 to $200 range) of perishables caused by the elec-
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tricity having been off for at least a day or more (and typically for a
week or more).

A 1arge percentage of the

sample a 1 so had damage to

vehicles or boats.
Few victim families on Kauai perceived themselves as much worse off
than others in the disaster-stricken community. For those who did, there
is a significant relationship between seeing themselves as worse off than
others and having had a higher level of damage to their property.
Ethnic Group Comparisons. Some differences can be noted when damage
distributions are examined for each of the ethnic groups being studied
(Appendix B,
small

Table 14);

for all

two

seem notable.

Although the

percents are

three groups with respect to high levels of damage, the

Caucasian group was most likely to have suffered a high level of damage
to the structure or contents of dwellings.

This

is believed to be a

reflection of thei r frequent ownership of beachfront houses which were
destroyed.

Otherwise,

the

damage

patterns

were

similar,

with

the

Japanese being slightly less likely than others to have suffered over 25%
structural damage, and the Filipinos slightly more likely than the others
to have suffered 26 to 50% damage. The di fferences between these two
groups may reflect housing quality more than housing location.
Some differences are also evident among ethnic groups with respect
to their perception of their postdisaster condition relative to others
(Appendix

B,

Table

15).

The

Caucasians

were

less

likely

than

the

Japanese or Fi 1 i pi nos to see themsel ves as better off than others. To
some extent, this may reflect their greater losses.
Dislocation and Disruption
Families

affected

by

disasters

such

as

Hurricane

Iwa must make

adjustments to their losses after the event has ended. Depending on the
nature and extent of the damage, there is some sort of dislocation and
disruption in the lives of these victims. It is useful to document the
adjustments

and thei r

effects

on

fami 1 i es

in

order to

i nfl uence the

design of programs to facilitate disaster recovery. Some differences in
adjustments may reflect not only family characteristics, but the nature
of the disaster event. The degrees of dislocation and disruption are
hypothesized to be related to the level of recovery a family will exhibit
by a certain point after the disaster.
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Household Dislocation. Dislocation refers to a family's having left
its dwelling due to the disaster and the damage or fear that it caused.
Respondents were asked if the household had to stay somewhere besides
the dwelling for even one night following the disaster events: 37% of the
respondents reported this on Kauai, with 3.6% of the families that left
their homes camping in their yards.
Excess housing was available in the community to house those who
were totally displaced from their predisaster housing. FEMA utilized
available resort housing, such as non-owner-occupied condominiums. The
extent to which it would have been utilized if not subsidized with federal funds is uncertain. (It might be added here that a major hurricane on
the Gulf coast of the mainland United States could well result in a
larger proportion, as well as absolute number, of homeless families than
was the case on Kauai, where only a relatively small number of dwellings,
mainly along one small section of coastline, were totally destroyed.)
Respondents were asked how many times the fami ly had moved after
the di saster, where they moved, and how long they stayed at each location. Once the hurricane was considered to be over, if a family was
unable or unwilling to stay at their own home or at the home of a relative, they were most likely to move in with friends or neighbors. In
talking to the Kauai victims, it often became evident that they had
stayed with relatives or friends during or after the storm more because
they wanted to be with others during a time of stress than because their
homes were uninhabitable. However, the mean amount of time spent in the
first location (Appendix B, Table 16) indicates many of the moves were
not just for one night, but for several weeks.
The most commonly reported destination for the second move was back
into one's own predisaster dwelling. As indicated by the earlier figures
on levels of damage, the bulk of the dwellings were less than 50%
damaged. The movi ng patterns i ndi cate that, for the most part, the
pattern was one of going into emergency housing of some sort and then
back into the home once the cri sis was percei ved as past or adequate
repairs had been made. When moving back into one's home still was not
pOSSible, renting was the most likely adjustment providing temporary
housing beyond the emergency period. Some famil ies may have gone from
emergency housing back to their own homes for a brief time, and then into
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a rental

unit until

they could finish repairs or find new permanent

hous i ng (Appendi x B, Table 16). In addit i on, renters do not have the
motivation to return to their predisaster location at the same rate as
home owners.
In the cases reported in this chapter and the next, the official
disaster

relief

programs

included

provision

of

federally

subsidized

temporary housing arrangements for victim families whose former dwellings
were not habitable. These are counted as rental housing in Appendix B,
Table 16. The destinations of dislocated disaster victims will undoubtedly vary according to the extent of housing provided by government
programs. The long-term doubling up with relatives or friends has been
noted in a foreign instance where housing was in short supply and housing
programs for displaced victims were slow to materialize (Bolton, 1979).
Household Disruption. Media accounts of disasters generally focus
on people's terror and trauma throughout the course of the event. People
are asked to describe what they did during the hours of howling wind and
rising water and how they felt about it. There is much less coverage of
the longer-term disruptions that accompany the postdisaster clean-up and
repair. Although 93% of the Kauai victim sample were still in, or back
to, their predisaster address by the time these interviews were conducted, thi s was not accompl i shed without

some i nconveni ence to the

families. About 58% of the sample reported high levels of disruption
from the dislocation (Appendix B, Table 17). In general, the respondent
households felt themselves to be permanently located by the time of the
interview, but about 19% of the Kauai sample indicated they intended to
move again in the near future.
While it may not be necessary to leave a damaged home, repair work
may be necessary to bring it back to its predisaster condition. About
78% of the total Kauai sampl e reported they had made repai rs to thei r
dwellings while living in them after the disaster. Living in a house
under repair was found to be disruptive, with 38% of the sample reporting
high levels of disruption for living in such homes. Much of the Kauai
sample also had undergone the inconvenience of several days, or even
weeks, without electricity.
Employment Disruption. The disaster caused damage to commercial and
industrial property as well as homes. Of the heads of household in the
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sample who were employed at the time of the disaster event, about 50% had
their workplaces closed due to the disaster (Appendix B, Table 18). The
place of work of heads of households in the sample was, on the average,
closed 4.9 weeks.
Being out of work

for

a

long

period of time can

be disruptive

psychologically as well as economically, both to the employee and his or
her families. On the other hand, it appears that it was not necessarily
the case that having one's place of work closed meant either that there
was no work to be done or that income was disrupted. Considerable variation probably can be found--depending on specific companies, community
conditions, and victim's occupational 1eve1--with respect to the actual
degree of disruption caused by the closure of work places after disasters.

In

some

cases,

the

place

of work

might

have

been

closed

for

business, but some of the employees brought in to do clean-up and repair
work; moreover, they mayor may not have been paid for this work. Volunteering to help out at one's place of employment after a disaste-r probably is not uncommon, espec i a lly among management and supervi sory personnel. Certainly if this sort of task is seen as contributing to getting
the bus i ness ope rat i ng that much sooner, it wi 11 be vi ewed as des i rab 1e
to be a participant.
It is also not the case that employees are without

income while

places of work are closed, although this may be truer for those who are
paid an hourly wage than those on salary. Further, this loss of income
may well

be compensated for by social

programs (unemployment compensa-

tion, food programs). Thus, the loss of work-related income in a U.S.
disaster is probably not the economic hardship that it is in Third World
disasters.

In general, being out of work for disaster-related reasons

for over a month was very uncommon in the two sites reported on in this
and the following chapter,

having affected about

7% of

all

heads

of

households in the Kauai sample, and 3% in the Coalinga sample (Appendix
B, Table 18). Di saster- re 1 ated unemployment was not an i mpo rtant vari able with respect to overall

community recovery, although it may have

affected i ndi vi dual famil i es.
Ethnic Group Comparisons.

Differences were observed among ethnic

groups with respect to dislocation (Appendix B, Table 19):

Caucasians

were more 1 i ke 1y than Japanese or Fil i pi nos to report havi ng been di s-
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located from their homes after the disaster. This is in keeping with the
higher dwelling damage levels found for the Caucasian group. As noted
earlier, the greater damage suffered by this group is believed to reflect
the fact that larger numbers of them live directly facing or close to the
ocean.
The temporary loss of employment due to the disaster was fairly
evenly distributed across the three major ethnic groups in the Kauai
sample. To some extent, the various ethnic groups are identified with
di fferent employment sectors and the damage on Kauai affected all three
major employment sectors. There was substantial damage to the resort
industry, with some of the longest-term closures being in that sector.
The publicity of the damage also resulted in an accompanying reduction in
demand for the undamaged facilities as tourists switched their reservations elsewhere. This probably accounts for the slightly greater likelihood for longer loss of work in the Caucasian group. Some closures,
although generally of short duration, were also necessitated by wind
damage to plantations and to the commercial and governmental district in
Lihue, mostly affecting the Filipinos and the Japanese.
Psychological Distress
A few measures were included in the interview to serve as indicators
of the extent to which the trauma and disruption of the disaster event,
disaster losses, and the recovery process affected the levels of physical
and mental health of the victim households. Since psychological distress
was not a major focus of the study, these measures are cursory. However,
they do provide some insights into the consequences of losses and disruption to these households and serve as an indicator of the level of
emotional recovery achieved at each site.
When respondents were asked about thei r general health 1evel rel ative to others their age, the majority reported their health as excellent
or good (84.3%). Few Kauai respondents (10%) reported new or worsening
health problems since the disaster, but most of the ones that had
occurred were felt to be related to the disaster.
A strong association was found between emotional strain in the
family and high levels of disruption from moving or repairs. Respondents
were asked if anyone in their household had shown emotional strain as a
result of the disaster. Forty-three percent of the households had a
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member who showed strain on their mental health and well-being in the
aftermath of the disaster (Appendix B, Table 20). As an indicator of
the seriousness of the emotional strain in the postdi saster months,
respondents were asked if they had sought help for this problem; only 12%
of households contained a member who had sought professional counseling.
With respect to emotional strain, there was little difference among the
ethnic groups on Kauai (Appendix B, Table 21).
Use ~_Formal Disaster Assistance Programs
After Hurricane Iwa was declared a major national disaster, disaster
assistance could be provided under the Federal Disaster Relief Act. As a
result of the declaration, the site was served by Disaster Assistance
Centers (DACs) in the weeks following the disaster. These centers are
central points at which disaster victims can obtain information on the
assistance programs available and be directed to those for which they are
likely to be eliyible. In conjunction with these centers, the Red Cross
also provided mass feeding facilities for a substantial amount of time.
The use of formal disaster assistance programs was the central focus
of this study. The findings can reveal the patterns of use, and elucidate the relationship of program use to eventual household recovery. The
studies in this chapter and the next show some variation in the level and
types of damage, and provide an opportunity to examine differences in
assistance use across the ethnic groups in the communities studied.
Use of the DACs and Funds
While the timing and types of formal disaster assistance made available were similar in both Coalinga and Kauai, the propensity to use these
assistance programs varied considerably. On Kauai, where DACs were
placed in each of several villages in the affected area, 47.6% of the
respondents said they had visited a DAC (Table V-I); about 23% of them
reported going to a DAC more than twice. The mean number of visits was
2.1.

Not everyone who goes to a DAC is necessarily eligible for, or
chooses to accept, specific kinds of disaster assistance. On Kauai, 42%
reported that they actually received assistance from one of the programs
(Table V-I). Subsequent figures in this subsection on the use of disaster assistance programs will refer to those households which actually
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TABLE V-1
INDICATORS OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE USE
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES
COALINGA
(N-376)

KAUAI
(N-446)

A.
B.

C.

Percent reporting having visited
Disaster Assistance Center (DAC)
Percent of above reporting
number of visits as:
One
Two
Three or more

N

%

N

%

212

47.5

306

81.4

119

56.1
20.3

78

25.5
28.4

43
50

Percent receiving assistance from
a local, state, or federal program

186

23.6

87
141

41.7

270

46.1
71.8

received assistance. That portion of the samples not receiving assistance is not indicated in the tables.
Typically, the most urgent needs immediately following a disaster
are meals in the early hours and days, perhaps emergency shelter, and-later on--food items, clothing, and household goods. Voluntary private
agencies such as the Red Cross and the Salvation Army, and to a lesser
extent church groups, traditionally have been the front-line providers of
these commodities. They give out either the specific items or vouchers
with which items can be purchased. The Red Cross provides meals and uses
the voucher system for other supplies; the Salvation Army offers goods
which they have received through donations. An application process
establ i shes loss and the unmet needs of those with no other means to
recover their losses.
Assistance users on Kauai were more likely to have used the Red
Cross (84%) than the Salvation Army (26%) (Table V-2). There were some
rt:!(Jorts that the Red Cross app 1 i cat i on procedure and imported personnel
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TABLE V-2
HOUSEHOLD USE OF SPECIFIC DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
FOR KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES (Percent)
PERCENT RECEIVING AID FROM*
Red Cross
Salvation Army
FEMA Temporary Housing Program
FEMA Minimum Repair Program
Small Business Administration
Food Stamps
Interfaith (Alliance/Task Force)
Christian Disaster Relief
Individual Family Grants Program
Other Church or Civic

KAUAI
(N=186)

COALINGA
(N=270)

84.5
26.3

79.3
66.8

10.8
5.9
5.4
17.3
2.7

32.2

6.5
17.7

9.6
76.8

.4
8.9
20.7
22.9

*Respondent households may have received assistance from more than one
program.

had not been well received by the inhabitants of the close-knit communities on Kauai, who preferred the procedures of the Salvation Army.
However, our findings did not indicate that such attitudes, if they
existed, affected use patterns for the majority of assistance receivers.
In the course of these studies, it did become evident that the Red
Cross has become virtually synonymous with disaster assistance. There is
a possibility that respondents occasionally reported the use of the Red
Cross when actually aid came from other, similar programs. Nonetheless,
the hi gh 1eve 1s of use of the Red Cross and Sal vat i on Army combi ned
indicate that these programs clearly fulfill the role of the first_line
provider. An effort was made to get respondents to recall accurately,
and to distinguish among, the different programs they may have used.
Generally, few respondents (less than 20% of the assistance receivers)
reported the use of programs other than those of the Red Cross or Salvation Army.
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TABLE V-3
NUMBER OF MAJOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS USED
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES*
KAUAI
TOTAL NUMBER USED

COALINGA

N

%

N

0
1
2
3
4

271
116
50
3
6

60.8
26.0
11.2

121
66
94
67
28

TOTAL

446

100.0

.7 ] 2.0
1.3

376

_%-

32.2
17.6
25.0
17.8 25.2
7 .4 J
100.0

*Programs: Red Cross, Salvation Army, FEMA Temporary Housing, Small
Business Administration, Individual Family Grants.

Kauai households were not very likely to have made use of either
Food Stamps or the Individual Family Grants program (IFG). The IFG
program is one of "last resort," and eligibility for an IFG indicates
high loss and/or low income among those eligible, as well as inadequate
coverage by other programs (or insurance) and ineligibility for programs
such as SBA loans. Only 6.5% of respondents reported use of the IFG
program on Kauai.
Table V-3 shows that only 2% of the Kauai households used more than
one program. However, a full 25% of the Coalinga sample reported using
three or four of the major programs. A strong association was found in
both sites between the number of assistance programs used and the level
of damage to dwell i ng structure and contents. Thi s suggests that the
lower program use on Kauai may have been related to the generally lower
damage levels. However, as will be noted later, there was also a tendency for one of the ethnic groups on Kauai to not use disaster assistance
programs at the same level as others and also for more losses on Kauai to
have been covered by insurance.
Respondents who had received disaster assistance from the formal
programs were asked to rate how important these disaster programs had
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TABLE V-4
IMPORTANCE OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE TO RECOVERY
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES
COALINGA

KAUAI
IMPORTANCE RATING*

N

A.

N

%

Importance to Economic Recovery
89
48
28
16
4

4
3
2

1
0
Total

185

No response
Not applicable, did not
use assistance programs

B.

_%_

48.1] 74.0
2!J.9
15.1
8.6
2.2
100.0

107
72

50
25
15
269

1

2

260

105

39.8] 66.6
26.8
18.6
9.3
5.6
100.0

Importance to Emotional Recovery

4
3
2
1
0

Total
No response
Not applicable, did not
use assistance programs

84
49
29
16
7
185

45.4] 71.9
26.5
15.7
8.6
3.8
100.0

110
80
37
16
26
269

1

2

206

105

40.9] 70.6
29.7
13 .8
5.9
9.7
100.0

*" •• would you rate how important the aid you received from these aid
programs has been in your household's recovering [economically]
[emotionally] from the [disaster]?" 4 = Extremely Important; 0 = Not
Important.

been in the recovery of the household (Table V-4). When asked about
importance to thei r economic recovery, 74% of the Kauai respondents
indicated that the assistance had been of high importance (3 or 4 on a
scale of 0 to 4), and about 72% of them said the assistance was very
important with respect to emotional recovery. In both sites, 90% or more
of the respondents indicated that they were satisfied with the programs
they had used.
Awareness of Assistance Programs
Multiple means were used to advertise the existence of the programs,
but systematic evidence was not gathered about the publicity programs in
terms of number of times a message was given, duration of the dissemination, and style of message delivery. Thus, it is not possible to say
whether differences in the ways persons heard of programs are due to
variations in the samples or to the information dissemination programs.
Nonethel ess, the observed differences in how peopl e heard about the
programs can be of some value.
Respondents reported that they were least likely to have learned of
the program through mail 1i terature or from seei ng posters or fl i ers
(Table V-5). The latter method was the least effective source of inforTABLE V-5
SOURCES OF INFORMATION ON ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS
FOR KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES
KAUAI
SOURCE*
Television or radio
Newspapers
Posters, fl i ers, handbi 11 s
Word of mouth
Through the mail
Loudspeakers**

N
308
99
11

288
7

COALINGA
'/,

69.1
22.2
2.5
64.6
1.6

N

%

100
67
59
315
25

26.6
17.8
15.7
83.8
6.6
3.5

13

*Respondents may have mentioned more than one source.
**Loudspeakers were not included on the list read to respondents; they
were given as an "other" response in Coalinga.
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mation on Kauai, where only 2.5% reported using it. Newspapers were more
successful, with 22% of the respondents reporting the newspaper as a
source of information. The use of the radio and television for information on programs was even more successful on Kauai, where 69% reported
those media as a source of information. This is a much higher percentage
than in Coalinga (27%), and the difference is somewhat remarkable, in
view of the fact that electricity was out for extended periods of time in
some areas on Kauai. Thus people probably had and used portable radios
and televisions immediately following the disaster on Kauai, and radios
and TVs were also probably an important information source later on.
Sixty-five percent of those on Kauai reported that their information came
by word of mouth.
Ethnic Group Comparisons
As noted above, the Coalinga victims were more likely than the Kauai
victims to have visited the official Disaster Assistance Centers (DACs).
On Kauai, the Japanese were markedly less likely than the Caucasian or
Filipino households to have visited a DAC (Table V-6). Although they
tended to have the lowest amount of damage among the groups, they were
not without damage; the difference is be 1i eved to refl ect a choi ce on
their part, perhaps deriving from cultural influences on attitudes toward
the need for, and the appropri ateness of, seeki ng outs i de ass i stance.
Since the Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands typically have resided there
for a very long time and typically wield considerable political power,
this difference is not likely to be a reflection of anticipated discrimination or language difficulty. One other possible explanation would be
the greater age of the group in this sample. Those Japanese who did
visit one of the DACs were more likely than persons from the other two
groups to make only one visit.
With respect to us i ng one or more of the di saster ass i stance programs, the Japanese again differed from the Caucasians and Filipinos in
the likelihood of using any of the disaster assistance programs (Table V6): only about 20% of the Japanese households reported assistance used,
compared to around 50% for the other two groups.
When the groups were compared with respect to which of the programs
they used (Table V-7}, the Filipinos stood out not only as most likely
to use the Red Cross, but also as most likely to use both the Red Cross
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TABLE V-6
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY INDICATORS OF DISASTER ASSISTANCE USE (Percent)
KAUAI

A.

Ja~anese

Fili~ino

(N=l17)

(N=89)

53.3
(73)*

27 .6
(32)

53.9
(48)

79.6
(207)

85.3

47.9
23.3
28.8

74.2
12.9
12.9

68.8
18.8
12.5

28.3
30.7
41.0

20.4
24.5
55.1

47.4
(65)

19.7
(23)

51.7
(46)

66.2
( 172)

84.5
(98)

% reporting

having visited
DAC

COAL INGA
Anglo
His~anic
( N-1l6)
(N=260)

Caucasian
( N=137)

(99)

B. % of above
reporting #
of visits as:
One
Two
~Three

C.

% receiving

assistance
from a local,
state, or
federal program

*Ns are given in parentheses.
TABLE V-7
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY USE OF SPECIFIC DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (Percent)*
KAUAI
PROGRAM
Red Cross
Salvation Army
SBA
Food Stamps
FEt~A Temporary
Housiny

Caucasian
(N-65)

COALINGA
His~anic

Ja~anese

Fili~ino

(N-23)

(N-46)

(N=172

(N-98)

80.0
23.1
4.6
16.9

87.0
21.7
13 .0
8.7

93.5
41.3
0.0**
4.5

77 .3
61.3
9.8
73.4

82.7
76.5**
9.1
82.7

15.4

0.0

8.7**

23.1

43.4**

~

*Each row of figures for each of the samples represents a separate
comparison; e.y., the first row is a comparison among three ethnic
yroups in the Kauai sample with respect to their use of Red Cross
assistance, and a comparison between two ethnic yroups in the Coalinga
sample.
**Differences among or between the ethnic groups in the sample were
significant at the .05 level or better (Chi-square).

TABLE V-S
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY NUMBER OF MAJOR DISASTER ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS USED* (Percent)
KAUAI
TOTAL NUMBER USED
0
1
2
3
4
Total %

Caucasian
(N-S9)

=

COALINGA

Ja~anese

Fili~ino

(N-ll7)

(N=137)

(N=260

(N=1l6)

56.2
30.7
10.2
.7
2.2

81.2
13.7
5.1
0
0

50.6
24.7
22.5
0
2.2

3S.1
19.6
22.7
12.7
6.9

19.0
12.9
30.2
29.3
8.6

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

His~anic

*Programs: Red Cross, Salvation Army, FEMA Temporary Housing, Small
Business Administration, Individual Family Grants.

and the Salvation Army as sources of necessary items. The Japanese were
more 1i kely than the other groups to have made use of SBA loans. The
Caucasians, who, as seen earlier, were more likely than others to have
suffered extensive damage to their dwellings, were found to be the most
likely to have used the FEMA temporary housing program.
With respect to the total number of programs used (Table V-S), there
was some tendency for the Filipinos to have made the greatest use of the
programs, but the most noticeable anomaly was that of the non-use by the
Japanese. The association between level of damage and number of programs
used was found to hold in both Coalinga and Kauai for all ethnic groups.
The various groups were compared with respect to their perceptions
of the importance of the a id they recei ved for the i r economi c and
emotional recovery. However, virtually no differences were observed
among the three groups on Kauai. Similarly, comparisons of the groups
with respect to satisfaction with the programs also revealed virtually no
difference among the groups, and the compa ri son of info rmat i on sources
used by the groups to get program information shows no difference among
the three groups on Kauai (Table V-g).
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TABLE V-9
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY SELECTED INFORMATION SOURCES (Percent)
KAUAI
COALINGA
Caucasian Ja~anese Fili~ino
An9lo
His~anic
SOURCE*
(N=ll7)
(N-89)
(N=260)
(N-1l6)
{N-l3n
Television or
radio
Newspaper
Posters, fl iers,
handbills
Word of mouth

70.1

75.2

69.7

31.1

16.4**

19.7

25.6

22.5

23.5

5.2**

3.4
63.5

0.0
61.5

1.5
69.7

19.2
86.2

7.8**
78.4

*Each row of figures for each of the samples represents a separate
comparison; e.g., the first row is a comparison among three ethnic
groups in the Kauai sample with respect to their use of Red Cross
assistance, and a comparison between two ethnic groups in the Coalinga
sample.
**Differences among or between the ethnic groups in the sample were
significant at the .05 level or better (Chi-square).

Alternative Adjustments to Losses
The disaster victims in the study sites were not necessarily totally
dependent on disaster programs to help them cope with their damages and
losses. The study also examined three other adjustments to losses:
insurance, the use of personal resources and strategies, and aid from
relatives and friends.
Insurance
Insurance proved to be a fairly important adjustment to the disaster
for Kauai households. It was more important than in Coalinga, since
earthquake insurance was far less likely to be held by those respondents
than was insurance for wind damage by the Kauai households. In fact, 88%
of the households in the Kauai sample reported having insurance coverage.
In many instances, the applicability of insurance was disputed for
those along the coast, as it was difficult to establish whether the
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damage had been done by wind or waves. Insurers generally did not consider damage by water to be covered under wind damage, and disputes over
insurance claims for the waterfront homes centered around whether or not
wind damage preceded the damage from the waves. Some of the Kauai inhabitants were eligible for flood insurance under the National Flood
Insurance Program, but, to a great extent, the dwellings which received
the most wave damaye were not in an area covered by that program.
(Furthermore, el i gibil ity cannot be equated with use of the program).
Although 9% of the respondents reported that their insurance claims were
not yet settled at the time of the interviews, insurance coverage was
much better on Kauai in general, where the average proportion of the loss
covered by insurance was 73%, than in Coalinga where the proportion was
only 40% (Table V-10).

TABLE V-10
INSURANCE USE FOR DISASTER LOSSES FOR THE
KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES
KAUAI
(N=446)
N
_%-

PERCENT OF LOSSES PAID BY INSURANCE

COALINGA
(N=376)
N
%

No coverage
0% paid for
1-25%
26-60%
51-75%
76-YY%
100% paid for

203
18
18
27
39
39
99

45.8
4.1
4.1
6.1
8.8
8.8
22.3

172
66
29
34
18
20
32

46.4
17.8
7.8
9.2
4.8
5.4
8.6

Total
No Response

443

100.0

371

100.0

3

Mean % covered for those with insurance

166

5

73.0

40.0

TABLE V-l1
LEVEL OF LOSSES COVERED BY EITHER INSURANCE OR ASSISTANCE
PROGRAMS FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES
KAUAI
PERCENT OF LOSSES COVERED

COALINGA

N

%

N

%

26-50%
bl-75%
76-99%
100%

67
65
45
60
69
116

15.9
15.4
10.7
14.2
16.4
27.5

70
98
57
36
37
69

19.1
26.7
15.5
9.8
10.1
18.8

Total

422

100.0

367

100.0

0%
1-2~%

Mean % of losses covered
by a combination of
insurance and assistance

58%

44%

When respondents were asked about the percentage of thei r total
losses which were covered by the combination of insurance and assistance
programs, Kauai respondents indicated an average coverage of 58% (Table
V-II). Kauai respondents indicated a higher mean dollar figure for
insurance and assistance received ($12,320) than did respondents in
Coalinga ($5,829). Similar portions of the Coalinga sample (36%) and the
Kauai sample (31%) reported they had money problems trying to replace
property losses.
Personal Resources
Although some portion of the households recouped 100% of their
losses through a combination of insurance and disaster assistance (27.5%)
(Table V-II)), most had some losses which were not covered in this way.
A series of items was included in the interview to determine how people
dealt with such losses. Persons may decide not to replace some things,
either because they do not need them at that time or because other items
received higher priority. Another strategy used when unexpected expenses
are incurred is that of rest ructuri ng the household budget: foregoi ny
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TABLE V-12
STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO UNINSURED LOSSES
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES (Percent)
KAUAI
( N-446)

COALINGA
(N=376)

Decided not to replace
certain thi ng s

42.8

64.4

Did without special
items (e.g., entertainment)

26.2

17.0

Used money or loans from
assistance programs

10.5

30.9

Used money or loans from
relatives or friends

14.8

9.8

Used savings or other
personal resources

37.9

42.0

STRATEGY USEO*

*Respondent households may have used more than one strategy.

some discretionary expenses (e.g., movies, expensive food items) in order
to use the money for necessities. Many families also have savings that
can be used to close gaps in expenditures, or they may have received
loans and grants from friends or relatives.
In both Coalinga and Kauai, at least 80% of the households indicated
that they had engaged in at least one of these strategies, some in more
than one (Table V-12). The most frequently mentioned strategy was that
of deciding not to replace certain things (reported by 43% on Kauai),
followed by using savings or other personal money resources (38%).
Consistent with the lower use of formal disaster assistance programs on
Kauai, 11% of the Kauai respondents--compared with 31% in Coal inga-reported having used loans or grants from disaster assistance programs.
On the other hand, 26% of the households in the Kauai sampl e i ndi cated
that they made adjustments in their discretionary spending ("went without
things") to be able to replace necessary items.
Ethni c Gro~~~~ons. Di fferences were found among the vari ous
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TABLE V-13
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY COVERAGE OF LOSSES BY INSURANCE
AND BY EITHER INSURANCE OR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS (Percent)
INSURANCE COVERAGE
OF LOSSES

Caucasian
(N-13n

KAUAI
Jaeanese
(N=1l6)

Filie ino
(N=88)

COALINGA
Hi seanic_
(N=256)
(N-1l5 )
~

No coverage
0% paid for
1-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-99%
100% paid for

59.8
2.9
4.4
6.6
9.5
3.6
13 .1

24.1
3.5
3.4
8.6
8.6
11.2
40.5

47.7
7.9
3.4
3.4
5.7
9.1
22.7

33.2
19.9
10.5
11.7
6.3
7.8
10.5

13.0
1.7
3.5
1.7
0.0
4.3

INSURANCE OR
ASSISTANCE
COVERAGE OF LOSSES

(N=129)

(N=1l5)

(N=84)

(N=255)

(N=1l2)

0%
1-25%
26-50%
51-75%
76-99%
100% paid for

20.9
24.8
11.6
10.9
10.1
21.7

13.0
6.1
9.6
11.3
14.8
45.2

14.3
14.3
8.3
15.5
19.0
28.6

18.3
26.7
14.9
8.6
12.8
18.8

21.4
26.8
17.0
12.5
3.6
18.8

75.7

ethnic groups with respect to insurance coverage (Table V-13). The
Japanese were found to be more likely than the other two groups not only
to have had insurance coverage of special kind, but to have had more than
75% of their losses covered by insurance. This fact probably explains
thei r generally lower propensity to use di saster assistance programs.
But a larger question still remains, then, concerning why the Japanese
were more likely to have insurance than were other groups. Given that
the Japanese do not differ significantly from Caucasians regarding education or income levels, the most likely explanation seems to be some
cultural characteristic.
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In some cases, lack of insurance was made up for by disaster assistance programs (Table V-13). This combination of aid does not result in
much change in the pattern for the Japanese but, to some extent, closes
the gap between them and coverage aChieved by the other two groups-especially the Caucasians.
The comparison of personal strategies used to deal with losses not
covered by insurance show few differences among the groups on Kauai
(Table V-14). As would be expected, the Japanese exhibiced a difference

TABLE V-14
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY STRATEGIES FOR RESPONDING TO UNINSURED LOSSES (Percent)

STRATEGY USED*

Caucasian
(N=137)

KAUAI
Jaeanese
( N=ll7)

Filie ino
(N=89)

Decided not to
replace certain
things

52.5

52.6

50.7

Did without
special items

35.0

26.9

Used money or loans
from re 1at i ves or
friends

19.2

16.7

Used money or loans
from assistance
programs

18.3

5.1

Used savings or
other personal
resources

45.8

44.9

=

COALINGA
Hiseanic
(N=260
(N-1l6)
68.5

55.2**

28.0

10.0

32.8**

17.3

11.5

6.0

12.0**

32.7

26.7

37.3

44.2

37.1

*Respondent households may have used more than one strategy. Each row
of figures for each of the samples represents a separate comparison;
e.g., the first row is a comparison among three ethnic groups in the
Kauai sample with respect to their use of Red Cross assistance, and a
comparison between two ethnic groups in the Coalinga sample.
**Differences among or between the ethnic groups in the sample were
significant at the .05 level or better (Chi-square).

170

from the other groups with respect to the use of loans from the disaster
-assistance programs, but otherwise the three groups are fairly similar in
their adjustments.
Aid from Friends and Relatives
Neighbors,

friends,

and relatives long have been acknowledged as

important sources of help in disasters and other emergencies. Relatives
stand out as the most important source of help; in the social science
literature it has been shown that they are expected to provide, in general, just about anything which is needed. In particular, they may be the
most likely source of long-term aid--such as a shared home or financial
assistance.

Although the actual

discharging

of these

responsibilities

varies, it has consistently been found to be a central feature of disaster recovery.
Neighbors and friends also can play an important role during crises.
Neighbors

provide

various

kinds

of

primarily because of their physical

immediate

support

and

assistance

proximity to one another; friends

also often provide material and emotional aid in crises even though they
do not live nearby. Seeing to those near to one in location and near to
one in blood probably takes precedence over checking on friends in the
immediate aftermath of a disaster, although much variation can be expected.
Receipt of Aid. In order to establish the availability of primary
group aid

("social

support"), respondents were asked some very general

questions about the presence in the community of relatives, friends, and
nei ghbors to whom they felt close and about t hei r 1 eve 1 of interact ion
with these persons.

Many

respondents

on

Kauai

and

in

Coalinga

(70%)

indicated very large numbers of close relatives and friends, which would
imply at least the potential for obtaining help from primary groups.
The actual informal aid sources used are show in Table V-15. Sixtyfive percent of the households in the Kauai

sample received aid from

informal sources. As with disaster assistance programs, the use of this
type of aid was strongly associated with the level of damage sustained.
In general, however, Kauai households were less likely than the Coalinga
households to have received aid through informal systems, with 35% of the
respondents saying they had received no aid from relatives, friends, or
neighbors; while in Coalinga only 20% reported receiving no aid from
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INFORMAL AID SOURCES USED

TABLE V-15
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES
KAUAI

N
A.

COALINGA
%

N

_%-

Number of Informal Aid Sources Used*

NUMBER OF SOURCES
156

0

113
93
84
446

1
2
3
Total

35.0
25.3
20.9
18.8
100.0

74
145
84
73
376

19.7
38.6
22.3
19.4
100.0

B. Receipt of Aid from Relatives, Friends, and Neighbors
RELATIVES
Received aid from
relatives
Aid offered, but did
not accept
Not offered aid
Total
FRIENDS
Received aid from
friends
Aid offered, but did
not accept
Not offered aid
Total
NEIGHBllRS
Received aid from
neighbors
Aid offered, but did
not accept
Not offered aid
Total

223

50.0

251

66.8

63
160
446

14.1
35.9
100.0

45
80
376

12.0
21.3
100.0

198

44.4

176

46.8

89
159
446

20.0
35.6
100.0

85
115
376

22.6
30.6
100.0

130

29.1

105

27.9

77

17.3
53.6
100.0

62
209
376

16.5
55.6
100.0

239
446

*Relatives, friends, or neighbors only; maximum number of sources is
three.

TABLE V-16
TYPES OF AID RECEIVED FROM INFORMAL SOURCES FOR
KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES (Percent)
TYPE OF AID
RECEIVED*
Food
Shelter
Clothing
Money
Emotional/
Moral Support
Labor
Transportation
Household or
Personal Items
Advice or
Information

KAUAI
Relatives Friends Nei£!hbors

COALINGA
Relatives Friends Neighbors

29.1
15.7
6.5
17.5

21.5
12.3
4.5
6.3

16.1
2.7
2.0
1.6

38.6
36.7
5.6
16.0

13.0
12.2
1.9
3.5

6.1
2.7
.3
0

34.3
21.7
7.2

.2
21.5
4.7

15.0
13 .9
3.4

50.3
14.1
10.6

36.4
4.8
4.0

22.9
2.9
1.9

14.8

8.7

4.3

15.2

2.4

1.3

23.1

15.9

8.5

24.5

12.8

5.3

*Household may have received more than one type of aid.

these persons.
Respondents were shown a list containing nine types of aid typically
received from relatives and friends and asked to indicate which they had
received after the disaster: food, shelter, clothing money, moral
support, labor, transportation, household items, or advice. Table V-16
shows the distribution of these kinds of aid from each of the informal
sources--relatives, friends, and neighbors. Kauai households appear to
have received food from across their primary groups, perhaps because the
lack of electricity for such a long period led people to get together to
cook and to use up food in danger of spoiling.
Importance of Aid. When asked about the importance of aid from
these informal systems, around half or more of the respondents felt it
had been important (Table V-17). In particular, this aid was viewed as
more important to emotional recovery than to economic recovery. In
comparison, the formal programs were considered equally important to both
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TABLE V-17
IMPORTANCE OF INFORMAL AID SYSTEMS TO RECOVERY FOR THE
KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES
COALINGA

KAUAI
IMPORTANCE RATING*

N

%

N

_%-

A. Importance to Economic Recovery
4
3
2
1
0

116
55
36
35
44

Total

286

No response
Not applicable, did not
receive informal aid

40.6 59.8
J
19.2
12.6
12.2
15.4
100.0

98
46
44
37
73
298

4

2

156

76

32.9 J 48.3
15.4
14.8
12.4
24.5
100.0

B. Importance to Emotional Recovery
4
3
2
1
0

180
56
35
6
9

Total

286

No response
Not applicable, did not
receive informal aid

62.9 J 82.5 183
19.6
58
12.2
27
2.1
18
3.1
12
100.0

298

4

2

156

76

61.4] 80.9
19.5
9.1
6.0
4.0
100.0

*" ••• would you rate how important the aid you received from your
relatives, friends, and neighbors has been in your household's
recovering [economicallyJ [emotionally] from the [disasterJ?" 4 = Very
Important; 0 = Not Important.

economic and emotional recovery (Table V-4 above).
"Ethnic Group Comparisons
When the number of sources of informal aid are examined among the
ethnic groups, it is clear (Table V-18) that on Kauai the Caucasian group

TABLE V-18
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY NUMBER OF INFORMAL SYSTEM SOURCES OF AID
KAUAI
NUMBER OF SOURCES*
0
1
2
3

Total %

COALINGA

His~anlc

Ja~anese

Fi'l~ino

(N=lll)

(N-89)

(N=260

(N=1l6)

24.1
29.9
27.7
18.2

47.0
19.7
17.1
16.2

40.4
29.2
13.5
16.9

18.1
35.4
24.2
22.3

23.3
45.7
18.1
12.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Caucasian
(N=13l)

*Relatives, friends, and neighbors only.

~

Maximum of three sources.

was more likely to have received aid from a wider range of their primary
groups than the other ethnic groups. For all the respondents, relatives
do not stand out clearly as the most important of the three potential
sources (Table V-19), although the extent to which they were a source is
similar across all three ethnic groups. For the Caucasians, friends as
the most important source differentiated them from the Japanese and
Fil ipinos.
Overall Recovery
Respondents were asked to rate thei r 1 eve 1 of recovery at the time
of the interview, eight months after the disaster. The amount of time
between the di saster and the survey all ows for the di saster assi stance
programs to have been utilized, and for people to have made economic and
emotional adjustments after the disaster. On the other hand, it is soon
enough after the disaster that there still is variance in the level of
recovery and, thus, the possibility of ascertaining influences on the
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TABLE V-19
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY RECEIPT OF AID FROM INFORMAL SOURCES (Percent)
Caucasian
(N=137)
RECEIPT OF AID
FROM RELATIVES
Received aid
from relatives
Aid offered, but
did not accept
Not offered aid
by rel atives
Total %
RECEIPT OF AID
FROM FRIENDS
Received aid
from friends
Aid offered, but
did not accept
Not offered aid
by friends
Total %
RECEIPT OF AID
FROM NEIGHBORS**
Received aid
from neighbors
Aid offered, but
di d not accept
Not offered aid
by neighbors
Total %

KAUAI
Japanese
(N=117)

Filipino
(N=89)

COALINGA
Hispanic
(N=260)
(N-116)
~

48.9

42.7

48.3

68.5

13.1

16.2

12.4

13 .5

8.6

38.0
100.0

41.0
100.0

39.3
100.0

UI.1

100.0

28.4
100.0

55.5

34.2

34.8

51.2

37.1

21.9

17.1

19.1

25.0

17.2

22.6
100.0

48.7
100.0

46.1
100.0

23.8
100.0

45.7
100.0

35.8

25.6

23.6

31.2

20.7

18.2

12.8

22.5

18.8

11.2

46.0
100.0

61.6

100.0

53.9
100.0

50.1
100.0

68.71
100.0

*Differences among ethnic groups in Kauai were significant at the .05
level or better; differences between ethnic groups in Coalinga were
significant at the .01 level or better (Chi-square).
**Differences among ethnic groups in Coalinga only were significant at
the .05 level or better.

TABLE V-20
PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC AND EMOTIONAL RECOVERY
FOR THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES
KAUAI
RECOVERY RATING*

N

A.

COALINGA

%

198

44.4

3

158

35.4

2
1

65
16

14.6
3.6

Total

%

Perception of Economic Recovery

4

0

N

119
J 79.8

130
78
35

31.6 J 66.2
34.6
20.7
9.3

9

2.0

14

3.7

446

100.0

376

100.0

B. Perception of Emotional Recovery
4

274

3

118

2

39

1

10

0
Total

132

35.1

147

39.1

8.7

67

17 .8

2.2

23

6.1

61.4 J 87.9
26.5

5

1.1

7

1.9

446

100.0

376

100.0

J 74.2

*" •• would you rate how we"ll recovered [economicallyJ [emotionallyJ
your household is from the [disasterJ?" 4 = Extremely Important; 0 =
Not Important.

rate of recovery. Respondents were asked to make separate ratings for
the household's economic recovery and its members' emotional recoveries.
Group Recovery Levels
At about ei ght months after the di saster, the 1eve 1 of househo 1d
recovery differed for Coalinga and Kauai (Table V-20). Economic recovery
at the 1eve 1 of the famil y appea rs to have progressed at a more rapi d
rate for Kauai than for Coalinga, with 44% of those on Kauai
themselves as completely recovered. Kauai
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rating

residents did claim to have

suffered considerable secondary economic impact from the temporary drop
off in tourism following Hurricane Iwa. With respect to emotional

re-

covery, many more Kauai victims (61%) than Coalinga victims (35.1%) felt
their households had achieved complete recovery.
This

is

consistent

with

the differences

in disaster events and

damage levels in the two communities. With the exception of the most
badly damaged housing and resort area on the beachfront, well out of view
of most of the island's long-term inhabitants, the Kauai residents were
not (by eight months after Hurricane Iwa) faced with the reminders of
devastation that greeted Coalinga residents daily. This is probably also
why emot i ona 1 recovery on Kaua i outpaced economi c recovery. Thi s difference in household recovery also could be related to other factors; for
example, it could rest with the effectiveness with which disaster programs were actually implemented in the community, or with a cultural
propensity for the inhabitants of Kauai to be more positive about circumstances.
Recovery rates for the different ethnic groups (Table V-21) follow
the distribution of damage across the groups (see Appendix B, Table 14,
above).

Indeed, it seems 1 ike ly that differences between ethni c groups

in recovery level

as well

as in usage of disaster assistance can be

attributed in part to differences in damage incurred unevenly across the
groups.

For

all

three

groups

on

Kauai,

emotional

recovery far

out-

stripped economic recovery but, in keeping with the damage distribution,
the Caucasian victims reported the lowest levels of both kinds of recovery. Again, among the three groups, the most extreme difference in
disaster assistance use was found with the Japanese. These victims as a
group were very unlikely to have used programs or even to have visited a
DAC. Explanations for this include not only their generally lower damage
levels but also their higher coverage by insurance--both possibly attributable to a cultural value of self-sufficiency.
In general, differences in ethnic group recovery could also be due
to

the

differential

application

of assistance,

or to

various

socio-

economi c factors that come into play when fi nanci a 1 c ri ses are experienced and a complex institutional system must be negotiated to obtain
assistance.

In addition, some element of the differences could lie in

the tendency of various ethnic groups to view their progress from differ-
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TABLE V-21
OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC AND EMOTIONAL RECOVERY (Percent)

COMPA~ISON

Caucasian
(N=137)

RECOVERY RATING*

A.
4
3

2

1

o
B.
4
3

2
1

o

KAUAI
Japanese
( N=ll7)

Perception
38.0
38.7
16.1
3.6
3.6

Fi 1 ipi no
(N=89)

COALINGI\
Anglo
Hi span;
(N=260)
(N-116

of Economic Recovery
511.4
47.2
34.6
29.9
37.1
33.0
11.1
6.7
19.6
.9
7.9
8.8
1.7
1.1
3.9

25.0
37.9
23.3
10 .3
3.4

Perception of Emotional Recovery
54.7
32.1
9.5
2.2
1.5

72.6
19.7
6.8
.9

62.9
24.7
7.8
4.5

39.6
38.5
14.2
6.2
1.5

25.0
40.6
25.9
6.0
2.4

*Level of recovery at about 8 months after the disaster.

ent perspectives,
di fferent ways.

resulting in similar situations

being

reported

in

~la.l~_r:!.[_Ec~nomi c:._~~c:.o_~~12

A simple model of the hypothesized relationship of the central
variables is provided in Figure V-I. This model assumes that patterns of
long-term dislocation and use of disaster assistance programs can be
explained by three primary influences: level of the disaster-related
damage, loss of work, and predisaster socioeconomic status. Further, it
assumes that the level of economic recovery reported at eight months
after the disasters can be explained to some extent by the combination of
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Where:

x, "
X2 "
X3
X4

FIGURE V-l
PATH DIAGRAM OF THE FAMILY
RECOVERY HODEL

Xs

=

=

=
Y, =

Y2
Y3
Y4

=
=
=

Percent of Damage to Dwell i ng Structul'c
and Contents
Number of Weeks out of Work (Head of
Household)
Education Level (Head of Ilousehol dl
Family Income Level
Age (Head of Household)
Number of Disaster Assistance Programs
Used
Number of Sources of Informal Aid
Use of Insurance
Percent of Losses Covered by
Insurance or Disaster Assistance
Number of Post-Di saster Ilousehol d r~ove~
Self-assessment of Economic Recovery
Error Variance

these variables.
The variables in the model have been measured in the following ways.
The perception of recovery is based on a five-point rating given by the
respondent regarding the degree of economic recovery achieved by the
household by the time of the interview, with a score of 4 indicating
complete recovery. The use of the disaster assistance is measured as the
total number of major disaster assistance programs used by the household
after the disaster; this can vary from 0 to 4. The use of informal aid
is measured in terms of the use of aid from three major primary groups
(relatives, friends, and neighbors), and thus can vary from 0 to 3. The
use of insurance was measured by whether or not the household received
any insurance payment (excluding comprehensive coverage from automobile
damage) to apply toward its losses, with 0 representing no insurance
payments and 1 representing the recei pt of an insurance payment of any
amount. The percent of losses covered refers to the percentage of all
losses that were recouped through some combination of the use of assistance programs and insurance payments, ranging from 0% to 100%.
Damage to dwelling was calculated as the summation of the percent of
damage to both structure and to the dwelling's contents; it varies from
0% to 100%. In order to keep this damage relevant to economic recovery,
specifically, renters were re-coded as having 0% structural damage. This
is predicated on the belief that renters do not incur direct economic
costs from structure loss, that being the economic responsibility of the
landlord. However, renters may be forced into moving, just as are
owners, if the dwelling was made uninhabitable. Thus, this coding policy
somewhat attenuates the hypothes i zed re 1at i onshi p between damage 1eve 1s
and residential dislocation in favor of the relationship between level of
damage as an indicator of economic loss and economic recovery.
Weeks out of work refers to the total number of weeks the head of
household was without work due to the disaster-related closure of his or
her workplace, varying from 0 to 30, although there was very little
variance for the either Kauai or Coalinga. Education is measured from
low to high levels of education completed, income from low to high monthly household income, and age from low to high for the head of household.
The hypothesized direction of the relationship is indicated in
Figure V-l. In traditional models of assistance, which underlie the
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provision of many kinds of relief services for various kinds of crises,
the expected direction of the relationships is based on a general, twopart hypothesis: 1) the higher the need, the more assistance used; and 2)
the more ass i stance used, the more rap i d the recovery from the cri sis.
The analytical technique applied here is not the best approach for testing that general hypothesis, since damage would have to be held constant.
However, a path analytical technique has been selected for the purpose of
determining the

relative effect on disaster

recovery of each of the

following specific factors: age, socioeconomic status, disaster losses,
disaster dislocation, and use of assistance.
In order to examine differences in the importance of these variables
to separate ethni c groups, ethni c group membershi p has been hel d constant. A multiple regression has been performed on the variables in the
model

for each

of the five

ethnic groups

studied

in both Kauai

and

Coalinga.
An Ethnic Group Comparison
A comparison of the model across the various ethnic groups indicates
some difference in the variables found to exert the most influence on the
level of recovery. A detailed discussion of each of the observed variations would be more tedious then

revealing for our purposes here,

so

discussion will be held to a general overview of what the analysis seems
to indicate about recovery.
The path coeffi ci ents for each dependent vari ab 1e and the 1evel of
variance explained are presented initially in tabular form. There is a
separate set for each of the ethnic groups, as follows: Caucasian, Kauai
(Table V-22); Japanese, Kauai (Table V-23); Filipino, Kauai (Table V-24);
Anglo,

Coalinga

(Table V-25);

and Hispanic (Table V-26). Significant
path coefficients and multiple R2 s are designated in the tables;discussion is limited to these significant indicators only. It should be noted

that sample size exerts some degree of influence on significance, and
that the size of the groups bei ng analyzed

vari es

from 89

(Fil i pi no

group) up to 260 (Anglo group).
From among the ethnic groups, the variables in the model are best
suited to explaining

recovery

for

the

Caucasian

group

in

the

Kauai

sample. In that instance, 33% of the variance in recovery is explained
by the variables used (Table V-22). The second best fit of the model is
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TABLE v-22
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS OF THE PATH HODEL
OF FAMILY RECOVERY: CAUCASIAN GROUP, KAUAI (N=13])
Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Use of
Disaster
Assistance
(Y 1)

Damage to Dwelling (X~)
Heeks out of \,ork (X)
Education (X
Income (X ) 3
4
Age (X )

.19*
.03
.06
-.04
-.06

.04

.96

Use of
Informal Aid
(Y 2)

Damage to Dwelling
Heeks out of Hork
Education
Income
Age

.31*
.03
.16
-.01
-.01

.12

.88

Use of
Insurance
(Y 3)

Damage to Dwelling
\-leeks out of Hork
Education
Income
Age

-.03
-.10
-.05
.19*
.40*

. 2~

.78

Percent of
Losses
Covered
(Y )
4

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

-.14
-.11
-.12
.14
.26*

.13

.82

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

.43*
.10
.14
.02
- .17

.23

.77

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age
Use of Disaster Assistance
Use of Informal Aid
Use of Insurance
Percent of Losses Covered
Household Moves

-.18
-.26*
-.12
-.17*
.02
-.32*
-.01
-.21*
.19*
-.01

.33

.67

s

Household
Moves

(Y5

Perception
of Recovery
(Y6)

Path
Coefficient

* Path coefficients significant at the 0.5 level or better.

Explained
Variance

Error
Variance

TABLE v-23
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARANETERS OF THE PATH NODEL
OF FAHILY RECOVERY: JAPANESE ETHNIC GROUP, KAUAI (N=ll7)
Path
Coefficient*

Explained
Variance

Damage to Dwelling (Xl)
Weeks out of Hork (X?
Education (X )
Income (X ) 3
4
Age (X )

.01
.09
-.03
-.07
-.18

.04

.96

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

.32*
• 16
-.08
.08

.16

.84

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of \~ork
Education
Income
Age

.13
.05
.02
-.01
.40*

.18

.82

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Hork
Education
Income
Age

.03
-.00
.03
-.00
.24*

.06

.94

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

.07
.04

.96

.25

.75

Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Use of
Disaster
Assistance
(Y 1)

s

Use of
Informal Aid
(Y

2

Use of
Insurance
(Y 3)

Percent of
Losses
Covered
(Y 4)

Household
Hoves
(Ys)

Perception
of Recovery

(Y6)

*

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of \.,rork
Education
Income
Age
Use of Disaster Assistance
Use of Informal Aid
Use of Insurance
Percent Losses Covered
Household Moves

Error
Variance

.03

.16

-.07
-.06
-.01
.01
-.12
.02
-.04
-.06
-.04
-.28*

-.14
.35*
-.06

Path coefficients significant at the .05 level or better.

TABLE v-24
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PA~!ETERS OF THE PATH MODEL
OF FAMILY RECOVERY: FILIPINO ETHNIC GROUP, KAUAI (N s 89)
Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Use of
Disaster
Assistance

Damage to Dwelling (X )
Weeks out of Work (X }
2
Education (X )
Income (X ) 3
4
Age (X )
5

(Y 1)

Use of
Informal Aid

Use of
Insurance
(Y 3)

Percent of
Losses
Covered
(Y 4)

Household
Moves
(Y 5)

Damage to Dwelling
Heeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age
Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of \~ork
Education
Income
Age
Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age
Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of \~ork
Education
Income
Age
Damage to Dwelling
out of \~ork
Education
Income
Age
Use of Disaster Assistance
Use of Informal Aid
Use of Insurance
Percent Losses Covered
Household Moves
\~eeks

Perception
of Recovery
(Y 6)

* Path

Path
Coefficient*

Explained
Variance

Error
Variance

.18
.05
-.13
.01

.05

.95

.18

.82

.24

.76

.15

.85

.18

.82

.21

.79

-.18
.15
-.08
.49*
-.16
.13*

.29*
-.17

.27*
.02
.42*
.29*
-.23*
.07
.05
.10

.26*
.15
.15
.02
-.13
-.31*
-.10
-.10
. II

-.10
.03
-.09
.31
.02
-.02

coefficients significant at the .05 level or better.

TABLE v-25

Dependent
Variable

ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARANETERS OF THE PATH MODEL
OF FANILY RECOVERY: ANGLO GROUP. COALINGA (N=260)
Explained
Independent
Path
Variable
Coefficient* Variance

Use of
Disaster
Assistance
(Y 1)

Error
Variance

Damage to Dwellings (Xl)
Weeks out of Work (X )
2
Education (X )
3
Income (X )
4
Age (X )

.05
.06
-.03
-.20*
-.06

.05

.95

Use of
Informal Aid
(Y )
2

Damage to Dwelling
!-Ieeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

-.03
.08
-.09
-.08
.06

.03

.97

Use of
Insurance
(Y 3)

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

.11
-.08
.14*
.21*
.07

.08

.92

Percent of
Losses
Covered
(Y 4)

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

.12*
-.13*
.09
.03
-.07

.04

.96

Household
Moves
(Y )
5

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

.16*
.01
.13*
-.06
-.08

.05

.95

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age
Use of Disaster Assistance
Use of Informal Aid
Use of Insurance
Percent Losses Covered
Household Moves

-.09
-.02
.02
.01
-.08
-.08
-.16*
-.09
.41*
-.08

.19

.81

s

Perception
of Recovery
(Y )
6

*

Path coefficients significant at the .05 level or better.

TABLE v-26
ESTIMATES OF THE STRUCTURAL PARAMETERS OF THE PATH MODEL
OF FAMILY RECOVERY: HISPANIC GROUP, COALINGA (N=166)
Dependent
Variable

Independent
Variable

Use of
Disaster
Assistance

Damage to Dwelling (Xl)
Weeks out of Work (X?)
Education (X )
Income (X ) 3
4
Age

(Y 1)

Use of
Informal Aid
(Y 2)

Use of
Insurance
(V )

·3

Percent of
Losses
Covered
(Y4)

Damage to Dwelling
Heeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

(yS)

Perception
of Recovery
(Y 6)

*

.12
.16
-.21

.10

.90

.06

.94

.05

.95

.11

.89

.10

.90

.25

.75

.18
-.01
.11

-.04
-.06

Damage to Dwelling
Weeks out of ',ork
Education
Income
Age

-.31*
-.09
-.09

to Dwelling
out of "ork
Education
Inc0me
Age

.23*
.07
-.14
-.02
-.16

Damage to D'oJe 11 ing
Heeks out of Hark
Education
Income
IIge
Use of Disaster IIssistance
Use of Informal Aid
Use of Insurance
Percent Losses Covered
Housphold Naves

Error
Variance

.07

-.07
-.06
-.05
.18

'~eeks

Explained
Variance

.04

Damage to Dwelling
'-leeks out of Work
Education
Income
Age

Dama~e

Household
Moves

Path
Coefficient*

.Il

-.14

-.04

.IJ
.241:

.05
.10

-.18
-.17
.03
.08
.27*
-.29*

Path coefficients significant at the .05 level or better.
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FIGURE V-2

RELATIOtJSHIPS IN THE PATH 140DEL SUPPORTED BY TIiE DATA,
CAUCASIAN GROUP. KAUAI
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FIGURE V-3
RELATIONSHIPS IN THE PATH MODEL SUPPORTED BY THE DATA.
JAPANESE GROUP. KAUAI
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fIGURE V-4
RELATIONSIHPS IN THE PATH MODEL SUPPORTED BY THE DATA,

FILIPINO GROUP, KAUAI
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found for the Japanese group (Table V-23) and the Anglo group (Table V26), where 25% of the variance in recovery is explained. No good exp1anat i on for the re 1at i ve "success" of the mode 1 across groups can be
offered, unless it is the relative greater variability within the Caucasian group with respect to the independent variables under consideration.
In order to bri ng into re1 i ef the most important "paths" to recovery
found in the various groups, those with significant path coefficients
have been plotted on a diagram of the model. These have been prepared
for each of the groups, as follows: Caucasian, Kauai (Figure V-2);
Japanese, Kauai (Figure V-3); Filipino, Kauai (Figure V-4); Anglo,
Coalinga (V-5); and Hispanic, Coalinga (Figure V-5). A few general
observations will be ventured, based on these comparisons.
For all groups but the Filipinos, the level of losses covered by
insurance or assistance was of particular importance, compared to other
variables, in explaining recovery level. The relationship between income
and insurance is positive, whereas the one between income and program use
is negative. This suggests that those few who did receive insurance
payments were less likely to make extensive use of the disaster assistance programs (and would have been ineligible for some types of assistance). For the Filipino group, the percent coverage of losses was not a
significant variable in explaining level of recovery. Even though the
level of damage for the Filipino households was positively and significantly related to the level of loss coverage, coverage of losses does not
contribute significantly to the explanation of level of recovery. Only
level of damage in a direct path is found to be of relatively greater
importance to recovery level than other variables in the model. The
relationship is negative, as would be expected--that is, the higher the
level of damage, the lower the perceived recovery. This implies that for
Filipinos, neither disaster assistance nor insurance removed the sting of
thei r losses.
As noted in an earlier section, the Japanese group was found to be
very unlikely to have used disaster assistance programs, or even to have
gone to the DACs to fi nd out about them. They were the most 1ike 1y of
all the groups to have had insurance and to have applied it to their
losses. The level of damage of their dwellings was not found to affect
the level of loss coverage, as was apparently the case with respect to
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level of coverage from assistance programs for some of the other groups.
However, 1evel of damage was important to whether or not the Japanese
accepted a high level of help from their primary groups. The negative
relationship of high use of informal aid suggests that the Japanese
tended either to have and rely on insurance, or to rely on their primary
groups. However, the type of aid obtained from primary groups apparently
does not strongly affect economic recovery, and the Japanese victims in
high damage situations who relied on this type of aid apparently were
less likely to consider themselves as recovered.
Many more of the variables in the model contribute to the explanation of recovery for the Caucasian group. As was observed with most
other groups, the percent of losses covered was important to the level of
recovery they reported (a positive correlation as might be expected).
The negative correlation of the use of disaster assistance programs and
of insurance suggests that these measures were less than efficacious in
dealing with losses. The negative correlation for insurance wa~ probably
related to damage to beach front homes, mainly incurred by this group, for
which insurance coverage was disputed. The level of damage sustained by
Caucasians on Kauai did not explain the level of loss coverage achieved
by the time of the survey, as it had for other groups depending mainly on
assistance programs.
Conclusion
These comparisons indicate some differences among the ethnic groups.
For the Japanese, who were more likely than others to use insurance,
the level of damage was not important to level of coverage. This is most
likely a characteristic of insurance users rather than of Japanese, per
se. For some reason, assistance recei ved by the Fi 1i pi nos (note the
importance of level of damage in explaining level of coverage of losses)
did not contribute to them considering themselves recovered. The other
two Kauai groups, the Caucasians and the Japanese, apparently did not
pursue the assistance route to its full potential, especially as compared
to both of the Coalinga groups.
However, it can be suggested that the more notable differences have
to do with the site and the disaster event, rather than separate values.
In Coalinga, both the Anglos and the Hispanics appear to have been able
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and willing to make use of the potential of the disaster relief programs.
On Kauai, only the Filipino group exhibited a strong correlation between
level of damage and level of assistance, but level of assistance received
did not have a s i gnifi cant effect on percept i on of recovery. For the
Filipino victims, recovery was explained mainly by the direct effect of
level of damage: the greater the damage they sustained, the lower their
perceived recovery at the time of the interview--regard1ess of the percent of thei r losses covered by di saster re 1 i ef proy rams

0

r ins urance.

This could reflect some difference in Filipino perception characteristics, or it might be attributable to measurement error since interviewers
had some language difficulties with this group.
Insurance seems to be a relatively important factor in the recovery
process for the Caucasians and the Japanese, although that adjustment was
more successful for the Japanese. This may be due to the type of damage
they sustained, compared to the damage befalling the mainly Caucasian
beachfront dwell ers--the coverage of whi ch, as noted, was di sputed.

In

an earlier section, it was noted that none of the Kauai groups made the
same level of use of disaster assistance programs as did the Coalinga
groups, with this being particularly pronounced for the Japanese. This
may simply be a reflection of the generally lower 1 evel s of damage related to Hurricane

Iwa

compared to the Coalinga earthquake. However,

again, it might also indicate a community or cultural norm on Kauai not
to seek assistance from outsiders. A third explanation could be that the
formal disaster relief effort was simply not as effective on Kauai, with
that

island's much more scattered population (compared to the compact

small community of Coalinga). Our data do not generally give us reason
to believe that to be true, although certainly the scattered and heterogeneous population on Kauai would have been much more difficult to serve
than the hi gh 1y concent rated and somewhat mo re homogeneous commun ity of
Coalinga.
A general observation can be offered on the basis of this analysis:
higher levels of recovery were best explained by the level of loss coverage from insurance or assistance. The level of loss coverage obtained
was best explained by the level of damage sustained by the household.
This seems most true in instances where insurance was not a major factor
ina househol d's recovery process. Where insurance coverage was appro-
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priate to the source of damage, the level of coverage did not depend on
the level of damage. When disaster assistance programs were the major
source of loss coverage, the level obtained seems to have varied with the
1eve 1 of damage--greater coverage bei ng exp 1 a i ned by greater damage. It
is not clear whether this is a function of the way the program works or
of the intensity with which those suffering the greatest losses "work"
the disaster relief system.
F rom the fi ndi ngs of thi s study, it can be conc 1uded that 1eve 1 of
damage is more important than socioeconomic or ethnic or minority group
status in explaining the rate of recovery from disasters. However, when
the interact i on of the di saster agent and the characteri st i cs of the
built environment lead to greater levels of damage within ethnic or
minority groups, their demographic and cultural
income, level

characteristics

(e.g.,

of trust in the government) and patterns of adjustment

(e.g., purchase of insurance) will then determine their use of assistance
and rate of recovery.
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CHAPTER VI
THE COALINGA, CALIFORNIA EARTHQUAKE
The monitoring of disasters described in Chapter V yielded another
site for study in May of 1983, when an earthquake hit Coal i nga, Ca 1ifornia. Although Coalinga only marginally met some of the criteria for a
study site, it was deemed particularly valuable for examination because
of the ongoing National

Earthquake Hazards

Reduction Program and the

associated increased national concern for better understanding of, and
preparation for, earthquake disasters.
As in Chapter V, the responses di scussed here were obta i ned from
disaster victims several months after the earthquake struck. Because the
studies are so similar, some additional comparisons of the Kauai

and

Coalinga disasters are offered in this chapter, and the data for Coalinga
are included with the data in Chapter V for Kauai. Information on all
the other aspects of the disaster in Coalinga--which was intensively
studied by numerous researchers and agencies--is available in various
reports, most notably ina comprehensive revi e\~ of all the research on
Coalinga recently published by the California Seismic Safety Commission
(Tierney, 1985).
The Disaster and the Community
At 4:42 p.m. on May 2, 1983, an earthquake occurred with a mean
Richter magnitude of 6.7 centered ten miles northeast of Coalinga. It
was quickly followed by an aftershock with a magnitude of 5.6. The two
shocks on May 2nd destroyed most of the central

business district of

Coalinga and caused major damage to about 50% of all

dwellings.

The

major source of damage was groundshaking.
In recent times, Coalinga has frequently experienced minor seismic
activity believed to be associated with the nearby San Andreas Fault.
However, it was a less conspicuous, undocumented fault in the Coalinga
ant i c 1i ne that produced the May 2nd quake. That event was fo 11 owed by
over 7,200 aftershocks from May 2 to August 1, 1983. Of these, 147
registered magnitudes greater than 3.0, and 28 greater than 4.0. According to Earthquake Engineering Research Institute descriptions, a complex
network of faults approximately 40 km long, 15 km wide, and more than
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10 km deep is responsible for these continuing aftershocks.
Impa~~~1:...I!.~ar~~~~

There have not been any previous earthquakes that have caused damage
to the town of Coalinga. However, historical analysis of seismicity of
the central coastal range indicates that the Coalinga earthquake should
not be considered anomalous. In this area an event of this magnitude can
be expected every 161 years; a quake of magnitude 6.0, every 55 years.
Desp i te thi s pat tern of sei smi c act i vity east of the San And reas, most
residents

of the

area

perceived the threat

of

earthquake

hazards

as

small.
Because the city is relatively small (approximately one and one-half
miles

between

uniform,

its

damage

farthest

patterns

points),

followed

self-contained,
variations

in

and

dwelling

geologically
structure.

Nearly all the residences were si ng1 e-story, wood frame homes, and over
two-thirds were at least 20 years old. The most severe damage was to
01 der

homes

whi ch

were

improperly

anchored

to thei r

foundat·i ons

and

lacked adequate lateral bracing. Typically, these houses were thrown off
their foundations. For the most part, damage to newer homes was limited
to interior furnishings, chimneys, brick veneers, and unanchored porches.
Nonstructura1 damage, such as falling bricks and breaking glass, was one
of the most common sources of injury. About 95% of the central downtown
business

district,

made up mainly

of older brick

buildings,

was de-

st royed.
Damage reports vary from report to report, and across time as estimates are revised. Appendix B, Table 2 presents estimates based on Red
Cross reports. These figures may have changed somewhat since they were
initially compiled. However, they give an indication of the magnitude of
the losses and damage related to the earthquake.
Disaster Assistance
One and one-hal f hours after the quake hit, the Red Cross established a mass shelter and feeding unit with the aid of the Salvation Army
and local churches. Other groups such as the National Guard, the Naval
air station,

and

private companies and utilities were instrumental

in

providing labor and other services to meet immediate needs.
A Presidential Declaration authorizing federal

assistance was made

on May 5, 1983. The Coalinga Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) was open
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between May 7 and May 25 as a cent ra 1 process i ng stat i on for di saster
. assistance information and applications for services. Approximately
2,500 claims were made with federal, state, and local governments and
private organizations that were represented at the DACs.
The Community
Coalinga is somewhat isolated from the rest of the state. It is a
small city of approximately 6,600 people situated 60 miles southwest of
Fresno on the western fringe of the San Joaquin Valley. Developed in the
late 1880s as a coaling station for the railroad, since the 1920s it has
been sustained by oil pumping operations, agriculture, and education.
Seen from the air, development density is fairly uniform throughout
the town, the boundaries of which are fairly discrete. In addition,
there are a few smaller towns several miles away and small settlements of
agricultural workers clustered around the headquarters of cotton farms
and feed lots in the vicinity. One enters the Coast Range foothills just
to the west of town, and an interstate highway lies about 13 miles east
of the commun ity. On 1-5 one can get to San Jose to the no rt h, 0 r Los
Angeles to the south in two to three hours. Fresno, the county seat, is
about an hour away.
Largely a result of the California Water Project, agriculture in the
area, now increasing in importance, has attracted a number of Hispanic
farm workers to the Coalinga area. Although Coalinga is relatively
homogeneous in its ethnic composition, with over four-fifths of the
community consisting of white/Anglo residents, nearly all of the remaining residents are of Hispanic origin (16%). In addition, there are
several farms and ranches in the outlying area that employ and provide
housing for Hispanic workers and their families. About 13% of the residents speak Spanish within the home.
The bulk of Coalinga's families consist of married couples (87%),
and 44% of all married couples have children under the age of 18. For
the most part, Coalinga is a middle-income community, with median family
income in 1979 dollars just below that of the State of California as a
whole ($20,403 vs. $21,537). About 7% of the family incomes were below
the poverty level; the average for the state is 8.7%.
Despite dwindling oil reserves over the past 15 years, unemployment
has remained only slightly above the state average (5.3% vs. 4.1%), and
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the standard of living is comparable to that found statewide. Approximately 58% of all

residents 25 years or older are in the labor force,

with the majority employed in education, retail trade, oil

operations,

agriculture, and construction (in that order). A lower proportion of the
residents than is characteristic for the state are either professional/
managerial workers (17% vs. 25%) or technical/sales/clerical workers (24%
vs. 33%).
About 64% of Coalinga residents have a high school diploma, relative
to 74% of state residents. However, a fairly high proportion have had at
least some college, probably due to the presence of a junior college in
the community.
A large proportion (84%) of the Coalinga residents live in singlefamily dwellings; almost two-thirds of the year-round housing units are
owner-occupied.

In

1980 there was

little excess housing in Coalinga;

1ess than 1% of homes owned were vacant, and about 6% of rentals were
vacant.

Coalinga is a fairly stable community. Over 50% of its resi-

dents surveyed in the 1980 census were occupying the same house they had
lived in five years previously.
The Study Method
The interview schedule used in Coalinga was virtually the same as
that used in Kauai, with the exception of a few changes that made it
site-specific. For Coalinga, both English and Spanish versions of the
interview

schedule

were

conducted both the Kauai

prepared
and

and

Coalinga

used.

The

surveys,

same
and

field

director

interviewers were

recruited and trained on site for both studies. In Coalinga, four of the
16 interviewers used were bilingual and conducted interviews mainly with
Hispanic households. They could use either the English or Spanish version of the interview.
Interviewing
The

interviewers

in

Coalinga

had

valuable

local

information and

experience, as did those in Kauai, and they enjoyed the trust of the
local

residents. There was a new problem in Coalinga, however, in that

many of the residents already had been interviewed by many researchers
and were reluctant to participate in yet another survey, regardless of
who was conducting it. As had been the case in Kaua i, i ntervi ews were
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conducted in the language most comfortable for the respondent.
Sampling
An enumeration of damaged dwellings consisting of the damage assessment list from the American Red Cross was used. The Red Cross damage
estimates were obtained by volunteers canvassing the impact zone immediately following the disaster. Dwelling units were evaluated as sustaining minor, major, total, or no damage, and as being either sing.e-or
multifamily. Either an address or a description of the dwelling and its
location was provided. For this study, buildings which were described as
havi ng no damage were eli mi nated. Then, to obta in the ta rgeted sample
size, 400 households (representing 22% of the affected residents) were
selected randomly from the Red Cross list.
Appendix B, Table 3 provides information on the completion rate and
reasons for non-completion of interviews with this initial sample. There
was a relatively high refusal rate attributed by the interviewers to the
large number of other surveys already administered to the residents.
Substitute sampling units were randomly selected, but, after making
approximately 25 substitutions in this manner, it became clear that an
insufficient number of Hispanic households were included in the sample.
Si nce the central intent of the study was to compare ethni c groups, it
was decided to compromise the sampling procedure in order to obtain
adequate numbers of Hispanics to permit valid analysis. This lower than
expected number of Hispanic interviews was due both to there being fewer
Hispanic families present in the community than had been anticipated from
earlier survey reports, and to the mObility of Hispanic households as a
result of the quake. Hispanic families were more apt than Anglo to live
in poorly constructed housing, which suffered greater than average
damage, and many had moved from their pre-earthquake homes. They were
also less likely to be home owners and therefore more mobile than other
residents.
Thus, as a means of increasing the number of Hispanic respondents, a
disproportionate sample of Hispanic households was drawn in addition to
the initial sample. Of the 120 substitutions made from the original
sample of respondents who were not interviewed, 80 were allocated to the
Hispanic group. Three clusters of Hispanic households were identified,
two consisting of neighborhoods within the city, and one consisting of
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clusters of farm employees at the ranches and farms around the community
which had sustained damage in the earthquake. Nearly all available
Hispanic households residing within these areas that had suffered quake
damage were interviewed.
~~~~~cteri s_~i c~_o.!_~~e.._~ampl e

The Coalinga sample represents mostly persons who live and work
in the community; a sma 11 proport i on 1i ve on scattered ranches (cotton
farms), and some of the town dwellers work on the ranches or in the oil
fields. The mean age of the victim respondents in Coalinga was 42.5
years, with 18% of the sample over the age of 60. There were 3.4 persons
per family, and 95% of the victim families resided in single-family
dwellings before the disaster; 55% of those owned the dwelling. The mean
number of years the victim family had lived in their home was 8.9; the
mean number of years in Coalinga was 18.4.
The average predisaster monthly income (after taxes) in the Coalinga
victim sample was $1405, reflecting in part the fairly high salaries of
oil workers. Heads of households were predominantly in unskilled and
skilled occupations (72.2%), as opposed to management or professional
positions (18.4%); 11.4% were reti red. Forty-five percent of the household heads had high school diplomas and 14.7% had college degrees. About
12.5% of the heads of household claimed no religious affiliation, 35.1%
were Catholic, 42.6% were Protestant, and the remaining 9.8% claimed some
other affiliation.
~~11!~ Eth~~Ci~~

About 70% of the sample classified itself as Anglo, and 30% as
Hispanic. Census figures indicate about 16% of the Coalinga population
is Hispanic, but the damage patterns suggested that Hispanics would be
di sproport i onate 1y represented ina sample of vi ct i ms. Because of the
extraordinary measures taken to find Hispanic victims, and the possibility that many of the Hispanics present at the time of the earthquake were
migrant farm workers who had since moved on, it is difficult to say how
representat i ve thi s di st ri but ion is of the damage incurred by the two
groups. The Hispanics appear to be mainly Mexican-American or Mexican
national, with a few from various other Central and South American countries. No effort was made during the interviews to establish whether or
not respondents were citizens of the United States, although there is
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evidence indicating that the sample includes some "illegal aliens" mainly
from Mexico.
The distinction between the ethnic groups was very discrete. Virtually all the non-Hispanic respondents characterized themselves as
belonging in the Anglo category. Three households were mixed, with one
spouse being Anglo and one something else (American Indian or Asian).
All were placed in the Anglo sample; thus, 31% of the sample was classified as Hispanic and 69% as Anglo. Although there was no significant
pattern with respect to age differences in the two ethnic groups of
victim respondents, the Hispanic heads of household tended to be somewhat
younger than the Anglo heads of household (Appendix B, Table 4).
The Hispanics in the samp"le were somewhat less likely than the
Anglos to have lived in their pre-earthquake dwelling for over five
years, while Anglo households were much more likely than the Hispanics to
have lived in theirs for over 15 years (Appendix B, Table 5). About 73%
of the Anglo group had lived in Coalinga for twenty years or more, compared to 27% of the Hispanic victim group. Hispanic respondent households also were more likely to be renters, with 68% renting or living in
employer-provided housing, compared to 34% renters among the Anglo group
(Appendix B, Table 6).
The Hispanic victims were less likely than the Anglos to represent
one-person households and slightly more likely to live in households with
children (Appendix B, Table 7). The larger families were somewhat more
likely to be found in the Hispanic group than in the Anglo group (Appendix B, Table 8). The heads of the Hispanic victim households were most
likely to be found in the unskilled and laborer categories of occupation,
while the Anglos were most likely to be found in the more skilled and
professional occupations (Appendix B, Table 9). The Hispanic laborers
were most likely to be associated with the agricultural activities, while
the Anglos were employed in the commercial activities in Coalinga or with
the oi I compani es. Pre-ea rthquake unemployment rates were simi I a r for
the two groups, although the Hispanics perhaps could be characterized as
more underemployed (7.8% worked only part time) (Appendix B, Table 10).
Fewer of the victim Hispanics classified themselves as retired--7% compared to 13.5% for the Anglo group.
The two groups of victims clearly differ with respect to thei r
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income level (Appendix B, Table 11). The Hispanic victims were much more
likely to be in lower income categories compared to the Anglos, who were
likely have a monthly income of over $1000. The general level of education of the heads of the Hispanic victim households also was lower than
for the Anglos (Appendix B, Table 12). Around 32% of the Hispanic heads
of household reported having at least a high school education, while
almost 80% of the Anglo heads of household had a high school education or
more.
Effects of the Disaster
Damage and Loss
The entire community was subject to essentially the same magnitude
earthquake, but the damage patterns reflected to a great extent the
nature of the construction of each individual building and its placement
on the lot. The social distribution of damage and loss generally
followed the distribution of housing by social class. High death and
injury counts for earthquake events are frequently related to particular
kinds of structures--specifically, those with unreinforced masonry walls
and/or heavy tile roofs.
For Coalinga, one subsequent death was attributed to the earthquake,
and some of the families in the samples reported that one or more family
members were injured badly enough to need medical attention. However,
most of the older, "pre-code" dwellings were of wood rather than unreinforced masonry and thus less subject to total collapse and less prone to
cause injury. The unreinforced masonry buildings present in the community (mostly in the downtown area) typically did not withstand the forces
of the earthquake, and the relatively few deaths were fortuitous.
Port ions of the community were 1eft undamaged, but, as desc ri bed
above, the study respondents were selected from lists of households that
had been destroyed or damaged. As was the case with the Kauai respondents, damage levels for the householdS varied. Hypotheses employed in
this survey were the same as those applied to Kauai.
Of the respondent famil i es, 41.2% reported some damage to thei r
dwellings, and 24% reported that their dwellings were totally destroyed
(Appendix B, Table 13). The latter figure is particularly important with
respect to postdisaster needs and household disruption (to be discussed
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later}. The average dollar loss for structural damage was $12,994, the
mean loss to contents was $2,908, and the average percentage loss to the
contents of dwellings was 31%. The total loss of a structure, however,
did not necessarily mean the total loss of the contents.
Ethnic Gro~~~~i~ons. In Coalinga, the Hispanic group was twice
as likely as the Anglo group to have suffered a high level (over 75%) of
structural damage (Appendix B, Table 14). Based on field observations of
the community, this difference is due to the greater likelihood of this
group living in the older and less structurally sound housing in the
communi ty.
In examining victim attitudes, a relationship was found between
level of damage and sense of being worse off than others (Appendix B,
Table 15). In Coalinga, the Hispanics were more likely to see themselves
as worse off than others, but not in the numbers one mi ght have been
expected in view of the level of loss within this group. One explanation
for this might be that when asked to compare themselves to others in the
community, they tended to compare themselves to other Hispanics. This
would make their comparison group one with similar levels of loss.
Dislocation and Disruption
A major characteristic peculiar to earthquakes can affect postdisaster decisions. It could not be assumed that "the earthquake" was
over in Coalinga after the initial damaging jolt. Major aftershocks
occurred soon thereafter, causing further damage and creating concern
among the inhabitants of the community about the safety of returning to
their dwellings. Noticeable tremors continued throughout the months
following the disaster and are expected to continue for several years.
Household Dislocation. Families in Coalinga were likely to have
left their home, with 75% reporting being out at least one night. It is
probable that the high dislocation rate in Coalinga is related to the
the frequent and severe aftershocks which convinced many families that it
was prudent to rema in outs i de thei r homes, even if the st ructure was
essentially habitable.
More than half the Coal i nga famil i es who moved out of thei r homes
reported camping in their own yard after the earthquake (Appendix B,
Table 16). This is probably related more to the uncertainty about being
inside than to not having other places to go, although there was in205

adequate housing available for the displaced. In addition, the pleasant
weather in Coalinga at that time permitted people to stay outdoors in
tents or in cars if they desired. The adjustment would probably have
been different had the weather been i ncl ement. Thus, a better understanding of the interaction between type of disaster and weather conditions and the resultant effect on where families decide to stay immediately after a disaster (i.e., in the yard, inside damaged homes, or in
shelters and others'

homes)

is clearly important for disaster relief

planning.
The provision of housing for disaster victims in areas where housing
supply is tight (due to disaster damage or predisaster patterns) creates
fairly

complicated

logistical

problems for the

providers

of disaster

relief. In Coalinga, where housing alternatives were virtually nonexistent after the earthquake, FEMA mobile homes were used. In a another site
we studied--Alviso, California--most flood victims were initially housed
in motels in unflooded areas. Each solution created different kinds of
dissatisfaction

for

the dislocated families.

These will

be discussed

later.
Similar percentages of those persons who were dislocated in both
Coalinga and Kauai moved in with relatives following the disaster (Appendix B, Table 16).

In Coalinga, these relatives might well

have lived

outside of town and therefore be considered a reasonable alternative to
staying in the earthquake zone. As mentioned, over 50% of the victim
families devised some means to stay near but outside their homes, and
only a few moved in with neighbors or friends. As is typically found in
instances where housing alternatives exist, few in either site selected
an official shelter as a first destination, although utilization of such
shelter was much more likely on Kauai than in Coalinga. Of course, there
are no figures for those whose first or perhaps second disaster-related
move was to leave town for good, since they are not included in the
samples.
Household

Disrl!.~~~.

Due to the differing natures of the disaster

events and their impacts, the families in Coalinga were more likely to
have been dislocated temporarily from their damaged homes, while the
families in Kauai were more likely to have lived in their homes while
they were under repair. Some families in Coalinga suffered both types of
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disruption.
Although 73% of the Coalinga victim sample were back to their predisaster address by the time these interviews were conducted (seven to
eight months after the disaster), 75% of the Coalinga households had left
their homes, at least temporarily, following the disaster event (Appendix
B, Table 17). Respondents for households which had been dislocated from
their homes were asked how disruptive the moves had been; having to leave
one's home was reported to be very disruptive by 56% of the sample. That
29% of the Coalingans indicated they intended to move again in the near
future may be a refl ect i on of the great number who had not returned to
their predisaster location or who were still living in FEMA-provided
housing at the time of the interview. The intent of most victims was to
find a more suitable dwelling in the community; few voiced the intention
of leaving the area.
About 49% of the sample reported that they had made repairs to their
dwellings while living in them after the disaster, and 40% said that
living in a house under repair was highly disruptive.
Employment Disruption. Since the earthquake caused damage to commercial and industria"1 property, some people were laid off from their
jobs. Twenty-seven percent of the heads of household had thei r workplaces closed--an average of 3.3 weeks (Appendix B, Table 18). However,
only 3% of the sample reported that they were out of work for over One
month. Although being out of work can be economically and emotionally
difficult, it does not seem to have caused great hardship to very many
families in this sample.
Ethnic Group Comparisons. Both Anglos and Hispanics were apt to
have been di sl ocated from thei r homes and to have moved twi ce, but
Hispanics were more likely than Anglos to have moved more than twice
(Appendix B, Table 19). The two-move sequence typically involved living
for a time in emergency housing and then moving back into one's predisaster dwelling. Moving more than twice seems to have been occasioned by
difficulty in finding suitable housing for permanent resettlement. That
this was frequently the case with Hispanics is attributable to three
interrelated circumstances: Hispanics lived in the oldest and most
damaged housing; they generally rented; and the type of housing they
occupied was either unlikely to be repaired or, if it was fixed up, it
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was likely to be priced out of the market it once occupied.
Anglos were more adversely affected by damage to their work places
than were Hispanics, largely because Anglos worked in the heavily damaged
downtown section of Coalinga and most Hispanics were agricultural
workers.
Psychological_~~stress

The measures of psychological distress included in the study were
designed to reveal some of the consequences of loss, disruption, and
dislocation, and to indicate levels of emotional recovery among the
victim families. In response to the query about their general health,
72.6% of the sample said it was excellent or good, but 19% said that it
had worsened since the disaster. About 80% of the complaints were felt
to be related to disaster effects.
There were some reports of increased smoking, drinking, or taking of
med i cat ions fo 11 owi ng the di saster. These increases may be related to
the extent of damage and destruction which Coalingans had to face, or to
the long-term disruptions they had to cope with. An attempt was made to
determine whether the continuing aftershocks of the quake caused stress:
80% of the respondents said that, indeed, they were disturbed by the
tremors.
Sixty-four percent of the households had one or more members dealing
with emotional problems, but in only 28% of the households was professional help sought (Appendix B, Table 20). Hispanics sought counseling more often than Anglos, but it is difficult to determine whether this
was because they had more damage and disruption, or because there was a
concerted effort made by a regi ona 1 mental health team to reach the
Spanish-speaking population (Appendix B, Table 21).
Use of Formal _D_i2.~ster _~~~~ance Prog.rams
The Presidential Disaster Declaration made recovery and reconstruction funds available under the Disaster Relief Act and established a
Disaster Assistance Center (DAC) in Coalinga. The Red Cross also set up
a mass feeding facility in conjunction with the DAC.
Use of DACs and Funds
----------------Of the respondents interviewed, 81.4% reported that they had gone to
the Disaster Assistance Center, with 46% saying they had gone more than
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twice (Table V-I; data for Coalinga are included with the data for Kauai
presented in the previ ous chapter). Thi s hi gh usage and return rate
(particularly in relation to Kauai) could be because food and other
commodities were available at the DAC and/or because the people had a
great need for help. Seventy-two percent of the respondents said they
received some type of assistance from one of the formal programs, with
79% of them getting aid from the Red Cross, 76% using food stamps, 67%
benefittin9 from a Salvation Army program, 32% seeking shelter through
the FEMA Temporary Housing Program, and 20% applying for Individual
Family Grants (Table V-2).
There was higher use of federal programs in Coalinga than in Kauai,
perhaps reflecting a programmatic use difference that exists in normal
times, the greater need for temporary housing in Coalinga, or the greater
need for the "last resort" funds provided by IFGs for victims not covered
by other programs or by insurance. Over 25% of the sample in Coalinga
reported using three or four major relief programs (Table V-3). As in
all the other study sites, there was a high positive correlation between
number of programs used and damage to dwelling place.
When they were asked to judge the importance of aid programs to
their own family's recovery (Table V-4), 67% of the respondents said they
were helped in their economic recovery, and 71% said their emotional
well-being was aided by the programs. About 90% of the people who had
used some program said they were satisfied with it.
Awareness of Assistance Programs
Various means were used to advertise the existence of aid programs
(Table V-5). Our survey did not attempt to determine in great detail the
specifics of different publicity programs, but we did ascertain how
respondents found out about the programs they used. Only 6% of the
Coalinga respondents said they learned about aid programs through mail
literature, 15% mentioned fliers and handbills, 18% cited a newspaper as
their source of information, and 27% named TV or radio. By far the most
frequently noted source of information was word of mouth; 83% of the
respondents said much of their information came that way.
Eth~ic Gr~up

Comparisons
As mentioned above, Hispanics were significantly more likely than

Anglos to have made multiple visits to a DAC (Table V-6). This is con209

sistent with their higher damage and loss levels. Hispanics were also
more likely to have used some local, state, or federal disaster assistance program (85% compared to 66%), no doubt because of thei r greater
losses, more frequent displacement, and lack of resources. It is apparent, at least in Coalinga, that aid programs were used most by those who
needed most.
Hispanics were also the more frequent users of Red Cross, Salvation
Army, food stamp, and temporary housing programs; and they were much more
likely to use multiple sources of aid (Tables V-7 and V-8). However,
Hispanics reported the programs as only slightly more important to their
recovery than did Anglos. A significant difference between ethnic
groups, and one that should be noted by all providers of aid, is the way
each got its information: common modes of public communication were far
less effective for Hispanics than was word of mouth (Table V-9).
Alternative Adjustments to Losses
Respondents were queried about sources of help available to them
other than the formal aid programs di scussed so far. Three avenues of
recourse were specifically examined: insurance, other personal resources,
and aid from relatives and friends. Each one needs to be understood in
order to form a complete picture of how victims recover from disasters.
Insurance
Only 9% of the households in the Coalinga sample reported having
earthquake insurance, 46% had no coverage at all, and 18% had some kind
of insurance but received no compensation. Traditional insurance coverage applied to some of the kinds of damage, and, in some instances,
structural damage was ruled to be covered even for those without specific
earthquake coverage. For the Coalinga households that did receive some
compensation, the average proportion of loss covered was 40% (Table V10). At the time of the survey (seven to eight months after the disaster), 20% of the respondents indicated that their insurance claims, had
not yet been settled. Households were highly unlikely to have recouped
over 75% of their total losses through assistance and insurance combined
(Table V-II). At least 36% of the sample reported continuing money
problems in their efforts to replace lost property.
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Personal Resources
Although 18% of the households recouped 100% of their losses through
a combination of insurance and disaster assistance, most had losses that
were not covered by any other provisions. At least 80% of the households
had
not
ing
to

to fall back on some other st rategi es to fi 11 in gap s, among them:
replacing some things they had lost (64% of the sample), restructurthe household budget to provide for necessities (17%), using savings
cover expenses (42%), borrowing money from disaster loan programs
(31%), or borrowing money from friends and relatives (10%) (Table V12) •
Aid from Friends and Relatives
Although relatives were the most important informal source of aid
during disaster recovery in Coalinga, neighbors and friends also played
an important role in providing aid to households in need (Table V-l~).
Respondents in Coalinga were much more likely than those in Kauai to
indicate that they had no close relatives, friends, or neighbors from
whom to get help. However, 70% of those interviewed said they had at
least one close friend or relative in town, so there was great potential
for social

support.

In fact,

80% of the sample

in Coalinga reported

having received aid from relatives, friends, or neighbors.
Respondents were shown a list of aid types typically received from
relatives and friends, and they were asked to indicate what kinds of
support they had gotten. Categories of help included: household items,
advice, moral support, labor, transportation, shelter, food, clothing, or
money. In Coalinga, relatives tended to provide shelter, and they, as
well as people close to the victim families, both gave moral support
(Table V-16). Both of these findings are consistent with the fact that
people were dislocated in Coalinga and needed both shelter and moral
support for that reason.
Ai d from fri ends and re 1at i ves was vi ewed by at 1east !JO% of the
respondents as having been very important, especially for emotional
recovery (Table V-17).
Ethnic Group Comparison
Hispanics were found to be much less likely than Anglos to have
household insurance of any kind, due in large part to their lower income
levels (Table V-l3). As was noted earlier, over 50% of the Hispanic
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families had a monthly income of $800 or less, compared to 17% of the
Anylos. This lack of insurance was, to a great extent, made up for by
the disaster assistance programs. Table V-13 indicates very little
difference between the Hispanics and Anglos with respect to the percentage of their total losses covered when insurance and disaster assistance
are considered together.
As far as personal strategies for coping with losses, Hispanics were
more likely than Anglos to change budget priorities and go without
special items in order to afford necessities; Anglos were more likely to
decide against replacing certain lost items (Table V-14).
Anglos were considerably more likely to have received informal aid
from more than one source, that is, help came from re 1at i ves, fri ends,
and neighbors (Tables V-18, V-19). There are two possible explanations
for this; 1) the friends and neighbors of the Hispanics were frequently
as bad off as they were, and 2) Hi spani cs in general interact more with
thei r relatives than with other groups. For both ethnic groups, relatives were the biggest source of help.
Overall Reco~~ry
Eiyht months after the disaster, when the interviews took place,
respondents had had sufficient time to adjust somewhat to their postdisaster situation, but very few had recovered completely from economic
and emot i ona 1 setbacks. When respondents we re asked to rate thei rove rall recovery, then, they provided clues to the factors that affected the
rate and success of their economic and emotional recovery.
Group Recovery Levels
Ei ght months after the di saster, 32% of the vi ct im famil i es rated
themselves as completely recovered economically, and 35% said they were
emotionally back to normal (Table V-20). The relative slowness of recovery compared to Kauai may very well be due to the nature of earthquake
damage and its aftereffects. The damaye in Coalinga was more severe; not
only was damage everywhere easily seen by all the community residents,
but reminders of the devastation persisted. There were empty lots in the
downtown area where familiar businesses had once been, and vacated houses
in residential districts stood as silent, disturbing testimony to the
losses Coalinga had suffered. In addition, there were recurring after212

shocks for a number of weeks. These recurring reminders in Coalinga may
account for the fact that on Kauai emotional recovery far outpaced economic recovery whereas in Coalinga, the two progressed at about the same
rate. Community economics could have also played a role: the Coalinga
economy had not been particularly robust prior to the disaster, making
community redevelopment following the disaster questionable to some.
The 1eve 1s of economi c and emot i ona 1 recove ry in Coa 1i nga refl ect
the varying rates of damage sustained by the different ethnic groups,
with higher levels of both sorts of

recovery

reported

by Anglos.

As

noted earlier, the Hispanics were notably more likely than the Anglos to
have suffered losses of 100%, while the Anglos typically suffered a loss
of 25% or less, or--put another way--40% of the Hispanics compared with
20% of the Anglos suffered damage to over 75% of their residence and
personal property. As mentioned, Hispanics were more likely to make use
of several disaster assistance programs. Indeed, there is much evidence
that higher damage level is related to greater use of assistance programs (as well as to -low 1eve 1 s of recovery).
As ment i oned

in

Chapte r

V,

differences in ethn i c group recove ry

could be due to the differential application of assistance and aid, or-more likely in Coalinga--to the socioeconomic factors that come into play
when

ethnic minorities must

complex
this

institutional

study was

deal

with the financial

arrangements

based on

associateu

with

difficulties and
a

disaster.

self-evaluation by the victims,

Since

some of the

di fferences may be due to the vari ous ethni c groups I di fferent vi ews of
their pre- and postdisaster situations.
~ 1a in i r1.~.lcono~~~<:.~ery

Our model of the hypothesized relationship of the central variables
was thoroughly described in Chapter V. However, some of its implications
for Coalinga should be reviewed here. For both the Hispanics and Anglos
in Coalinga, it is likely that disaster assistance programs--not insurance--accounted for most of the loss coverage, al though some Coal i nga
victims

did

have

at

least

partial

insurance

coverage.

In

the

Anglo

group, both insurance use and high use of assistance programs are influenced by income. The relationship between

income and

insurance

is

positive; that between income and program use is negative. This suggests
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that those few who did receive insurance payments were less likely to
make extensive use of the disaster assistance programs (and would have
been ineligible for some types of assistance).
Again, for both the Anglos and the Hispanics, level of damage to the
dwelling was significant in explaining the level of losses covered. In
fact, the relationship was found to be a positive one--the higher the
damage levels, the higher the eventual percent coverage of losses. This
might indicate that--at least in disasters similar to the Coalinga earthquake--di saster assi stance programs work the best for persons with the
greatest damage.
Conclusion
This analYSis indicates some differences in recovery between the
ethnic groups in Coalinga, as well

as differences between recovery on

Kauai and recovery in Coalinga (discussed in detail in the conclusion to
Chapter V). Also, importantly, it shows a strong positive relationship
between level of damage and losses covered by disaster assistance programs. This relationship might reflect the extent to which persons with
ligh levels of damage continued to pursue the system to its fullest,
IIhile others, with manageable levels of loss, gave up that endeavor.
(Thus, in the Anglo group, there was a negative and significant relationship between income and the number of disaster assistance programs used).
An alternate expl anation--that di saster assistance programs attend in a
more

effective way

to

the

needs

of those

warrants further study.
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with

high

losses--perhaps

CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This report has considered a voluminous amount of data across a
range of disaster sites and victim characteristics. The following is a
summary of findings, comparing results from the various sites, and a
discussion of the conclusions and policy implications that might be
derived.
Summary
The data for this study resulted from four different disaster agents
(earthquake, tornado, hurricane, and floodS) affecting two small towns, a
developed urban area, and a somewhat dispersed set of rural villages and
residences. Coalinga and Paris were rural communities of similar population where a disaster significantly damaged residential areas. The Utah
disaster affected an urban strip along the front of a mountain range, and
damage was restricted to areas along streambeds and adjacent mountain
slopes. The disaster on Kauai was more widespread and damaged parts of
the entire island.
At each site, different racial, ethnic, and religious groups were
involved. The Coalinga sample consisted of about 70% Anglo and 3U%
Hispanic victims. The Paris disaster had almost equal numbers of black
and white victims. For both of these sites, the victims belonging to
racial minorities were also of significantly lower socioeconomic status.
The Kauai sample included victims from several ethnic groups; the three
sufficiently large to permit multivariate analyses were Caucasian (40%),
Japanese (34%), and Filipino (26%). Unlike the samples at the first two
sites, the Hawa i i an vi ct i ms showed no ma rked income differences among
groups. The Utah victims were predominantly Mormons, members of a fairly
distinct subculture. They \~ere all white, essentially middle-income
suburbanites. Each site, except Utah, permitted a comparison of disaster
response and recovery among ethnic groups.
Th~ distribution of disaster impacts among victims at each site was
related primarily to disaster agent characteristics, topography, and
residential location, and secondarily to the sort of housing each of the
groups tended to live in. On Kauai, damage was related to topography
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since,

as

in most

hurricanes,

damage

was

most

severe to

beach front

properties. Most such properties were likely to be owned by Caucasians.
Damages to dwellings away from the ocean front were related in part to
how the topographic features of the island affected wind patterns and
intensity levels, and in part to the structural characteristics of the
dwellings

(those cllaracteristics themselves being a reflection of the

socioeconomic

status of the occupants).

Structural

characteristic,s of

housing were also a prime determinant of damage in Coalinga: newer, more
solid homes were less likely to be damaged, irrespective of location;
however, as in Kauai, structural

soundness was

related to the socio-

economic status of the residents. In Utah, damage was directly linked to
location: homes at the mouths of canyons and near runoff channels sustained the most damage, and the actual area of impact was quite limited.
l~c~tio~ andt.yp~.

In Paris, damaye was a function of both residential

Tornadoes are notoriously capricious in the damage they do, and it was
not unusual in Paris to see a house completely destroyed while another
100 feet

away

sustained only a few broken windows.

~ousing

type did

affect damage 1eve 1s: fragi 1e wood-frame homes suffered greater damage
(other thi ngs

bei ng equa l)

than

bri ck

homes.

Thi s

study found quite,

clearly that disaster agent characteristics, as well as damage levels,
are important in understanding response patterns of victims.
Damage levels were directly related to ethnicity for two reasons:
1) residential patterns tend to be determined by ethnicity (segregation)

and 2) different ethnic groups frequently

live in differing sorts of

houses. Housing type relates to ethnicity because types of construction
and location are determined by costs and the ability to pay (which, as
already

noted,

is

closely

correlated

with

race/ethnicity).

Thus,

on

Kauai, Caucasians incurred the highest damages because of their preference for,

and ability to

purchase,

beachfront

housing.

In

Coalinga,

Hispanics reported higher damage levels, because they were more likely to
reside in older, less structurally sound homes. However, in Utah, losses
were not directly

related to class or ethnicity,

but simply to home

location. The situation in Paris was analogous to that in Coalinga-blacks were more

likely to

live in older,

poorly

built

homes.

Con-

sequently, compared to whites, they reported higher levels of physical
damage but lower dollar losses.
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A number
observed

both

of

differences

between

and

regarding

within

sites.

dislo~ation

residential
For example,

were

dislocation was

much more likely in Coalinga and Paris than on Kauai. In part, this was
due to the greater damage levels at those two sites, and, in Coalinga, it
was also attributable to the nature of that town's disaster. Many "dislocated" families stayed outside their own homes for one or more nights,
often camping in their yards, because of the threat posed by aftershocks.
On Kauai, families who found it necessary or desirable to find alternative shelter after the hurricane were most likely to stay initially with
relatives.

In both Coalinga and Kauai, the longest stays in temporary

housing and the greatest number of postdisaster residential changes were
related to levels of damage. However, families on Kauai were more likely
than those at the other sites to stay in or move back to homes in need of
repair instead of staying in temporary shelter.
The pattern of residential

dislocation and postdisaster moves was

somewhat different in Paris. There, blacks were more likely than whites
to have sought temporary emergency shelter, but whites tended to make
more postdi saster moves. While the pattern, to an extent, was damagerelated

(i.e.,

people whose homes were destroyed tended to live else-

where),

it was quite clearly related to class and

race as well.

The

pattern reflects one of the prerogatives of class--the ability to seek
out

optimal

temporary

housing

while

a

home

is

being

rebuilt.

While

previous research has indicated that blacks have stronger kin networks
than whites, in Paris there was no difference between the two groups in
obtaining temporary shelter from kin. Perhaps the most striking difference between the two groups

(one also illustrating the perquisites of

race and class) was that the overwhelming majority of victims living in
FEMA trailers were black. Such trailers are rarely considered desirable
by vi ctims (e.g., Bol in, 1982), and the fact that few whites resided in
them

probably

reflects

the

options

available to those with

a higher

socioeconomic status.
Both blacks and whites in Paris suffered emotional
effects

of

postdisaster moves

and

inadequate

strain~_Jr_om

temporary

housing,

the
but

blacks were more likely to report high levels of stress. Data from both
Kauai and Coalinga also indicated that postdisaster moves create emotional

disruptions and stress. At both those sites, and in Utah as well,
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living in a damaged home was also reported to cause problems; however,
those displaced in Coalinga generally reported higher levels of emotional
strain than those living in damaged homes on Kauai.

In Utah, the pro-

tracted nature of the flooding added to the uncertainties and stresses
associated with living in a damaged home. Similarly, in Coalinga, the
continued aftershocks caused stress and acted as a recurrent reminder of
the ea rthquake.
Because of the _s_tress, as well as the greater levels of damage and
the higher level of residential dislocation, more Coalinga families-than
Kauai families reported emotional strain. Again, there were few differences

in

levels

of

reported emotional

groups on Kauai. However,

strain among the three ethnic

in Coalinga, Anglos were significantly more

likely than Hispanics to report such strain--a fact consistent with other
mental

health

literature.

The Paris data showed that blacks

reported

slightly more psychosocial disruption than whites, but differences were
not large.
Variances

among

ethnic groups

became more clear when looking at

patterns of utilization of forma1_ aid __at the various sites. While the
timing and types of assistance were similar at all four sites (with the
notable exception of the Mormon Church at the Utah site), there were
distinct differences among the various groups of victims in their use of
these programs. For example, Coalinga victims were much more likely to
go to DACs than were Kauai victims, and the same may be said for Paris
victims versus Utah victims.

In Coalinga, almost three-fourths of the

victim households reported that they actually received assistance from at
least one program. However, on Kauai, less than half of the respondents
used any of the programs. There, it was the Red Cross and the Salvation
Army that were most 1 i ke1y to be used, because they offered vi rtually
immediate assistance.
In Paris, housing programs from FEMA were used relatively frequently, more often by blacks than whites; among whites, younger victims' were
more likely to use FEMA than were older victims. However, white victims
were twice as

likely as blacks to receive SBA reconstruction loans--

reflecting, at least in part, the poorer blacks'

inability to qualify

for such financing. On the other hand, the lower incomes of blacks made
them more 1 i ke 1y to recei ve IFG moni es (IFG bei ng a program of "1 ast
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resort"),
Blacks

but whites generally

also

utilized

received

Interfaith

larger cash

Disaster

Services

grants
and

from

other

IFG.
local

charitable organizations more often than whites. The greater likelihood
of blacks to use multiple aid sources reflects both their inability to
receive adequate support from fewer sources and thei r poorer insurance
coverage. Utah victims, Mormon or not, tended most often to use aid from
the Mormon Church, sometimes to the exclusion of aid from federal, state,
and

private disaster organizations

(such

as

the

Red

Cross).

In

some

instances, Utah victims did utilize SBA loans to rebuild homes, but the
Mormon Church disaster effort overshadowed other programs.
At all sites, the use of multiple aid programs typically was found
to be associated with higher levels of damage and loss, although the
pattern was more distinct in Paris and Coal inga than Kauai or Utah. On
Kauai, Japanese were the ethnic group least likely to use any assistance
program or even to visit a DAC. In a sense, their behavior was comparable to that of Mormons in Utah:

their attitude toward and use of aid

probably reflects a cultural ethic analogous to the Mormon doctrine of
self-reliance.

In Coalinga, Anglos were less

likely than Hispanics to

have used multiple programs of assistance (paralleling the situation in
Paris), but the pattern may be explained by both diffe,rences in damage
levels and the already mentioned differences in resources available to
each group.
Victims at all sites and across all ethnic groups reported that the
aid they recei ved was important in thei r recovery. Approval
somewhat lower in Paris than other sites,

rates were

and blacks there were most

likely of all groups to consider the aid they received inadequate.
There are some important differences between sites that are associated with the nature of the disaster agent and its impact. Only 9% of the
Coalinga

victims

reported

having

earthquake

insurance--reflecting

the

relative scarcity and expense of such coverage. Similarly, virtually no
one interviewed in Utah had flood insurance. On Kauai, 88% of the victims reported having coverage for wind damage, and they had far better
coverage by insurance of any kind than did Coalinga respondents.
In Paris, blacks and whites utilized insurance at essentially equal
rates, although somewhat below the level of Kauai

respondents. However,

blacks were less likely to report having adequate coverage. Still, most
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victims in both racial groups felt that the settlements they received
from their insurers were fair. Not surprisingly, whites were more likely
to have additional living expense coverage to pay for temporary housing.
This explains, in part, both their lower utilization of FEMA housing and
the fact that insurance coverage was associ ated with the economi c recovery of whites but it was not for blacks.
The possession of insurance was directly related to ethnicity and
socioeconomic status, with victims of higher status having more adequate
coverage. In general, the distribution of aid at all sites demonstrated
that assistance is typically added to insurance coverage to reduce discrepancies between losses and reimbursements. A common strategy across
groups for adapting to losses not covered by insurance or aid programs
was simply not to replace certain items. Victims who had personal
savings (typically middle and upper class) utilized them rather than
loans or grants.
At all sites, victims often utilized thebelp and support of kin,
neighbors, and/or friends. On Kauai, the receipt of such aid was clearly
related to levels of household damage, with higher loss victims being
more likely to receive help from kin or friends. The same pattern held
in Paris for both racial groups, but not in Coalinga. There, informal
aid was received by a broad range of victims and was not specifically
related to high damage levels. As a source of aid, relatives were more
important in Coalinga than on Kauai, although aid from friends and neighbors was similar for the two sites.
Because of the greater importance for Hispanics of extended family,
in Coalinga they were more likely than Anglos to have received assistance
from relatives. The white groups in Paris, Coalinga, and Kauai were more
1i kely to have recei ved aid from ~or~ than one of the three primary
groups (kin, neighbors, friends) than were the minority groups.
At all sites, the role of kin in providing moral support and emotional comfort was quite obvious, and at sites where there were relatively high rates of residential dislocation (i.e., Paris and Coalinga), the
role of relatives in providing shelter and food, especially during the
emergency period, was also particularly evident. In all cases, aid
received from informal sources was generally viewed by recipients as more
important for emotional rather than economic recovery.
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When data were gathered eight months after the respective disasters,
levels of household recovery varied among sites as well as among ethnic
groups

within

each

site.

Recovery

was

most

rapid

on

Kauai.

There,

residents were considerably more likely than victims at the other sites
to report high levels of emotional recovery. This differential

recovery

rate was probably related to the greater damage levels at the other sites
and, in the case of Coalinga, to the long-term effects of the damage to
houses and to continuing aftershocks.
Within the Kauai and Coalinga samples, the ethnic groups that had
suffered the highest levels of damage also reported the lowest levels of
economic recovery

(Caucasians and Hispanics,

respectively).

Similarly,

in Paris, a smaller proportion of blacks than whites were recovered;
however, that differential

rate was due mostly to the differing socio-

economic status of the two groups. Family size in Paris proved to be
important in recovery with, as might be suspected, small families of both
racial groups recovering economically more quickly than larger ones.
The high use of assistance programs by those with greater damage may
be related to those victims

I

needs to use the full range of programs to

mitigate their losses. This need was obviated by sound insurance coverage. Still, many of those victims who readily used assistance had not
achieved recovery by the time of these interviews. Therefore, it should
not be surprising that, in spite of the available aid, many victims-especially those belonging to ethnic minorities and those of lower socioeconomic status--reported that assistance was inadequate to meet their
needs.
Conclusions
This report is a first attempt to examine the influence of race and
ethnicity. on family recovery from disaster. Of course, concern with race
and ethnicity is essentially concern with culture and traditions, but
cultural variations are not due solely to differences in race or ethnici-ty--class

i.s

a determinant

as

well.

Social

classes

have

distinctive

values, traditions, attitudes, and ways of behaving just as do racial,
ethnic, and religious groups. Therefore, in a sense, this study attempts
to assess

the effects on disaster

response

and

recovery of cultural

variation that is itself a complex interplay of both class and ethnicity.
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Indeed, it has been impossible not to refer to certain class factors
in comparing the various ethnic groups. Class factors certainly figured
strongly in the Paris data, where victims of lower socioeconomic status
simply did not recover as quickly as did those of- higher socioeconomic
status, irrespective of race. However, data from that site also disclosed certain recovery strategies that could not be attributed directly
to class. Thus, disaster response and recovery behavior is determined by
a dynami c i nte rp 1ay of the characteri st i cs of the di saste r i tse lf, the
losses of the victims, and the complex set of family and cultural traditions, resources, and ways of responding to stress.
In this study, we have tried to select a reasonable set of variables
to examine, but as in all such enterprises, several factors may have been
overlooked or arbitrarily excluded. If the omissions are glaring, we
hope other researchers may profit from such oversights by focusing on
them in future research.
Among the few general conclusions that may be drawn from this study,
the most obvious is that poor families and large families have the most
trouble acquiring adequate aid and recovering from disaster, and are
consequently more vulnerable to a disaster. Members of ethnic minorities, particularly blacks and Hispanics, are typically more likely to
belong to such families. These families have greater numbers of nonproductive dependents, poorer insurance coverage, less money in savings
accounts, and fewer personal resources. As noted in the theoretical
discussion of stress (Chapter II), such families are under stress even
prior to a disaster and have fewer abilities (material, social, or
psychological) to cope with additional demands. Recovery policies should
recognize this fact so that social inequities will not be magnified by a
disaster.
This study found that blacks and Hispanics used multiple aid sources
in thei r~T?orts to recoup losses. Yet, they were st ill more likely than
whites to evaluate aid received as inadequate and to recover economically
more slowly. Clearly, programs for outreach to such groups must be
expanded and used in disasters involving significant numbers of blacks or
Hispanics. This recommendation is particularly pertinent for those
involved in planning for earthquakes in southern California; such earthquakes will almost certainly involve both groups.
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We also observed that certain ethnic/cultural
keep some victims out of the formal

traditions tend to

aid network. In Utah, for example,

tfie~-~Mormontradition of self-reliance, coupled with the church's elabor-

ate,

decentralized self-help system,

encouraged citizens to

use

non-

governmental aid. However, this situation is probably relatively unique;
the LOS church could only maintain a private disaster recovery program
because of its great wealth and far-reaching organization. It is unlikely that emergent or established organizations such as the Red Cross could
alone provide adequate resources following a major disaster. The Utah
case also highlighted certain organizational domain and conflict issues
that emerged when established disaster organizations had to deal with a
new and powerful aid group (the LOS Church) during response and recovery.
Again, disaster planners could profit greatly if they would anticipate
such interorganizational problems.
On

Kauai,

cultural

traditions

seemed to

keep Japanese out of the

additional

factors

sponse:

of

family

and

fo rma 1 aid

self-reliance

system.

However,

also
two

(found significant at all sites) affected thei r re-

loss levels and insurance coverage.

Loss levels, of course, are important because they create the need
that results in a search for aid, and because they are used as guidelines
for the receipt of aid.

In addition,

high

loss levels are associated

with the receipt of aid from a primary group. Beyond that, however, loss
levels

are

related

to

both

ethnicity

and

class.

Cultural

traditions

determining home sites (Kauai) and patterns of residential segregation
(Paris), and class attributes influencing choice of house type (Coalinga
and Paris) can all affect loss and the resultant need for aid. Thus even
a seemingly "objective" category such as disaster loss is underlain by
cultural and class factors.
Another revelation from this study is thatlilck .of insurance or of
act.g~quate

coverage

forces

victims

into

the

formal

aid

system.

In

Coalinga, where few victims had earthquake insurance and in Utah, where
few had flood insurance, this was quite clearly the case. At the other
two sites, inadequate (rather than nonexi stent) coverage was associated
-with victims seeking out additional sources of financial aid. In Paris,
minorHie-s and those of lower socioeconomic status were the most likely
to_J<lt-e their coverage as inadequate. Ethnicity and social class affect
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strongly insurance use and its contribution to recovery.
!
While this study attempted to provide some initial answers to the
!
,I question of race and ethnicity in long-term family recovery, the issues
are complex, interwoven, and amenable to only the broadest interpretation
at this point. At the time of these interviews--eight months following
the disasters--many families had not yet recovered fully or, in the case
of the poorest minorities, even begun to recover. Thus the families were
in or enteri ng a proces s of change (see, for example, Drabek and Key,
1984). Part of any future research program should examine the effect of
such changes on the various categories of victims over the three to five
years following impact.
Disaster recovery planners should recognize the differential access
to, and util ization of, formal and informal aid programs. It appears
that it is difficult for some disaster victims--particularly those of
lower socioeconomic class and those on fixed income--to qualify for some
programs, such as SBA loans. Failure to receive such loans or grants to
rebu il d a home can mean a 1ong-te rm dec 1i ne in the qua 1ity of 1ife and
standard of living of poorer victims. The formal aid system has proven a
key element in disaster recovery, but policies and standards that exclude minorities and the poor must be re-examined unless disasters are to
create increasingly large social inequities.
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APPENDIX A
ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTER III
TABLE 1
MONTHLY HOUSEHOLD INCOME
INCOME

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

Leas than $500

20.8% (44)

59.8% (131)

$500 - $999

32.5% (69)

29.2%

64)

$1,000 -

$1,999

32.5% (69)

9.6%

21)

$2,000 and more

14.2% (30)

1.4%

3)

n - 212

x2

_ 91.04, P

<

n -

219

.02
TABLE 2
HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD OCCUPATION

OCCUPATION

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

Unskilled Service
Worker

11.0% (22)

44.0% (81 )

Laborer

20. 0% (40)

27.7% (51)

7.5% (15)

3.8% ( 7)

Operative
Craftsmen and Kindred
Skilled Service Worker
Clerical and Sales
Farmers and Ranchers
Managers
Professionals
(~7

X

missing observations)
-99.01,P<..05

14.0% (28)

6.0% (11)

5.5% (11)

10.9% (20)

11. 0% (22)

2.7%

5)

2)

.5%

1)

21. 5% (43 )

2.2%

4)

8.5% (17)

2.2%

4)

1. 0%

(

n - 184

n - 200

TABLE

3

HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD EDUCATION
EDUCATION LEVEL

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

Lei. than High School

46.7% (98)

56.9% (124)

High School Graduate

23.8% (50)

30.3%

66)

Some College or Technical
School

14.3% (30)

8.7%

19)

College Graduate and
Post Graduate

15.2% (32)

4.1%

9)

n - 210
(3 misling observations)
X2 - 20.48, P < .05
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TABLE

4

HOUSEHOLD SIZE
NUMBER OF HOUSEHOLD
MEMBERS AT TIME OF
TORNADO

WHITE VICTIMS

2

BLACK VICTIMS

18.9% (40)

22.8% (SO)

37.7% (80)

20.S% (4S)

17.9% (38)

17.4% (38)

4

lS.1% (32)

14.2% (31 )

5 or more

10.4% (22)

2S.1% (55)

n •

212

n • 219

x2 • 24.96, P <. .OS
5

TABLE

HOUSEHOLD TYPE
WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

Non-chi1drearing
Households

61.3% (130)

47.S% (104)

Households with Dependent
Children

33.0%

70)

37.9%

83)

12)

14.6%

32)

HOUSEHOLD TYPE

Three Generation
Household

5.7%
n •

212

n • 219

x 2 • 12.97, P < .OS
TABLE

6

MARITAL STATUS OF RESPONDENT
STATUS
Harried

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

67.9% (144)

30.1% (66 )

Single

8.0%

17)

20.S% (4S)

Divorced

6.6%

14)

11.9% (26 )

Separated
Widowed

1. 4%

3)

8.7% 0.9)

16.0%

34)

28.8% (63)

n • 212
X2 • 64.43, P

< .OS
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TABLE 7
AGE OF RESPONDENT
WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

Le •• than 30 Years

17.0% ()6)

18.7% (41)

30 to 59 Years

44.8% (95)

43.4% (95)

60 Years and Older

38.2% ( 8ll

37.9% (83)

AGE GROUP

n - 212

x

2

n - 219·

- .24, N. S.
TABLE 8
DAMAGE TO RESIDENCE

PERCENT OF ROUSE
DESTROYED

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

1% - 25%

28.8% (61)

26.9% ( 59)

26% - 50%

19.8% (42)

26.9% ( 59)

75%

8.0% (17)

9.6% ( 2ll

76% - 99%

5.7% (12)

3.2% ( 7l

37.7% (80)

33.3% 03)

51%

100%

n -

212

n - 219

x2 • 4.84, N. S.
TABLE 9
DOLLAR LOSS TG HOUSE
STRUCTURE BY RACE
AMOUNT OF LOSSES
TO HOUSE

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

~5,OOO

25.3% (45)

36.5% (42)

$5,000 - $15,000

29.8% ( 53)

34.8% (40)

$16,000 - $25,000

20.8% (37)

9.6% (1ll

$26,000 - $35,000

8.4% (15)

12.2% (14)

15.7% (28)

7.0% ( 8)

Le.s than

$36,000 or more

n - 178

x2

• 14.26, P < .05
138 Missing Observations:

n - 115

132 rented their homes - 12.3% (26)
white victims; 48.4% (106) black
victims.
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TABLE 10
DAMAGE TO HOME
CONTENTS BY RACE
PERCENT OF CONTENTS
DESTROYED

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

25%

43.4% (92)

42.9% (93)

26% - 50%

14.6% (31)

22.6% (49)

51% - 75%

8.0% (17 )

6.0% (13)

76% - 99%

5.7% (12)

8.3% (18)

28.3% (60)

20.3% (44)

u -

100%

n •

x 2 • 8.19, P

212

n •

217

< .05

TABLE

11

DOLLAR LOSS TO HOME
CONTENTS BY RACE

AMOUNT OF LOSSES TO
HOME CONTENTS

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

Le.1 than $5,000

61.1% ( 118)

71.0% ( 130)

$5,000 - $10,000

22.3%

43)

21. 9%

40)

$10,100 - $15,000

5.7%

11)

3.8%

7)

$15,100 - $20,000

3.6%

7l

1.1%

2)

More than $20,000

7.3%

14)

2.2%

4)

n • 193

x2

• 9.65, P

<

.05

55 Milsing Observations
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TABLE 12

LOSSES BY VICTIM INCOME LEVELS

DAMAGE LEVELS TO HOUSE STRUCTURES
HIGH DAMAGE*

MODERATE DAMAG E*

.l!l!.lll VICTIMS
High Illcome**
Il •
62
Moderate Income**
Il •
150

30.6% (19)

69.4%

43 )

40.7% ( 61)

59.3%

89)

BLACK VICTIMS
Bigh I~
Il •
10
Moderate Illcome
Il •
209

10.0% (

90.0:

9)

1)

34.4% (72)

65.6% ( 13 7J

DAMAGE LEVELS TO ROME CONTENTS
HIGH DAMAGE***
WH ITE VI CTIMS
High Illcome
Il •
62
Moderate Income
n • 150
BLACK VICTIMS
High Illcome
Il •
10
Moderate Illcome
Il •
209

MODERATE DAMAGE***

19.4% (12)

80.6% (

32.0% ( 48)

68.0% ( 102)

(

0)

21.3% (44)

100.0% (

50)

10)

78.7% ( 163)

2 Missing Observations
*Bigh Damage (Structure) is equivalellt to 75% to 100% of structure
de s tr oye d.
Moderate Damage (Structure) is equivalent to 0-74% of structure
destroyed.
**High Income is equivalent to $1300+ earlled per month.
Moderate Income is equivalent to $0-1,299 earlled per month.
***Bigh Damage (Contents) ia equivalent to 100% of contents destroyed.
Moderate Damage (Contents) is equivalent to 0-99% of contents destroy",
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TABLE 13

NUMBER OF INJURIES WITHIN
PRIMAIlY GIlOUPS
NUMBER OF llELATIVES INJURED
NONE
ONE OR MORE
WHITE VICTIMS
11

-

212

92.9% (1971

7.1% (15)

93.2% (204)

6.8% (15)

BLACK VICTIMS
11

-

219

2
X - 0.0, N.S.

NUMBER OF FRIENDS INJURED
NONE
ONE OR MORE
WHITE VICTIMS
11

-

212

90.1% (191)

9.9% (21)

80.4% (176)

19.6% (43)

BLACK VICTIMS
11

-

219

X2 _ 7.31, P <. .05

NUMBER OF NEIGHBORS INJURED
NONE
ONE OR MORE
WHITE VICTIMS
11

-

212

87.7% (186)

12.3% (26)

87.2% (191)

12.8% (28)

BLACK VICTIMS
11

-

219

X2 - 0.0, N.S.
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TABLE

14

BUMBER OF DEATHS WITHIB
PRIMARY GROUPS
BUMBER OF RELATIVES KILLED
BOBE
ONE OR MORE
WHITE VICTIMS
11 • 212

93.9% (199)

6.1% (13)

BLACK VICTIMS
11 •
219

95.0% (208)

5.0% (11)

X2 • 0.09, N.S.
NUMBER OF FRIENDS KILLED
NONE
ONE OR MORE
WHITE VICTIMS
11 •
212

82.5% (175)

17.5%

BLACK VICTIMS
D • 219

68.9% (151)

31.1% (68)

X2 • 10.08, P

<

(37)

.05
NUMBER OF NEIGHBORS KILLED
NONE
ONE OR MORE

WHITE VICTIMS
D •

212

BLACK VICTIMS
11 • 219
X2 •

86.8% (184)

13.2% (28)

88.1% (193)

11.9% (26)

0.07, B.S.
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TAIILE

15

EMOTIONAL IMPACT OF DEATHS IN
PRIMARY CROUP
EMOTIONAL RECOVERY
INCOMPLETE

COMPLETE

54.3% (l08)
84.6% ( 11)

45.7% ( 91)
15.4% ( 2)

.!!!!!1.l! v I CTI M5
Number of Relative. Killed
Hone (n • 199)
1 or Hore (n • 13)

X2
Number of Friends Killed
None (n • 175)
1 Or Hore (n • 37)

56.6%
54.1%

.

53.8%
71.4%

<-

.05

99)
20)
X2

Number of Neighbors Killed
Hone (n • lS4)
1 or More (n • 28)

3.41, P

43.4% (76)
45.9% (7)

·

0.01, N.S.

99)
20)
x2

46.2% (85)
28.6% ( 8)

·

2.39, N.S.

BLACK~

Number of Relatives Killed
None (n • 20S)
1 or Hore (n • 11)

65.4% (136)
7)
63.6% (
X2

Number of Friends Killed
Hone (n • 151)
1 or Ho re (n • 6S)

64.2%
67.6%

·

0.0, N.S.
35.8% (54)
32.4% ( 22)

97)
46)
X2

Number of Neighbors Killed
None (n • 193 )
1 or Hore (n • 26)

34.6% (72)
36.4% (1)

·

0.11, N.S.

64.2% (124)
73.1% ( 19)
X2 • 0.45, N.S.
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TABLE

16

POST-TORNADO RESIDENTIAL CHANGES

TOTAL NUMBER OF RESIDENTIAL CHANGES

WHITE VICTIMS
High Damage
n • 80
Moderate Damage
n • 132

46.3% ( 37)

53.8% (43)

84.1% (111 )

15.9% (21)

58.9% ( 43)

41.1% (30 )

90.4% (132)

9.6% (1 Ii

61.3% ( 38)

38.7% (24 ,

73.3% (110)

26.7% (40)

60.0%

6)

40.0% ( 4)

80.9% ( 169)

19.1% (40)

60.3%

79)

39.7% (52)

85.2%

69)

14.8% (12)

76.5% (104)

23.5% (32)

85.5% ( 71)

14.5% (12 )

BLACK VICTIMS
High Damage
n • 73
Moderate Damage
n • 146
IIHITE VICTIMS
High Income
n • 62
Moderate Income
n • 150
BLACK VICTIMS
High Income
n • 10
Moderate Income
n • 209
WHITE VICTIMS
Under 60 Years of Age
n • 131
60 Years and Older
n • 81
BLACK VICTIMS
Under 60 Years of Age
n • 136
60 Year. and Older
n • 83
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TABLE

17

EFFECTS OF RESIDENTIAL CHANGES ON VICTIMS
NUMBER OF POST-DISASTER MOVES
~3

~2

VICTIM EXPERIENCES
WHITE VICTIMS
Reduced Leisure

34.5%

51)

42.2% ( 27)

Storm Related Upsets

54.7%

81)

60.9% (39)

Family Strains

19.6%

29)

31.3% (20)

n • 64

n • 148
BLACK VICTIMS

38.9%

on

Reduced Leisure

38.9% ( 68)

Storm Related Upsets

61. 7% (08)

81.8% (36 )

Family Strains

36.6% ( 64)

47.7% (21)

n • 44

n • 175

TABLE 18
FAMILY DISRUPTION DUE TO
QR5Tn~NTTA~

WHITE VICTIMS
~2
~3

Changes
Changes

BLACK VICTIMS
!:2 Changes
"2.3 Changes

CRANGE

None

Moderate

8.8% 03 )

35.4% (52)

55.8%

82)

8.4%
9.4%

7l
6)

39.8% (33)
29.7% (9)

51.8%
60.9%

43)
39)

3.5%

5)

20.6% ( 29)

75.9% (107)

5.2%

5)

23.7% (23 )
13.6% ( 6)

71.1%
86.4%

High

69)
38)

*Index ia baaed on 288 families who experienced residential change ••

TABLE 19
FAMILY DISRUPTION DUE TO
RESIDENTIAL REPAIRS
RESIDENTIAL
Rone

~

DISRUPTION

Moderate

~

Extreme

WHITE VICTIMS

8.9% (1)

50.4% (62)

40.7% (50)

BLACK VICTIMS

6.9% ( 8)

47.4% (55)

45.7% (53)

*Index is based aD 239 families lived in their homes during which repair
work val being performed.
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TABLE 20

CHANGES IN VIS InTI ON RATES
OF VICTIMS
KIN VISITATION FREQUENCY
Pre-Tornado
# of Month1! Visits

Nov. 1982
# of Monthl! Visits

~5

I ~6

52.2% (225 )

47.8% (206)

51. 5% (222)

48.5% (209)

53.3% (113)

46.7% ( 99)

52.8% (112 )

47. 2% (100 )

58.8% ( 47)

41. 3% ( 33)

57.5% ( 46)

42.5% ( 34)

50.0% ( 66)

50.0% ( 66)

50.0% ( 66)

50.0% ( 66)

51.1% ( 112)

48.9% (lon

50.2% ( 110)

49.8% (l09)

58.9% ( 43)

41.1% ( 30)

54.8% ( 40)

45.2% ( 76)

47.3% ( 69)

52.7% ( 71)

47.9% ( 70)

52.1% ( 76)

~5

:::6

VICTIMS
n • 431

.R!!l.ll

.!l£.I.1l:!.§

n • 212
High Damage
n • 80
Moderate Damage
n • 132
BLACK VICTIMS
n • 219
High Damage
n • 73
Moderate Damage
n • 146

235

Appendix A
TABLE 20 (Continued)

VISITATION FREQUENCY WITH FRIENDS
Pre-Tornado
# of Month1x Visits
~6

~S

Nov. 1982
# of Monthl! Visits
~6

:S

VICTIMS
n - 431

64.7% (279)

3S.3% (1S2)

6S.0% (280)

3S.0% (1S1)

6S.1% (138)

34.9% ( 74)

64.6% (137)

3S.4% ( 7S)

67.5% ( 54)

32.5% ( 26)

67.5% ( 54)

32.5% ( 26)

84)

36.4% ( 48)

62.9% ( 83)

37.1% ( 49)

64.4% (141)

35.6% ( 78)

65.3% (143 )

34.7% ( 76)

71. 2% ( 52)

28.8% ( 21)

74.0% ( 54)

26.0% ( 19)

61.0% ( 89)

39.0% ( 57)

61.0% ( 89)

39.0% ( 57)

WRITE VICTIMS
n - 212
High Damage
n - 80
Moderate Damage
n - 132
BLACK

63.6%

(

~

n - 219
High Damage
n - 73
Moderage Damage
n - 146

NEIGHBOR VISITATION FREQUENCIES
VICTIMS
n - 431

65.2% (281)

34.8% (150)

64.7% (279)

3S.3% (152)

69.8% (148)

30.2% ( 64)

67.5% (143)

32.5% ( 26)

68.8% ( 55)

31.3% ( 25)

67. 5%

54)

32.5% ( 26)

70.5% ( 93)

29.5% ( 39)

67.4% ( 89)

32.6% ( 43)

60.7% (133)

39.3% (86)

62.1% (136)

37.9% (83)

68.5% (100)

31. 5% (46)

68.5% (100)

31.5% (46)

56.8% ( 41)

43.2% (32)

58.9% ( 43)

41.1% (30)

WRITE~

n - 212
High Damage
n - 80

(

Moderate Damage

n - 132
BLACK VICTIMS
n - 219
High Damage
n - 146
Moderate Damage
n - 73
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TABLE

21

POST-DISASTER CHANGES III
S TAIIDARD 0 F L IV IIiG
CHAIIGES IN STANDARD OF LIVING SIIiCE STORM
LOWUED

REMAINED SAME OR RISEN

.lltt!llJ
n • 431

28.1% (121l

71. 9% ( 310)

17 .9% ( 38)

82.1% (174)

37.9% ( 83)

62.1% ( 136)

WHITE VICTIMS
n • 212
BLACK VICTIMS
n • 219
WHITE VICTIMS
High Damage
n • 80

31.3%

25 )

68.8% (

9.8%

13 )

90.2% ( 119)

High Damage
n • 73

42.5%

31l

57.5%

42)

Moderate Damage
n • 146

35.6%

52)

64.4%

94)

Under 60 Year. of Age
n • 131

15.3%

20)

84.7% ( 111l

60 Year. and Older
n • 81

22.2%

18)

77.8% (

63)

Under 60 Year. of Age
n • 136

43.4%

59)

56.6%

77)

60 Year. and Older
n • 83

28.9%

24)

71.1%

59)

Mo dera te Dama ge
n • 132

55)

BLACK VICTIMS

WHIT! VICTIMS

.!lr.!£! V I CTI MS
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TULE 22
POST-DISASTER INCREASES
IN COST OF LIVING
THOSE AGREEING WITH
THE STATEMENT THAT
n •

212

n •

219

Prices have risen
since the tor na do

48.1% ( 102)

70.8% ( 155)

My expense 8 have risen
since the tornado

40.6%

86 )

67.2% ( 147)

The coat of my housing has
risen since the storm

35.4%

75)

48.9% ( 107)

TABLE 23
STORM-RELATED FAMILY PSYCHOSOCIAL IMPACTS
PERCE NT AG REE ING
WRITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

Upsets With Storm

56.6 % (120)

65.8% (144)

SELF-REPORTED IMPACTS

Time Pressures

45.3%

96 )

49.7% ( 109)

Lack of Patience

32.1%

68)

42.9%

94)

Strained Family Re 1 at iODsh ips

23.1%

49)

38.8%

85)

Strengthened Family Ties

93.9% (199)

87.7% (192)

Decreased Importance of
Material Possessions

61.8% ( 131)

63.0% ( 138)

Increased Family Happiness

27.4% (

19.6% ( 43)

n •

58)
212

n •

219

TABLE 24
INCIDENCE OF STRAINS TN
FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS
PROPORTION OF SAMiLE REPORTING
IN FAMILY RELATIONS

STRAINS

BLACKS

WHITE
Victims Overall

23.1% (49)

38.8% ( 85)

High Loaa Victim.

35.0% (28)

42.5% (31)

Moderate L08s Victims

15.9% ( 21)

37.0% ( 54)

Under 60 Yrs. of Age

28.2% (37)

46.3% ( 63)

60 Yr •• and Older

14.8% (12)

26.5% (22)

N •
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TABLE 25

INCIDENCE OF DISRUPTIONS
IN FAMIL Y L IF!
RESPONDENTS INDICATING STORM RELATED
DISRUPTIONS OF FAMILY LIFE
WHITES

BLACKS

Vict i ....

32.1% (66)

47.0% (103)

High Da ... age

21.2% (28)

44.5%

65)

Moderate Da... age

47.5%

52.1 %

38)

Under 60 Yr •• of Age

32.1% (42j

52.2%

711

6 a Yre. of Age

29.6% (224)

38.6%

32)

(38)

TABLE 26
POST-TORNADO HOUSING IMPACT EVALUATIONS
RESPONDENTS AGREEING
RESPONDENT EVALUATION
OF HOUS ING SITUATION

WHITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

76.4% ( 162)

62.5% ( 137)

88.7% ( 188)

76.7% ( 168)

Current Hou.ing is as
Nice

a8

Pre-Tornado

Hou.ing
Satisfied With Comfort
of Current Housing
Current Rousing Better

Built and Safer
Current Housing Makes it
Difficul t to Recover

35.9%

76)

29.2%

64)

14.2%

30)

21.0%

46 )

TABLE 27

EFFECTS OF POST-DISASTER NEIGHBORHOOD
ON FAMILIES
RESPONDENTS AGREEING
RESPONDENT EVALUATION
OF NEIGHBORHOOD CHANGES

WH ITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

Neighborhood Construction
Has Been an Obstruction
to Recovery

42.5% (90)

61.6% (135)

Po.t-Disa.ter Neighborhood
i. Le.s Pleasant Than
Pre-Disa ster

43.9% (93)

74.9% (164)
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TABLE 28
EMOTIONAL IMPACTS OF THE TORNADO
SELF-REPORTED SYMPTOMS

WH ITE VICTIMS

BLACK VICTIMS

88.7% (188)

86.8% (190)

Storm

32.1% (

38.4% (

Sleeplessness

53.3% (113)

55.9% (122)

Separation*
Fear iD Children

85.6% (

91.9% (125)

Nervousness
in Stormy
Weatber

Bad Dreams
About tbe

CbildreD**
Nervous in Stormy
Weatber

77)

90.2% (10I)
N •

'*

68)

212

84)

91.8% (134)
N •

219

For fsmilie s with children responding to this question,
tbe D'S are 90 for white victims and 136 for black
victims.

**Por families with children responding to this question,
the n l 8 are 112 for white victims and 134 for black victims.

TABLE

29

STORM ANXIETY AMONG VICTIMS
RESPONDENTS EXPRESSING NERVOUSNESS
FAMILY CHARACTERISTIC

WHITES

BLACKS

Higb Damage

93.8% ( 75)
n • 80

87.7% ( 64)
n • 73

Moderate Damage

85.6% ( 113)
n • 132

86.3% (126)
n • 146

Under 60 Years of Age

90.1% ( 118)
n • 131

90.4% (123 )
n • 136

60 Years and Older

86.4: ( 70)
n • 81

80.7% ( 67)
n • 83

3 Persons or Less

87.3% ( 138)
n • 158

84.2% ( 112)
n • 133

4 or Hore Per SODS

92.6% ( 50)
n • 54

90.7% ( 78)
n • 86
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TABLE 30
lESPONDENT ATTITUDES
WHITE VICTIMS
Index Item

BLACK VICTIMS

Percent Agreeing With Statement

Many times I feel that
I have little influence
over the things that

58.5% (124)

60.7% (133)

In the long run the
bad things that happen
to us are balanced by
the good ones.

91.0% (193)

73.5% (161)

It is not always wise
to plan too far ahead
because many things turn
out to be a matter of
luck (good or bad) anyhow.

57.5% (122)

80.8% (177)

Sometimes I feel that I
donlt have enough control
over the direction my life
ia taking.

34.4% ( 73)

46.6% (102)

happen to me.

N •

212

N •

219

TABLE 31
FATALISM AND DISASTER LOSSES
AGREEMENT WITH FATALISM ITEMS*
4

WRITE VICTIMS
High Damage
n • 80
Moderate Damage

63.8% (51 )

90.0% ( 72)

65.0%

52)

40.0% (32)

55.3% (73)

91.7% ( 121)

53.0%

70)

31.1% ( 411

X2 • 1.14
.286
Sig.

X2
Sig.

.03
.870

X2
2.45
.117
Sig.

X2
1.39
.23S
Sig.

60.3% (44)

65.8% ( 48)

78.1% ( 57)

39.7% (29 )

61.0% (89)

77.4% (113 )

82.2% ( 120)

50.0% (73 )

. ..30

X2
1.67
.196
Sig.

n • 132

.

BLACK VICTIMS
High Damage
n • 73
Moderate Damage

n • 146

..

..

..

X2
X2
2.82
0.0
.093
sig.
1.000 Sig.

..

X2
Sig.

.585

..

..

*Fataliam was measured using the following statements:
1.

Many times I feel

that I have little influence over the things

that happen to me.
2.

In the long run the bad things that happen to us are balanced by
the good onea.

3.

It ia not alwaya wiae to plan too far ahead becauae many thinga
turn out to be a matter of good or bad luck.

4.

Sometime. I feel that I don't have enough control over the
direction my life i. taking.
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ADDITIONAL TABLES FOR CHAPTERS V AND VI
TABLE 1
RED CROSS DAMAGE ESTIMATES FOR HURRICANE IWA.
KAUAI. HAWAII. NOVEMBER 23. 1982

o (2

Deaths:

on Oahu)

Injuries:

7 hospitalized

Residential Damage:

Of 14,800 total housing units, 4.845 were
damaged or destroyed.
Single Familv

Destroyed:
Maj or Damage:
Minor Damage:

Apartments/Condos

209
1,134
2.699

314
292
197

FEMA's 1/5/83 estimate placed residential losses at $41 million plus
losses to public housing alone totalling $2.2 million.
Business Losses:

7S small business destroyed or sustaining major
damage; 105 small businesses were damaged altogether.

$59.5 million loss to business. excluding agriculture.
Most of this was to resort hotels and apartments.
State Agriculture Department estimated almost S15
million to facilities.

Due to island-wide power failure, nearly every
household suffered the loss of perishable food items.
In some communities electricity outages lasted over
two weeks.
An estimated S234 million in losses statewide, with
most of this impacting Kaua!.
Actual business losses are expected vary from $67
million to $151 million, depending on the recovery of
the tourist industry.

TABLE 2
COMPILATION OF INFORMATION ON
DAMAGE AND INJURIES ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE
COALINGA EARTHQUAKE, MAY 2. 1983
Deaths:

o

Injuries:

32

Major (21 hospitalized)

173

Minor

Residential Damage:

Of 2,500 housing units total, 2,092 were
damaged or destroyed (About 1000 persons
displaced) •

Single Family
Destroyed:
Major Damage:
Minor Damage:

Business Damage:

309
653
985
46

Apartments

33
39
73

of 51 Total Buildings Destroyed

141 Businesses Damaged (According to state
Office of Emergency Services report to Governor,
5/4/83)
Total Estimated Loss:

$31,076,300 ($5,947,300 of this public)
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TABLE 3
Survey Completion Summary
Coalinga

Kauai

1.

Dwelling units selected from
sampling frame

400 • 22% of
impacted
residences

521 • 13% of
impacted
residences
from 3
districts

2.

Number interviewed of initial
sample drawn

256 (64%)

417 (80%)

3.

Number of substitutions
for unlocated households

40

29

4.

Number of Hispanic families
added to assure representation
in sample

80

NA

5.

Residents moved and untraceable
(For Coalinga, 6 had moved
there after quake)

27

42

6.

Residents unable to complete
interview due to illness or
incapabity

6

7.

Refusals

77

41

8.

Residents not at home after
three attempts

24

19

9.

Total number of interviews
attempted

520

550

10.

Total number interviewed
(Completion rate)

376 (72.3%)
21% of
impacted
households

446 (18%)
11% of
impacted
households

TABLE 4
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES,
BY AGE GROUP OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent)

Caucasian

Kaua!
Japanese

AGE GROUP
(in years)
17 thru 29

13.2

6.1

30 thru 39

37.5

Anglo

Coalinga
Hispanic

8.0

20.2

38.4

13.9

14.8

27.5

19. &

21.7

1&.1

40 thru 49

16.2

19.1

22.7

50 thru 59

15.4

21.7

21.6

10.1

12.5
12.5
.9

60 thru 69

11.8

25.2

17.0

8.9

70 thru 79

4.4

11. 3

11. 4

7.4

~

~

~

~

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

136

115

88

258

112

80 and over
Total %

Respondents, NNonrespondents, N-
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TABLE 5
COHPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS III THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAI-lPLES,
BY LENGTH OF RESIDENCE (Percentl
A.

Length of Resi dence at Pre-di saster Address

YEARS
1 year
2 - 5
6 - 10
11 - 15
Over 1 5
Total 'l.

Caucasian
or 1 ess
years
years
years
years

Respondents, N=

Kauai
Japanese
4.3
17.2
19.0
16.4
43.1

7.9
28.1
15.7
19.1
29.2

19.6
34.6
13.8
10.0
21.9

lllO":O

T5Q.O

TOO:O

T5Q.O

TOlr.O

136

116

89

260

116

0

0

0

or 1 ess
years
years
years
years
years

Respondents, N=
Nonrespondents, N=

*

21.6
41.4
19.0
10.3
7.8

Length of Resi dence in the Communi tl

YEARS
1 year
2 - 5
G - 10
11 - 15
16 - 20
Over 20
Total j,

Coal inga
Anglo
Hispanic

21.3
32.4
19.9
10.3
16.2

tlonrespondents, 11=

B.

Filipino

Caucasi an

Kauai*
Japanese

7.4
23.5
15.4
13.2
8.8
31.6

6.9
6.0
6.0
6.9
74.1

6.8
14.8
10.2
9.1
59.3

iOD.O

TOO:O

136

116
0

Fil ipino

Coalinga
Hispanic
Anglo

lOQ."O

3.8
18.5
16.1
12.3
10.0
39.2

4.3
15.5
24.1
11.2
12.9
31.9

TOO:O

TOO:O

88

260

116

0

0

The disaster area for the study in Hawaii \~as the Island of Kauai,
rather than one particular cor.t;1unity. Kauai respondents were asked how
many years they had 1 ived on Kauai. Even though there are many
cOllUDunities on the various islands, we believe that one's island of
residence provides a distinct residential identity. Since the hurricane
affected virtually all of populated Kauai, residents considered the
island, and not just specific cOr.lllunities, as a disaster area.
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TABLE 6
COIIPARISON OF ETHIIlC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAlIPLES,
ilY OWNERSHIP OF DWELLING
Kauai
Caucasian Japanese

Fil ipino

Anglo

Coalinga
Hispanic

OWELLltlG
OW~ERSHIP

(Pre-disaster)
Owner of
residence

40.1

70.9

41.6

65. a

31. 9

Renter of
residence

58.4

33.8

50.0

_._4

~

58.4

26.5

Provided by
thi rd party*

~

--1..:i

Total %

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

137

116

39

260

116

0

0

0

0

0

Respondents. N=
tlonrespondents, N=

* For example, a few agricultural workers in each sample were provided
rent-free housing on the plantations or cotton farms. A fe~1 respondent
fami 1 i es 1 ived in housi ng loaned by parents. Households were coded as
renters if they said they rented their housing from their employer.
TABLE 7
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SMPLES,
BY EXTENDEDNESS OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent)
Kauai
Caucasi an Japanese Filipino
IIUIIBER OF
GENERA TI OilS
IN HOUSEHOLD
(Pre-di saster)

Coalinga
Anglo
Hi spani c

One person
househol d*

11.8

15.5

5.6

15.0

8.6

tlore than 1 person,
same generation**

27.9

38.8

37.1

25.8

26.7

Two
generat i ons ~

52.9

36.2

44.9

55.6

62.1

Three or more
generations##

~

---12

....l1..:i

~

--1..:i

Total ::;

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

135

116

89

260

116

0

0

0

Respondents, N=
Nonrespondents. N=

* Refers to one adul t, 1 iving alone.
**ilore than one adult, such as husJand and 'dife, no chil dren; or adul t
sibl i ngs.
/I Typically one or two parents and one or more minor children; can also be
adult child or couple and their parents.

IIMi nor chil dren, thei r parents, and the chil dren' s grandparent( s).
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TABLE 8
COMPARISON OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SMAPLES
BY SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD
Kauai
Caucasian Japanese Fil ipino

Coal i nga
Anglo
Hispanic

SIZE OF HOUSEHOLD
(Pre-di saster)
1 person

10.9

10.3

5.8

12.7

6.9

2 persons

27.0

26.7

23.3

24.2

15.5

3 persons

16.8

22.4

18.6

18.7

20.7

4 persons

23.4

17.2

20.9

24.2

24.1

5 persons

13.1

15.5

14.0

13.5

19.0

6 or more persons

~

---.Z.&

.JL.!

~

..ll.:.Q.

Total

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

137

116

86

260

116

3

a

a

~

Respondents. N=
ilonrespondents. N=

a
TABLE 9

COl1PARISOli OF ETHIIlC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAJ1PLES.
BY OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORY OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent)
Caucasian
OCCUP ATI mlAL
LEVEL*
Unskilled service
worker**

Kauai
Japanese

Fil i pi no

Coal i nga
Anglo
Hi spanic

13.9

11.8

10.7

17.1

23.5

Laborer

6.2

11.8

28.6

10.0

30.4

Operative

4.6

5.5

15.5

10.8

19.1

Craftsman

20.0

27.3

15.5

30.0

17.4

Skilled service
worker

.8

6.4

4.8

4.0

.9

Clerical. sales

15.4

9.1

9.5

5.2

1.7

farm &
ranch opera tor

12.3

11.8

7.1

8.8

3.5

t~anagers.

Professional
Total

~

Respondents. tl=
Nonrespondents. N=

26.9

.J.E..:.i

~

14.0

....1:2.

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

130

110

84

250

115

7

7

5

10

* For current or last he1 d job.
**Inc1 udes "never worked" (typi cally students) and housel1i yes.
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TABLE 10
COMPARISOtI OF ETHIIIC GROUPS III THE KAUAI AND COALlNGA SAI~PLES.
BY EMPLOYMENT CATEGORY OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLO (Percent)

EI~LOYr~ENT

Kauai
Caucasian Japanese

Filipino

Coalinga
Anglo
Hispanic

CATEGORY (at time
of interview)
Working full time

67.2

55.6

58.4

72.3

70.7

llorking part time

8.8

3.4

6.7

1.5

7.3

Retired

13.9

32.5

27.0

13.5

6.9

Homemaker

2.9

1.7

1.1

4.2

1.7

Di sabl ed

1.5

3.4

5.6

4.2

6.9

Unemployed

5.8

2.6

1.1

3.5

4.3

.8

1.7

Other

.9
TABLE 11

conPARISOII OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAl1PLES.
BY IIONTHLY INCOi~E CATEGORY (Percent)
Caucasian

Kauai
Japanese

Fil ipi no

Coalinga
Anglo
Hispanic

ti0NTHLY FAlHLY
IilCariE
$000 -

$600

14.2

$601 -

10.7

16.4

10.6

32.1

$800

10.4

13.1

17.8

6.5

20.8

$801 - $1000

19.8

20.2

19.2

10.6

15.1

$1001 - $1500

29.2

36.9

24.7

25.5

20.8

19.0

9.4

27.8

1.9

$1601- $2000

17.0

9.5

5.5

$2001 & over

9.4

9.5

16.4

TABLE 12
COIiPARISON OF ETHIIIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AlID COALlNGA SAI,IPLES.
BY EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF HEAD OF HOUSEHOLD (Percent)
Kauai
Caucasian Japanese

Fil ipino

Coal inga
Anglo
Hi spani c

EDUCATIONAL
LEVEL
Grade 9
or 1ess

11.3

22.1

39.5

8.5

46.6

4.0

4.4

7.0

11.6

20.7

High school
graduate

33.1

32.7

20.9

32.6

19.0

Some college or
techni cal school

29.0

21.2

17.4

27.5

10.3

College
graduate

22.6

19.5

15.1

19.8

3.4

Some hi gh
school
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TABLE 13
DWELLltlG DA!~AGE FOR KAUAI AllO COAL! NGA
DISASTER VICTIM SA:"PLES (Percent)
A.

Damage to ()o./ell ing:

Structure*

Kauai
II

');

DAMAGE (Percent)
None
25% or 1ess**
26'); - 50'j',
51'j', - 75'j',**
76'j', - 99'j',
100',!;
Total

16
226
112
44
18

...l2.

3.6
50.8
27.4
9.9
4.0
~

~

5.7
47.7
15.5
4.9
2.6
23.6

445

100.0

340

100.0

9

28

No Response
Average
Percent Damage
B.

20
165
54
17

32.8

Damage to lJo..,elling:

41.2

Contents

N

%

Ilone
25'j', or 1ess
26% - 50't
51'1'. - 75'j',
76'j', - 99~
100',!;

102
215
66
21
17
23

23.0
48.4
14.9
4.7
3.8
5.2

2
209
87
24
13
28

-L2

Total

444

100.0

363

100.0

DAMAGE (Percent)

No Response
Average
Percent Damage

2

.6
57.6
24.0
6.6
3.6

13
24.0

31.3

* Figures for Coalinga include total damage to dwelling and contents from
the initial ;~ay 2nd earthquake and from succeeding aftershocks.
**Giving a percent figure for structural damage was difficult for
apartment dwellers. For those unwilling to venture an estimate but who
characterized the damage as minor, the response was coded 25%; for those
who characterized the damage as major, the response was coded 75'); (the
latter only infrequently occurring).
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TABLE 14
COIIPAAISOII OF ETHtlIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAHPLES,
BY LEVEL OF DAHAGE (Percent)
A.

Percent of Structure Damaged
Caucasi an

Kauai
Japanese

Fil ipino

Coalinga
Anglo
HI spani c

DAJoIAGE LEVEL
None

3.6
50.4
20.4
10.9
5.8
8.8

25~
26~

or less
- 50't
5a - 75't
76~ - 99't
100't
Respondents, N=

4.5
49.4
36.0
5.6
2.2
2.2

6.5
57.3
13.8
2.9
2.1
17.5

TOii':O

TOii':O

'iOQ.O

TOD.O

136

117

89

240

0

0

0

20

Nonrespondents, tl=

B.

3.4
57.3
25.6
10.3
2.6
.9

3.7
26.2
19.6
9.3
3.7
37.4

'iOlf:O

Percent of Contents Damaged
Caucasi an

Kauai
Japanese

Filipino

Coalinga
Anglo
Hi spani c

DAl-IAGE LEVEL
None
25't or 1ess
26't - 50~
51~ - 75'l,
75$ - 99'l,
100't
Respondents, 11=

14.0
50.0
14.7
5.9
5.9
9.6

4l.4
36.2
15.5
4.3
2.6

TOlJ.O"

TTIlf.Q

136

116

24.7
56.2
11.2
3.4
3.4
1.1

roo.o
89

.4
66.4
22.0
5.4
3.1
2.7

1.0
35.6
23.8
9.6
4.8
20.2

roo.o

roo.o

259

104

0

Nonrespondents, N=

12

TABLE 15
COI·IPARISON OF ETHIHC GROUPS IN THE KAilAI AND COALINGA SAl1PLES,
BY PERCEPTION OF POST-DISASTER CONDITION (Percent)
Caucasi an

Kauai
Japanese

Fil ipino

Coalinga
Anglo
Hispanic

CONDITION
RELATIVE TO
OTHERS*
I~uch

or somewhat
better off

53.3

75.3

73.0

73.4

61. 2

About the same

3l.4

22.2

19.1

18.1

26.7

Somelihat or much
worse off
Total 't
Respondents, N=
Nonrespondents, N=

*

~

~

I:.'i

3.5

~

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

137

117

89

260

116

0

0

0

0

0

Item wording was: "In terms of all your losses, how do you think your
situation compares to others in (Coal i nga/Kauall who were a1 so affected
by the (disaster)?" Five choices, collapsed here to three, were read
for the respondent to se1 ect from.
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TABLE 16
DESTINATIONS OF DISLOCATED DISASTER VICTIMS, BY STAGE IN RELOCATION
PROCESS, FOR KAUAI AND COALINGA SAI-1PLES (Percent)
Kauai

DESTINATION
i'toved in with
rel atives
Moved in with
friends or
neighbors
Went to an
official shelter

First
r-tove

Second
Move

39.4
35.8

Coal inga
Third
Move

First
Move

7.4

2.1

33.9

13.5

11.3

11.1

4.3

7.4

6.9

5.2

Second
I~ove

Third
Move

12.1

a

0

.4

.7

a

140ved to rental
apartment or house

5.4

17 .3

34.1

2.9

17.1

42.6

Bought a house

1.8

1.9

Rented a hotel/
motel room

1.8

1.9

Camped near own
home

3.6

.6

IlA

Returned to predi saster dwell i n9
Total t
~umber

movi n9

Never 1eft own
dwell ing
Ilumber not respondi ng
I·lean number of
weeks at that
location for those
who moved again*

a

a

a

4.3

1.8

3.3

1.7

a

53.7

9.9

7.8

59.9

57.4

NA

48.5

27.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

165

162

47

283

274

115

a

a

2

a

a

a

3.8
'Ilks

6.7
'Ilks

8.4
wks

2.9
tiles

15.3
'Ilks

13.4
'Ilks

2.1

93

281

* Average, especially for First Move, is somewhat inflated by counting the
response "1 week or 1ess" as one week. Famil i es lihi ch had not 1eft thei r
third destination are not included in the length-of-stay figure for the
third move.
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TABLE 17
DISRUPTION FROl~ RESIDENTIAL DISLOCATION AIIO REPAIRS
FOR KAUAI AND COALINGA SA1"PLES (Percent)
A.

Disruption from Residential Dislocation
Kauai
Households
Ilhi ch Hoved
All
Once or 1~ore*
Househol ds

Coal inga
Households
Whi ch I~oved
All
Once or i·lore
Househol ds

DEGREE OF DISRUPTION*""

4

38.757.7
19.0- 1
17.2
11. 7
13.5
NA

3
2
1
0
Di dn' t Move
Total

j',

Respondents, N=
Nonrespondents, 11=
B.

14.1
7.0
6.3
4.3
4.9
63.4

35.255.5
20.3- 1
17.1
16.0
11 .4
IIA

26.5
15.2
12.8
12.0
8.6
24.9

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

162
1

445
1

281
2

374
2

Disrupti on from Res i denti al Repair
Kauai
Househol ds
Wh i ch I"oved
Once or i"ore*

All
Househol ds

Coal i nga
Househol ds
All
IIhich i"oved
Househol ds
Once or ;"ore

DEGREE OF DISRUPTION**
4
3
2
1
0
Didn't Do Repairs
Total '10
Respondents, N=
Nonrespondents, N=

14.5
14.9
24.3
15.1
8.6
22.5

18.938.1
19.2- 1
31.4
19.5
11.0
NA

22.340.2
17.9- 1
26.6
24.5
8.2

10.9
8.8
13.1
12.0
4.0

NA

.2l.,1.

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

342
2

444
2

183
1

375
1

* Dislocation includes short-term as well as long-term dislocations and single
as well as multiple; that is, every household out of their dI~elling one
ni ~ht or more, and no r.1atter how r.1any tiones they moved before 1 ocati n9
permanently again.

**

Measured with the item: On a scale of 0 to 4, would you rate how disrupted
your houshold has been due to [moves/damages or repairs] since the
[disaster]? 4 a Extremely disrupted; 0 = llot disrupted at all.
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TABLE 18
LOSS OF WORK DUE TO CLOSURE OF WORK PLACE, FOR HEADS OF
HOUSEHOLD IN KAUAI .~ND COALINGA SAMPLES (Percent)
Kauai
All
All Employed
Respondents Respondents

Coalinga
All Employed All Employed
Respondents
Res2ond'!nts

DURATIOII OF
CLOSURE
P1 ace of work of
head of household
not closed due to
di saster

33.9

50.2

52.6

73.0

Closed one week
or less

11.4

16.9

10.2

14.2

Closed one to
two weeks

6.5

9.6

3.5

4.9

Closed tliO to
three weeks

4.9

7.3

2.4

3.4

Closed three to
four weeks

3.8

5.6

.3

.4

Closed four weeks
or more

7.0

10.3

3.0

4.1

32.5

NA

28 •. 0

tlA

Total ('l,)

100.0

99.9

100.0

100.0

Respondents, N=

466

tlot app1 icab1e,
not working at
time of di saster

ilonrespondents, tl=

150

371

0

5

0

Not app1 icab1e, ,1=

72

5

296

299

TABLE 19
CO:~PARISON

OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI A~ID COALINGA SA.'IPLES,
BY tlUMBER OF POST-DISASTER MOVES (Percent)
Caucasi an

K3uai
Ja2anese

Filipino

Coal inga
Anglo
Hispanic

POST-DISASTER
t~OVES*

12.9

2.3

2.6

19.1

43.1

40.5

7.9

14.2

27.6

10.4

....!§..:..!

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

137

117

89

260

116

0

0

0

0

0

51.8

74.4

1.5

.9

twi ce

31.4

22.2

three times

10.2

2.6

100.0

~Io

t~oved

;~oved

:~oved four or
more time

Total

'l,

Respondents, N=
Nonrespondents, N=

73.0

30.0

moves

Hoved once

~

* Every relocation is counted, including moving back to one's pre-disaster
dlie1ling.
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TABLE 20
EfolOTIONAl STRAIN FROM THE DISASTER, COMPARISON OF
THE KAUAI AIlD COALINGA SAlo1PlES
Kauai

N
A.

B.

C.

Percent of househo1 ds
wi th one or more members
experiencing emotional
strain as a resu1 t of
the di saster

$

192

43.0

243

64.6

23

12.0

69

28.4

Percent of those
househo1 ds \~hi ch
used fonna1
counse 1 i ng for
this problem
Source of counseling
(may have used one
or more):
Professional (e.g.,
physician, social
worker, counselor)

8

51

8

20

10

9

Church-re1 ated
counsel ing
Other
O.

(H=il'4O)

Degree of strain related
to subsequent earthquake
tremors in Coalinga:
Not at all di sturbed
Somewhat di sturbed
Very di sturbed

66
203

17.6
54.0

~
376

100.0

28.5

TABLE 21
COr~PARISON

OF ETHNIC GROUPS IN THE KAUAI AND COALINGA SAMPLES.
av EflOTIONAl STRAIN FROII THE DISASTER
Kauai
Caucasian

(11~'31l*

J(~alm
=

F1Vmo

Coalinga

r=

~
(11=2-60)

C
HiSPiji
N= 6)

A.

Percent of households with some
member( s) experiencing emotional
strain*
(Number)

44.5

40.2

(61 )

(47)

38.2
(34)

69.6
(131 )

53.4
(62)

18.0

4.3

11.8

26.0

35.5

(11)

( 2)

( 4)

(47)

B.

Percent of above
total \~hich sought
counsel ing
(llumber)

(22)

* The item wording was: "A number of people we have ta1ke1 to have tol j
us about the emotional strain they have experienced from the
(di saster). Have you or anyone in your househo1 d experienced anything
similar?"

253

REFERENCES
Ahearn, F. and S. Castellon
1979
"Mental Health Problems Following a Disaster Situation."
Act~J:~~atrica y Psic~logica de America Latina 25: 58-68.
Angell, R.C.
1936
1~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~he_~~J:~~sion.

New York: Scribner.

Antunes, G., C. Gordon, C.M. Gaitz and J. Scott
1974
"Ethnicity, Socioeconomic Status and the Etiology of
Psychological Distress." Sociology and Soc~~Re~earch 58
(July): 361-368.
--Babchuck, N. and J. Ballweg
1971
"Primary Extended Kin Relations of Negro Couples."
Sociological Q.~~rterly 12: 69-77.
Bahr, H. and C. Harvey
1979
"Correlates of Loneliness Among Widows Bereaved in A Mining
Disaster." Psychological Reports 44 (April): 367-385.
Baisden, B.
1979
"Social Factors Affecting Mental Health Delivery: The Case of
Disasters." Pp. 238-241 in Sociological Research Symposium
IX. E. Lewis, L. Nelson, D. Scully, J. Scully, J. Williams,
(eds.) Richmond: Virginia Commonwealth University.
Barkun, M.
1974
Barton, A.
1970

Disaster and the Millennium.
Press:-----------------~~~~~~~~~~ __ ~~J2.~s..aster.

New Haven: Yale University

Garden City, New York: Doubleday.

Bates, F., C. Fogleman, B. Parenton, R. Pittman and G. Tracy
1963
The Social and Psychological Consequences of a Natural
Disaster. NRC Disaster Study 18: Washington: National Academy
Of Science.
Beady, C. and R. Bolin
1983 Ihe_Il~~_~the_~~~~~ Med~2~ Disast~orting to the
~_~~o_m~l!..~.
Baltimore, Maryland: Institute of Urba.n
Research, Morgan State University.
Bell, B.
1978

"Disaster Impact and Response: Overcoming the Thousand
Natural Shocks." The Gerontologist 18: 531-540.

Bell, C. and H. Newby
1971
Comm~~~. London: Praeger.

254

Birnbaum, F., Caplan and I. Scharff
1973
"Crisis Intervention After a Natural Disaster." Social
Casework
- - 54: 540-551.
Blaufarb, H. and J. Levine
1972
"Crisis Intervention in an Earthquake."
16-19.
Bolin, R.
1976

Social Work
.------

17:

"Family Recovery from Natural Disaster: A Preliminary Model."
Mass Emergencies 1: 267-277.

1981

"Family Recovery from Disaster: A Discriminant Function
Analysis of Rural and Urban Data." Family Recovery Project
Working Paper #2. Las Cruces: Department of Sociology and
Anthropology, New Mexico State University.

1982

Long-Term Family Recovery from Disaster. Monograph #36.
-Boulder: University of Colorado;-fnstitute of Behavioral
Science.

1983

"Social Support and Psychosocial Stress in Disaster." Paper
Presented at the Western Social Science Association Meetings,
Albuquerque, New Mexico. April.

1984

"Impact and Recove ry: A Compa ri son of Bl ack and IJhite
Disaster Victims." Las Cruces: Department of Sociology, New
Mexico State University.

Bolin, R. and P. Bolton
1983
"Recovery in Nicaragua and the U.S.A." The International
Journal of Mass Emergencies 1: 125-144.
Bolin, R. and D. Klenow
"Response of the Elderly to Disaster: An Age-Stratified
1983
Analysis." International Journal of Aging and Human
Development~r:-283-296.

Bolin, R. and P. Trainer
"Modes of Family Recovery Following Disaster: A Cross1978
National Study." In E. Quarantelli (ed.), Disaster: Theory
~Research. London: Sage.
Bolton, P.
1979
Boyd, S.
1981
Bucher, R.
1957

"Long Term Recovery from Disaster: The Case of Managua."
Unpublished Dissertation. Boulder: University of Colorado.
"Psychological Reactions of Disaster Victims."
Medical Journal 60: 744-748.
"Blame and Hostility in Disaster."
Sociology X: 467-475.
255

S0l!.~_~frican

Am~~~~_~l!..!:..nal

of

Buckl ey, W.
1967

Englewood Cliffs, New

Burgess, E.
1926
"The Family as a Unity of Interacting Personalities." The
~~~ 7: 3-9.
Burr, W.R.
1973

The~r:L..~ons!!,uc:.~f]._and th~2Q.c:.~ology

York: Wiley.

of

t~Family.

New

Campbell, B. and E. Campbell
1978
"The Mormon Family." Pp. 386-415 in C. Mindel and R.
Habenstein (eds.), Ethnic Families in America. New York:
Elsevier.
---------------Cantor, M.H.
1979
"Neighbors and Friends."

Research on Aging 1: 434-463.

Carlton, T.
"Early Psychiatric Intervention Following a Maritime
1980
Disaster." Military Medicine 2: 114-116.
Cavan, R. and K. Ranck
1938 The Family and the Depression. Chicago: University of Chicago

Pres-s-.----------------

Chodoff, P.
"The German Concentration Camp as a Psycholpgical Stress."
1970
Archives of General Psychol~chia~: 78-87.
Church, J.
1974

"The Buffalo Creek Disaster: Extent and Range of Emotional
and/or Behavioral Problems." Omega 5: 61-63.

Ciborowski, A.
1967
"Some Aspects of Town Reconstruction (Warsaw and Skopje)."
Impact 17: 31-48.
Clifford, R.A.
1956
"The Rio Grande Flood: A Comparative Study of Border
Communities." National Research Council Disaster Study #7.
Washington: National Academy of Science.
Committee on Natural Disasters
1984 The Utah Landslides, Debris Flows and Floods of May and June
1983. Washingto-n: National Academy Press.
Cooley, W.W. and P.R. Lohnes
1971
Multivariat..!:.J~.~-~_~_}ni~..1.1..~~. New York: Wiley.
Davis, I.
1977

"Emergency Shelter."

Qlsas~ers

256

1 (1): 23-40.

Dohrenwend P.
1966
"Social Status and Psychological Disorder: An Issue of
Substance and an Issue of Method." American Sociological
Revi ew 31 (February): 14-34.
Drabek. T.
1969

"Social Processes in Disaster: Family Evacuation." Social
Problems 16 (Winter): 336-349.

Drabek. T. and K. Boggs
1968
"Families in Disaster: Reactions and Relatives." .Journal
- - - - -of
Marriage and the F~_~ 30 (August): 443-451.
Drabek. T. and W. Key
1984 I~~~uering Disaster: Family ~~covery~~~_~~~~-Term
Consequences. New York: Irvington.
Drabek. T.E •• W.H. Key. P.E. Erikson and J.L. Crowe
1975
"The Impact of Disaster on Kin Relationship."
t~arriage and the FamUx 37 (August): 443-451.

Journ'!.~of

Dudasik. S.
1980
"Victimization in Natural Disaster." Q.i2'!.s_ters 4 (3):
329-338.
Erikson. K.
1976
Everything in its Path. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Farris. B.E •• and N.D. Glenn
1976
"Fatalism and Familism Among Anglos and r~exican Americans in
San Antonio." Sociology and Social Research 60 (July):
393-402.
Flynn. C.B. and J.A. Chalmers
1980 The Social and Economic Effects of the Accident at Three Mile
Island. Tempe. Arizona: Mountain West"-Research. Inc. with
Social Impact Research. Inc.
Frederic. C.
1977
"Current Thinkiny About Crisis or Psychological Intervention
in United States Disasters." Mass Emeryencies 2: 43-50.
Fried. M.
1966

"Grieving for a Lost Home." Pp. 359-379 in Wilson (ed.).
Urban Renewal. Cambridge. Massachusetts: MIT Press.

Friedsam. H.
1961
"Reactions of Older Persons to Disaster-Caused Losses: An
Hypothesis of Relative Deprivation." The Gerontologist 1:
34-37.
Gaity. C.M. and J. Scott
1972
"Age and the Measurement of Mental Health."
and Social Behavior 13 (March): 55-67.
257

.':1.~l!.r:n.2..L~_Health

Gleser, G., B. Green and C. Winget
1981
Prolonged Psychosocial Effects of Disaster: A Study of
Buffalo Creek. New York: Academic Press.
Golec, J.
1982

"A Contextual Approach to the Social Psychological Study of
Disaster Recovery." Paper presented at the lOth World
Congress of Sociology, Mexico City.

Greenson, R. and T. Mintz
"California Earthquake 1971: Some Psychoanalytic
1972
Observations." International Journal of Psychoana~
~~<:. hott:!.er'!P.l 1 (5): 7-23.
Haas, J.E. and T. Drabek
"Community Disaster and System Stress: A Sociological
1970
Perspective." In J.E. McFrath (ed.), Social and Psychological
Factors in Stress. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Hansen, D. and R. Hill
1979
"Rethinkiny Family Stress Theory: Definitional Aspects." In
W. Burr, R. Hill, 1. Reiss, 1. Nye (eds.), Contemporary
Theories About Family, Volume I. New York: Free Press.
Henderson, D. and T. Bostock
1977
"Copiny Behaviour after Shipwreck." British Journal of
Psychiatry 131: 15-20.
Hi 11, R.
1949
1958

Fami~ie~_Und~~_~tress.

New York: Harper.

"Sociology of Marriage and Family Behavior 1945-1956: A Trend
Report and Bibliography." Current Sociology 7: 1-98.

Hill, R. and D. Hansen
1962
"Families in Disaster." In G. Baker and D. Chapman (eds.),
Man and Society in Disaster. New York: Basic Books.
Hocking, F.
1965
"Human Reactions to Extreme Environmental Stress." The
Medica~':!..our~~Australia 2 (September 18): 247-250.
1970
Hogg, R.
1980

"Psychiatric Aspects of Extreme Environmental Stress."
Disease of the Nervous System 31: 542-545.
"Pastoralism and Impoverishment: The Case of the Isiolo Boran
of Northern Kenya." Disast_~rs 4 (3): 299-310.

Holdren, J.
1982
"Energy Hazards: What to Measure, What to Compare."
Tect:!.f!..~logy Revi....ew 85 (3): 32-38.

258

Houts, P., R. Miller, K. Ham and G. Tokuhata
1980
Health Related Behavioral Impact of the Three Mile Island
Nuclear Accident, Parts I and II. Harrisburg: Pennsylvania
Department of Health.
Huerta, F. and R. Horton
"Coping Behavior of Elderly Flood Victims."
1978
(12): 541-546.
Hunter, A.
1974
1975

Symb~~~ommun~ties.

~eront~l_~g_~

18

Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

"The Loss of Community: An Empirical Test Through
Replication." American Sociological Review 40: 537-552.

Instituut voor Sociaal Onderzoek van her Nederlandse Volk Amsterdam
1955
Studies in the Holland Flood Disaster 1953, Volumes I-IV.
Washington: National Academy of Science.
Jackson, J.
1971
"Negro Aged: Toward Needed Research in Social Gerontology."
The Gerontologist 22: 52-57.
Janis, 1.
1951

Air War and Emotional Stress: Psychological Studies of
Bombing and Civilian Defense. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Kahn, R. and T. Antonucci
1980
"Convoys Over the Life Course: Attachment, Roles and Social
Support." In Baltes and Brim (eds.), Life ~an Development
and Behavior. New York: Academic Press.
Kantor, D. and W. Lehr
1975
Inside the Family: Toward a Theory of Family Process. San
Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
Kephart, W.
1980 Ext raordi l2.~y ...§.r::.~. New York: St. Mart ins.
Kessler, R.
1979
"A Strategy for Studying Differential Vulnerability to the
Psychological Consequences of Stress." Journal of Health and
Social Behavior 20: 10U-I08.
Kilijanek, T. and T. Drabek
1979
"Assessing Long-Term Impacts of a Natural Disaster: A Focus
on the Elderly." The Gerontologist 19: 555-566.
Kinston, W. and R. Rosser
1974
"Disaster: Effects on Mental and Physical State." Journal of
Psychosomat~c Res~arch 18 (December): 437-456.

259

Kliman, A.S.
1976
"The Corning Flood Project: Psychological First Aid Following
a Natural Disaster." Pp. 325-335 in H.J. Parad, H.L.P.
Resnik, L.G. Parad (eds.), Emergency and Disaster Management:
~fient~ Heal~2.0urcebook. Bowie, Maryland:
Charles Press.
Knaus, R.L.
"Crisis Intervention in a Disaster Area: The Pennsylvania
1975
Flood in Wilkes-Barre." Journal of the American Osteopathic
Association 75 (November): 297-301.
Koos, E.
1946

Families in Trouble. Morningside Heights, New York: Kings
Crown Pres 5.-----

Lacey, G.N.
1972
"Observations on Aberfan."
16: 257-260.
Lee, G.R.
1980

Journ~Cl..!.~chosomatic

Research

"Kinship in the Seventies: A Decade Review of Research and
Theory." Journal of ~larriage and the Family 42 (4): 923-934.

Leivesley, S.
1977
"Toowoomba: Victims and Helpers in an Australian Hailstorm
Disaster." Disas!..~ 1 (3): 205-216.
Levine, A.
1981

"Love Canal." Paper presented at the Meetings of the Eastern
Sociological Society, New York. March.

Lifton, R.J.
1967
Survivors of Hiroshima: Death in Life. New York: Random
House-.- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - Lifton, R.J. and E. Olson
1976
"The Human Meaning of Total Disaster."

Psych~atry

39: 1-18.

Lin, N., R. Simeone, W. Ensel and W. Kuo
1979
"Social Support, Stressful Life Events and Illness: A Model
and an Empirical Test." Journal of Health and Social
Behavior 20: 108-119.

Lindell, M., R. Perry and M. Greene
1980
"Race and Disaster Warning Response." Seattle, Washington:
Battelle Human Affairs Research Centers.
Lindy, J.D., M.C. Gruce and B.L. Green
1981
"Survivors: Outreach to a Reluctant Population." American
Journal of Orthopsychiatry 5 (July): 468-478.

260

Lipman-Blumen, J.
1975
"A Crisis Framework Applied to Macrosociological Family
Changes. Marriage, Divorce, and Occupational Trends
Associated with World War II." Journal of Marriage and the
Family 27 (November): 889-902. -------------------Logue, J.N., H. Hansen, and E. Struening
1981
"Public Health Reports." 96 (1): 67-79.
Loizos, P.
1977

"A Struggle for Meaning: Reactions to Disaster Amongst
Cypri ot Refugees." Di sast~ 1 (3): 231-239.

Lomnitz, C.
1970
"Casualties and Behavior of Populations During Earthquakes."
Bulletin of Seismological Society of America 60 (August):
1309-1313.
Lopata, H.
1978

"Contributions of Extended Families to the Support Systems of
Metropolitan Area Widows: Limitations of Modified Kin
Network." Journal of Ma~_riage and t_~_~_~~mily 40 (May):
355-366.

Lucas, R.A.
Men in Crisis: A Study of a Mine Disaster. New York: Basic
1969
Books.
Lumsden, D.
"Toward a Systems Hodel of Stress: Feedback from an
1975
Anthropological Study of the Impact of Ghana's Volta River
Project." In G. Sarason and C. Spielberger (eds.), S_yes~and
Anxiety. Washington, D.C.: Hemisphere.
McAdoo, H.
1978

"Factors to Stability in Upwardly Mobile Families." Journal
of Marriage and the Family 40: 762-778.

McCubbin, H.
1979
"Integrating Coping Behavior in Family Stress Theory."
Journal of Marriage and t~ami~ 41: 237-244.
1980
Madsen, W.
1964

"Family Stress and Coping: A Decade Review."
Marriage and the Family 42 (4): 855-871.

Journ~LJi.

The Mexican Americans of South Texas. New York: Holt,
and Winston.

~inehart

Martin, E. and J. Martin
1978 The Black Extended Family. Chicago: University of Chicago
-Press.

261

Melick, M.
1976

"Social, Psychological and Medical Aspects of Stress Related
Illness in the Recovery Peri od of a Natural Di saster."
Dissertation
Abstracts International 37: 1239A-1240A.
-----------

Mileti, D., T.E. Drabek and J.E. Haas
Hum~~stems in Extreme Environments. Monograph #21.
1975
Boulder: University of Colorado, Institute of Behavioral
Science.
Miller, J., J. Turner and E. Kimball
1981
"Big Thompson Flood Victims: One Year Later." Family
Relatio~~ 30 (1): 111-116.
Milne, G.
1977

"Cyclone Tracy: Some Consequences on the Evacuation for Adult
Victims." Aust~~~~chologist 12: 39-54.

Minnis, M. and P. McWilliams
1971
Tornado: The Voice of the People in Disaster and After.
Lubboc~exas Tech University.
Mi rowsky, J. and C. Ross
1980
"Minority Status, Ethnic Culture and Distress: A Comparison
of Blacks, Whites, Mexicans, and Mexican Americans." American
Jou~~~~!. Soci_~logy 86 (3): 479-495.
Mitchell, W.A.
1976
"Reconstruction After Disaster--Gediz Earthquake of 1970."
Geographical Rev~ew 66 (3): 296-313.
Mitchell, W.A. and T.H. Miner
1978
"Environment, Disaster, and Recovery: A Longitudinal Study of
the 1970 Gediz Earthquake in Western Turkey." Colorado
Springs, Colorado: USAF Academy, Department of Economics,
Geography and Management.
Moore, H.E.
1964 And the Winds Blew. Austin: Hugg Foundation for Mental
Heaitf1;lJrllvers ity of Texas.
Newman, C.J.
1976
"Children of Disaster: Clinical Observations at Buffalo
Creek." American_ Journal of Psychiatry 133 (March): 306-312.
O'dea, T.
1957

I~e

Mormons. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ollendick, D.G. and Sister M. Hoffman
1982
"Assessment of Psychological Reactions in Disaster Victims."
~~~~~L.E.!. Com"!.~~__~c~.!.~~ 10 (2): 157-167.

262

Parker, G.
1975

1977

"Psychological Disturbance in Darwin Evacuees Following
Cyclone Tracy." Medical Journal of Australia 1 (Hay 24):
650-652.
"Cyclone Tracy and Darwin Evacuees: On the Restoration of the
Species." British Journal of Psychia~ 130 (June):
548-555.

Pa rsons, T.
1951
The Social System. Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press.
Perry, R.W. and M.K. Lindell
1978
"The Psychological Consequences of Natural Disaster: A Review
of Research on American Communities." Mass Emergencies 3:
105-115.
Perry, H.S. and S. Perry
1959
The Schoolhouse Disasters: Family and Community as
Determinants of the Child's Response to Disaster. Washington:
National Academy of Science/National Research Council.
Perry, R.W., M. Lindell and M. Green
1980
"Evacuation Decision Making and Emergency Planning."
Seattle, Washington: Batelle Human Affairs Research
Centers.
Price, J.
1978

"Some Age-Related Effects of the 1974 Brisbane Floods."
Australian and New Zealand Journal of Psychiatry 12: 55-58.

Quarantelli, E.L.
1979
The Consequences of Disasters for Mental Health: Conflicting
Views. t1onograph #62. Columbus: Disaster Research Cenfer-,-O~State University.
1982

Shelteri ng and Housi ng After Major_<=-~~IT!.l!.!:!.iJ:,y_Di sasters: _Case
Studies and General Conclusions. Columbus: Disaster Research
Center, OhiOState Universl~

Raphael, B.
1977
"The Granville Train Disaster--Psychological Needs and Their
Management." The Medical Journal of Australia 1 (February):
303-305.
---.------------Richard, W.C.
1974
"Crisis Intervention Services Following Natural Disaster:
The Pennsylvania Recovery Project." Journal of Community
Psychology 2 (July): 211-219.
Ritzer, G.
1983

.Sociological Theory. New York: Knopf.

263

Sega 1, J.
1974

Psychological and Physical Effects of the POW
Experience: A Review of the Literature. Unpublished
~anuscript. San Diego, California: Center for POW Studies,
Naval Health Research Center.
~~~g-Term

Si nger, T.J.
1982
"An Introduction to Disaster: Some Considerations of a
Psychological Nature." Aviation, Space and Environmental
Medicine 53 (March): 245-250.Skolnick, M., L. Bean, P. May, V. Arbon and P. Cartwright
1978
"t4ormon Demographic History I." Population Studies 32 (1): 519.
Snedecor, G.W. and W.G. Cochran
1976
Statistical Methods. Sixth Edition. Ames: Iowa State
University Press.
Stack, C.
1974

All Our Kin: Strategies for Survival in a Black Community.
New York: Harper.

Staples, R.
1976
Introduction to Black Sociology. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Staples, R. and A. Mirande
1980
"Racial and Cultural Variations among American Families: A
Decennial Review of the Literature on Minority Families."
Journal of Marriage and the Family 42: 887-904.
Suttles, G.
1972
Social Constr'uction of Communities. Chicago: University of
Chicago-Press. - - - - - - - - - - - Taylor, V.A.
1977
"Good News About Disasters." Psychology Today 11 (5): 93.
Taylor, J.B., L.A. Zircher and W.H. Key
1970
Tornado: A Community Responds to Disaster. Seattle:
University of Washington Press.
Tierney, K.J. and B. Baisden
1979
Crises Intervention Programs for Disaster Victims: A
Sourcebook and Hanual for Smaller Communities. Rockville,
Maryland: National Institute of Mental Health.
Tierney, K.
1985
Report on the Coalinga Earthquake of May 2, 1983. Report #SSC
85-01. Sacramento: California Seismic Safety Commisssion.
Titchener, J.L. and T.T. Kapp
1976
"Family and Character Change at Buffalo Creek." American
Journal of Psychiatry 133: 295-299.
264

Trainer, P. and R. Bolin
1976
"Persistent Effects of Disasters on Daily Activities: A
Cross-Cultural Comparison." Mass Emer9.~ncie~ 1: 279-290.
Wallace, A.F.C.
1956
"Tornado in Worcester: An Exploratory Study of Individual and
Community Behavior in an Extreme Situation." NRC Committee on
Disaster Studies 3. Publication #392.
-------Warheit, G.J., C.E. Holzer, R.A. Bell, and S.A. Arey
1976
"Sex, Marital Status, and Mental Health: A Reappraisal."
So~~a~~q[ces 55 (December): 459-470.
Wellman, B.
1974
"The Network City." In M. Effrat (ed.),
York: Macmillan.

~_~~munity.

New

Western, J.S. and G. Milne
1979
"Some Social Effects of a Natural Hazard: Darwin Residents
and Cyclone Tracy." Pp. 488-502 in R.L. Heathcote and B.G.
Thomas (eds.), Natural Hazards in Australia. Canberra:
Australia Academy or-Sclence:-----------Wettenhall, R.
1979
"Organization and Disaster: The 1967 Bushfires in Southern
Tasmania." Pp. 431-502 in R.L. Heathcote and B.G. Thomas
(eds.), Natural Hazards in Australia. Canberra: Australia
Academy of Science.
Young, M.
1954

"The Role of the Extended Family in a Disaster." Human
7: 383-391.

Relations
--Zusman, J.
1976

"Meeting Mental Health Needs in a Disaster: A Public Health
View. In J. Parad, H.L.P. Reznik, L.G. Parad (eds.),
Emergency and Disaster Management: A Mental Health
Sourcebook. Bowie, Maryland: Charles Press.

265

Monograph Series
Program on Environment and Behavior
Institute of Behavioral Science #6, Campus Box 482
University of Colorado
Boulder, CO 80309
The following monograph papers may be obtained from the Natural
Hazards Research and Applications Information Center, located at the
above address. The monographs may be purchased on an individual basis
($8.00 or $10.00*) or as part of a subscription ($7.00 each).
#023

Farhar, Barbara C. and Julia Mewes.
Social Acceptance of
Weather Modifi cat ion: The Emergent South Dakota Cont roversy.
1975, 204 pp.

#024

Farhar, Barbara C., Ed.
Environment. 1977,293 pp.

#025

Kates, Robert, Ed.
Managing Technological Hazard:
Needs and Opportunities. 1978, 175 pp.

#026

Kunreuther, Howard, et al. An Interactive Modeling System for
Disaster Policy Analysis. 1978, 140 pp.

#029

Drabek, Thomas E., et ale The Flood Breakers: Citizens Band
Radio Use During the 1978 Flood in the Grand Forks Region.
1979, 129 pp.

#031

Mileti, Dennis S., Janice R. Hutton, and John H. Sorensen.
Earthquake Prediction Response and Options for Public
Policy. 1981, 150 pp.

#032

Palm, Risa. Real Estate Agents and Special Studies Zones Disclosure: The Response of Californla Home Buyers to Earthquake
Hazards Information. 1981,147 pp.

#033

Drabek, Thomas E. , et a1 •
Managi ng Mult i organi zat i ona 1
Emergency Responses:
Emergent Search and Rescue Networks in
Natural Disaster and Remote Area Settings. 1981, 225 pp.

#034

Warrick, Richard
1981, 150 pp.

#035

Saarinen, Thomas F., Ed.
ness. 1982, 200 pp.

#036

Bolin, Robert C.
1982, 281 pp.

#037

Drabek, Thomas E., Alvin H. Mushkatel, and Thomas S.
Kilijanek. Earthquake Mitigation Policy:
The Experience of
Two States. 1983, 260 pp.

#038

Palm, Risa 1., et ale
Home Mortgage Lenders, Real Property
Appraisers and Earthquake Hazards. 1983, 163 pp.

A.,

et

Hail

al.

Suppression:

Society and
Research

Four Communities Under Ash.

Cultivating and Using Hazard Aware-

Long- Term Fami ly Recovery from Di saster.

#039*

Sa 11 i eA. Ma r s ton, ed •
. .:.T: :.e:. :rl.:.:.nl:. ;.n.:.:a:...:l_:::.D..:,.i
"
:;;sa::..:s:.:t:.:e:..:,r,::s..:.:_---'C::..:o:...:m:.r:p-=u..:.t.::..e:....r
Applications in Emergency Management. 1986, 218 pp.

#040

Blair, Martha L., et al. When the Ground Fails: Planning and
Engineering Response to Debris Flows. 1985, 114 pp.

#041*

Rubin, Clai re B., et al.
Disaster. 1985, 295 pp.

Community Recovery From a Major

The following publications in the monograph series may be obtained
from National Technical
Information Service, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Springfield, Virginia 22161.
#002

Friedman, Don G.
Computer Simulation in Natural
Assessment. 1975,194 pp. PB 261755; $7.75.

Hazard

#003

Cochrane, Harold C.
Natural Hazards and Their Distributive
Effects. 1975,135 pp. PB 262 021; $6.00.

#004

Warrick, Richard A., et al.
Drought Hazard in the United
States:
A Research Assessment. 1975, 199 pp. PB 262 022;
$9.25.

#005

Ayre, Robert S., et al. Earthquake and Tsunami Hazard in the
United States:
A Research Assessment.
1975, 150 pp.
PB 261 756; $8.00.

#006

White, Gilbert F., et al.
Flood Hazard in the United
States: A Research Assessment. 1975. 143 pp. PB 262 023;
$14.00.

#007

Brinkmann, Waltraud, A. R., et al.
Hurricane Hazard in the
United States:
A Research Assessment.
1975, 98 pp.
PB 261 757; $5.50.

#008

Baker, Earl J. and Joe Gordon-Fel dman McPhee.
Land Use
Manayement and Regulation in Hazardous Areas:
A Research
Assessment. 1975, 124 pp. PB 261 546; $12.50.

#009

Mileti, Dennis S. Disaster Relief and Rehabilitation in the
United States:
A Research Assessment.
1975, 92 pp.
PB 242 976; $4.75.

#010

Ericksen, Neil J.
Scenario Methodology in Natural
Research. 1975, 170 pp. PB 262 024; $7.50.

#011

Brinkmann, Waltraud A. R., et al. Severe Local Storm Hazard
in the United States: A Research Assessment. 1975, 154 pp.
PB 262 025; $6.75.

#012

Warrick, Richard A.
Research Assessment.

#013

Mileti, Dennis
United States:
547; $6.50.

Hazards

Volcano Hazard in the United States:
1975, 144 pp. PB 262 026; $6.75.

S.
Natural Hazard Warning Systems
A Research Assessment. 1975, 99 pp.

in the
PB 261

#014

Sorensen, John H. wi th J. Kenneth Mitchell. Coastal Erosi on
Haza rd in the United States: A Research Assessment. PB 242
974; $4.75.

#015

Huszar, Paul C.
Frost and Freezi ng Hazard in the United
States: A Research Assessment. PB 242 978; $4.25.

#016

Sorensen, John H., Neil J. Ericksen and Dennis S. Mileti.
Landslide Hazard in the United States:
A Research
Assessment. PB 242 979; $4.75.

#017

Assessment of Research on Natural
Avalanche Hazard in the United
Assessment. PB 242 980; $5.25.

Hazards
States:

staff.
A

Snow
Research

#018

Cochrane, Harold C. and Brian A. Knowles. Urban Snow Hazard
in the Un ited States:
A Research Assessment. PB 242 977;
$4.75.

#019

Brinkmann, Waltraud A. R.
Local Windstorm Hazard in the
United States: A Research Assessment. PB 242 975; $5.00.

#020

Ayre, Robert S.
Technological
Hazards. PB 252 691; $4.50.

#021

Mileti, Dennis S., Thomas E. Drabek and J. Eugene Haas. Human
Systems
in
Extreme
Environments:
A Sociolo9lCal
Perspective. 1975, 165 pp. PB 267 836; $14.00.

#022

Lord, William B., Susan K. Tubbesing and Craig Althen. Fish
and Wildlife Implications of Upper Missouri Basin Water
.;,;A'i'-"'",;,0c;;;a;:...t~l",o;:.nc...:.:---'-"""rA~....:R.:..:e:..::sc::ec::a-,--r-=-ch,-,----,--,A=-ss:. : e:. :s:. : s: :.m",e.:. :.n-=-t.
197 5 , 11 4 PP •
PB 255 294; $11.00.

#027

Tubbesing, Susan K., Ed.
Natural Hazards Data Resources:
Uses and Needs. 1979, 202 pp. PB 194 212; $11.

#028

Lord, William B., et al. Conflict Management in Federal Water
Resource Planning. 1979, 114 pp. PB 300 919; $11.00.

#030

Platt, Rutherford, et al.
Floodplains. 1980, 317 pp.

Adjustments

to

Natural

Intergovernmental Management of
PB 194 904; $24.50.

